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ABSTRACT 
Whistleblowing is a valuable check on action in the public and private sectors. This 
paper considers whether the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 will effectively reform the 
law for whistleblowers. In analysing that issue this paper looks at the problems there are 
with the current law, whether reform is needed, what the reform options are, and 
whether reform would be effective. It is concluded that the current law leads to 
uncertainty and inadequate protection for whistleblowers. Reform is needed. When 
considering options for reform this paper concludes that a two-pronged approach would 
be the most likely and effective option to alleviate the current problems. That approach 
is to have reform via a statute and industrial reform encouraging employers to have 
internal mechanisms for whistleblowers. It is recognised that no reform would be 
absolutely successful countering the more subtle reprisals suffered by whistleblowers, 
but it is concluded that encouraging a more positive and supportive environment for 
whistleblowers could make those kinds of reprisals less common. It is also recognised 
that any reform must ensure that there is balance between the rights of whistleblowers 
and the rights of those named by whistleblowers. Intentionally false disclosures should 
be vigorously punished. 
In the light of those conclusions the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 is considered. It is 
compared with the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 and Acts and Bills from other 
countries, in particular Australia. This analysis reveals the Protected Disclosures Bill to 
be deeply flawed. It sets up an extremely detailed and onerous set of procedures, 
effectively discouraging whistleblowing. Even more problematic than that, the Bill 
expressly preserves the common law, which runs counter to many of its provisions. The 
Protected Disclosures Bill is also toothless when it comes to protections from reprisals, 
leaving it to the whistle blower to take action. None of this leads to clarification of the 
existing law nor to any certainty for whistleblowers. Perhaps more forebodingly, given 
that there seems no major corruption in New Zealand, it seems unlikely that a Bill in 
this area will have high priority in a coalition or minority MMP Parliament. 
This paper concludes that a new Bill is needed. A proposal of such a Bill forms the 
Appendix I of this paper. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding footnotes, bibliography and annexures) comprises 
approximately 15, OOO words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper starts with the premise that whistleblowing is a useful check in the public 
interest. For that reason it ought to be valued and a whistleblower ought to be protected 
from reprisal. This paper analyses the question of whether the law surrounding 
whistleblowing and whistleblowers needs reform. Specifically this paper considers what 
reform options there are, and whether the recently proposed Protected Disclosures Bill 
1996 provides any useful progress. 
When considering whether reform is needed this paper looks at the current legal 
situation. This paper concludes that whistleblowers face problems that are not 
adequately remedied by the current available protections, and that the protections 
themselves are unclear in scope and effect. It is also unclear how some of the law in this 
area interacts. This paper also considers the question of whether any reform would be 
effective in this difficult area in any case. It is concluded that the value of 
whistleblowing in the light of the contemporary emphasis on accountability, the 
evidence of reprisals suffered by whistleblowers and the confusion surrounding what 
legal protections are currently available for whistleblowers all mean that some sort of 
reform is needed. 
This paper looks at two options when considering reform. Reform by legislation is one 
option. There are a number of different ways that legislation could reform this area. For 
instance it could set up a separate Authority or it could encourage internal 
whistleblowing. The problem with legislative reform in a difficult area such as this is 
that any reform will not completely alleviate the problems. General industrial reform is 
the other reform option looked at. It could be initiated by ensuring that there are internal 
whistleblowing mechanisms in every organisation. That could be achieved by a statute 
which impliedly encourages such internal mechanisms or by a movement in the 
industrial area requiring such mechanisms to be included in employment contracts. The 
problem with this option alone is that there is likely to be inconsistent treatment of 
· whistleblowers. It is concluded that legislative reform and industrial reform together is 
the best option for reform. It is also considered to be the most palatable reform for all of 
the interest groups involved. 
The Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 has recently been introduced into Parliament. This 
Bill is analysed in some detail. It follows an earlier private member's bill, the 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994. The two Bills are compared and the analysis 
reveals them to be markedly different. Comparisons are also made between the New 
Zealand Bills, and Acts and Bills from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America. The analysis shows that the Protected Disclosures Bill is flawed. The 
Bilf will do little for whistleblowers, it will add to and not alleviate the problems with 
the current situation and, in New Zealand's new MMP era, such a Bill seems unlikely to 
gain the widespread enthusiasm of pressure groups nor to be a high priority for a 
minority or coalition government. 
Appendices II and III set out the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994, the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW), the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT), the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and the 
LAW LIBRARY 
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Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia). Those are the Acts and Bills that 
are most extensively analysed in this paper, although others are considered and referred 
to . Appendix I sets out my own proposed Bill which is called the Public Interest 
Disclosure Bill 1996 so that it is easy to distinguish from the other New Zealand Bills. 
This proposal is, in part, a compendium of the best aspects from the Acts and Bills 
analysed. It also contains some radical proposals to encourage whistleblowing. It is 
contended that this proposal alleviates the problems revealed in the analysis of the 
Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 by proposing a two-pronged approach to reform and 
encouraging and actively protecting whistleblowers. 
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II THE CURRENT LAW AND WHISTLEBLOWING 
A Introduction 
For the purposes of this paper I adopt the definition of "whistleblower" used by the 
Ministerial Review Team on Whistleblowing in their report: 1 
A "whistleblower" is a person (usually an employee) who notifies some other person (usually in 
authority) ofan activity being conducted within an organisation which breaches the law, or constitutes a 
risk to a specific interest, (such as a risk to public health or public safety, or to an individual's health or 
safety, or to the environment). The motivation for such a disclosure is usually a concern to have the 
matter at issue remedied or addressed, either by the organisation itself, or by some external agency in the 
public interest. 
Noticeable about this definition is that a whistleblower is someone who discloses 
information in the public interest. For that reason whistleblowing ought to be valued and 
encouraged, and whistleblowers ought to be protected. Whistleblowing encourages 
accow1tability and ensures that standards are high. Further analysis of who is a 
whistleblower appears below in Part IV of this paper. That analysis considers 
specifically who ought to be covered by any reforming protective legislation. This paper 
considers the problems faced by whistleblowing employees. It is recognised however 
that it is not just employees who blow the whistle. 
Whistle blowing is prima facie a breach of the contract of employment. Employees owe 
a duty of good faith and fidelity to their employer. This duty is to preserve the mutual 
trust and confidence on which the employment relationship is based . As a reflection of 
that duty either as an express or implied term in the employment contract an employee 
cannot misuse confidential information belonging to the employer. At present an 
employee who blows the whistle is in breach of the implied term of contract not to 
misuse confidential information belonging to their employer. Once that term is breached 
by a whistleblowing employee, an employer has grounds for dismissal.2 The employer 
could also take a breach of confidence action. This has the advantage of being effective 
against a whistle blowing employee after the end of employment and against third 
parties who subsequently receive the confidential information. Another advantage is that 
1 Report of the Ministerial Review Team on Whistleblowing (20 October 1995) page 4. Some 
commentators have cringed at the term "whistleblower". The Ministerial Review Team (at p 4) compared 
the word to "snitch" "stool pigeon" and "nark". See also Derek Round Submission on the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994 (undated) who contends whistleblowers should be called " informants". 
2 For instance see Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1986] I All ER 617 (CA) and Hobbs v North Shore 
City Council [ 1992] I ERNZ 32. Even where the information is in the public domain the employee is 
under an obligation not to use his or her position to his or her advantage: Schering Chemicals Ltd v 
Folkman Ltd [ 1982] I QB I; British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1980] 3 WLR 775 and 
Allorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2) (below n 3). Also see Dominion "Social worker 
suspended" 20 June 1996, page 9 and PSA Journal "CYPS worker sacked for speaking out" 21 August 
1996, p 2. Although not every whistleblowing ought to justify a dismissal, like not every breach of 
contract justifies a dismissal: Y Cripps " Protection from Adverse Treatment by Employers: A Review of 
the Position of Employees who disclose information in the belief the disclosure is in the public interest" 
( 1985) IOI LQR 506. 
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the remedies for breach of confidence are many and varied. They include injunctions,3 
orders to deliver up the confidential documents,4 compensatory damages5 and accounts 
for profits. 6 Disciplinary proceedings are also an option.7 
Parliament and Courts have recognised that the duty of confidence in employment is not 
absolute. Statutory provisions and common law rules have been created. This is explicit 
recognition that the duty of confidence inherently involves competing public interests, 
one in the preservation of confidences and another in the right of the public to be 
informed of matters in the public interest. In defined occasions the latter public interest 
wins out. 
B Protective statutes 
In areas considered to be of acute public interest Parliament has concluded that 
whistleblowing is a valuable tool to be encouraged, and has created statutory provisions 
which stop any Court action being taken against a whistleblower. 
Examples of these provisions can be found in section 41 of the Local Government 
Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, sections 15 and 16 of the Children Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1989, section 115 of the Privacy Act 1993, section 137 
of the Law Practitioners Act 1982 and section 48 of the Official Information Act 1982. 
All of these provisions protect good faith disclosures of information. It is unclear what 
that concept requires of a whistleblower. The issue of whether protective legislation 
should be restricted to whistleblowers who disclose in good faith will be discussed later 
in this paper. 8 Further, the protection is limited to civil and criminal proceedings, not 
disciplinary action. As is noted later in this paper9 it is disciplinary action and other non-
judicial reprisals that whistleblowers face more often. By its very nature whistleblowing 
is an act in the public interest. Whistleblowers ought to be protected from reprisals for 
that reason. Finally these provisions are obviously limited in terms of subject matter and 
scope. Section 66( 1 )( a)(iii) of the Human Rights Act 1993 makes it unlawful in terms of 
that Act to treat less favourably because of giving information or making a complaint 
under that Act. The remedies are set out in sections 89 to 91 of the Human Rights Act 
1993. Despite issues about the burden of showing a nexus between the complaint or 
3 See for instance Attorney-Genera/ v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [ 1988] 3 All ER 545 and 
European Pacific Banking Corporation v Television New Zealand Ltd [ 1994) 3 NZLR 43 (CA). 
4 See for instance Initial Services Ltd v Pu//erill [ 1968) l QB 396 and British Steel Corporation v 
Granada Television Ltd [ I 980) 3 WLR 775. 
5 See also A 1/orney-General f or United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [ 1988) l NZLR 129 at 
165 where the Court of Appeal indicated as an obiter statement that exemplary damages might also be 
available. 
6 See for instance Attorney-General v Guardian Ne wspapers Ltd (No. 2) (above n 3). 
7 
See for instance Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinmy Committee [ 1986) I NZLR 513. There 
could al so be general disciplinary action - demotion etc. 
8 For instance if confidential documents are stolen and then released does that mean bad faith ? If so the 
whistleblower who released European Pacific Banking Corporation Ltd' s papers which initiated the Cook 
Islands tax inquiry would be unprotected. See further discussion below pp 14 to 15, Part IV of this paper 
at p 29 . 
9 
Sec below pp 14 and 18 of this paper. For an example of the more extreme action against a 
whistlcblower see Stanley Adams Roche versus Adams (Jonathan Cape Ltd, London, 1984) and Evening 
Post "Triumph for little man" 8 November 1985, page I I. 
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information and the less favourable treatment, this is probably the closest that we have 
at present to an active protection for whistleblowers against reprisals. Significantly, I 
have not found any case law on this provision. Active encouragement of whistle blowing 
can also be found in Rule 6.03 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Barristers and 
Solicitors. 10 It is unclear how this works alongside other duties as an employee. 
The provisions mentioned above are intended to act as both protection and 
encouragement for whistleblowers. For whistleblowers seeking protection, action is also 
possible under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 for employees who suffer reprisals 
falling short of actual dismissal. A possible personal grievance action could be based 
upon section 27(1 )(b) of the Employment Contracts Act - that is, that terms or 
conditions of employment have been affected to the employee's disadvantage by some 
unjustifiable action by the employer. Commentators have suggested that an employee 
would find this difficult to pursue because the employee's 'employment, or one or more 
conditions of employment' has to have been affected and the Courts have interpreted 
this to mean that there must have been a breach of a contractual obligation or 
entitlement before the action will fall within the section. 11 Also difficult would be 
alleging that the action by the employer was "unjustifiable". Some disciplinary action 
seems arguably justified if the employee has breached the employment contract by 
whistleblowing, revealing confidential information and breaking the relationship of trust 
and confidence. There are also the limited possibilities of a common law action for 
wrongful dismissal and judicial review. 12 
C Miscellaneous Protections 
Provisions based upon fundamental human rights also have an impact in this area. 
Based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 needs to be considered. Section 14 deals with the freedom of 
expression. Like all other sections of the Act, section 14 is subject to section 5 which 
provides that the rights in the Act are subject to the reasonable limits as can be justified 
in a free and democratic society. Section 14 could become a greater tool for 
whistleblowers. Certainly in two recent cases 13 it was raised in support of a 
10 See also Bruce Davidson "A practitioner's duty to report breaches of rules of conduct by colleagues" 
lawtalk 464 16 September 1996, p 8 and Independent ' Whistleblowers infiltrate super schemes" 26 April 
1996, p I for similar proposals for receivers of superannuation schemes. Doctors in the National Health 
Service in England have contractual clauses encouraging whistleblowing. The professional environment 
leads to a reluctance to speak out, and because of that such contractual clauses seem unlikely to be 
successful: Lucy Vickers " Whistleblowing and Freedom of Speech in the NHS" [ 1995] New Law Journal 
Part II 1257. 
11 Anderson, Banks, Hughes, Johnston Employment law Guide (Butterworths, Wellington , 1995) pp 220 
- 223. See as an example of this requirement Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui (No. I) [1994] I ERNZ 
58 and (No.2) [ 1994] I ERNZ 174 where Pugmire was awarded an injunction preventing his employer 
from taking demotion action against him and the Court focused upon the fact that the employer had failed 
to give a procedurally correct suspension notice thus breaching the employment contract. 
12 Y Cripps (above n 2) at 509. A wrongful dismissal action would only lead to damages and is not as 
wide as the personal grievance of "unjustifiable dismissal" ins 27 of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991. Judicial review would be limited to cases where the employer is a public body and where that 
employer took account of irrelevant considerations when disciplining the employee. 
13 I lobbs v North Shore Cily Council (above n 2) and Lowe v Tararua Dislricl Council [ 1994] I ERNZ 
887. 
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whistleblower's right to speak out, but was never pursued with much vehemence. In the 
United States arguments from whistleblowers and particularly newspapers seeking to 
rely upon the First Amendment right to freedom of speech have had more success. 14 In 
Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd' 5 the House of Lords, pointing to Article 10 
of the European Convention (which has the same wording as section 5 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990), refused to grant an injunction preventing a former 
MI6 operative from publishing a book. The House of Lords held that there ought to be 
few limits on freedom of speech and that an injunction would only be granted if the 
Crown could show that the public interest would be harmed by publication. Effectively 
because of the guarantee of freedom of speech there was a presumption in favour of 
publication. 16 International Labour Organisation Convention 158 provides that a 
dismissal is unjustified if it is based on an employee giving evidence against an 
employer for alleged violations of the law. In Tavita v Minister of lmmigration 17 and 
other cases 18 international instruments and obligations have been given greater 
significance. 
These provisions give whistleblowing a broad human rights centred focus. 
Whistleblowing can be seen to be much more than an employment issue. However the 
relationship between these protections and employment law seems unclear. ILO 
Conventions have not been ratified by New Zealand. It could be argued that in terms of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 that in the employment situation obligations of 
trust and confidence justify a limitation on freedom of speech. Further, the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act has been argued in the whistleblowing context before 19and has not 
had a great deal of impact. The scope for the application of international instruments is 
unclear. Note, for instance, that section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act limits 
the application of the Act to governmental bodies and bodies conferred with a public 
function. 
14 For instance see New York Times Co v United States 403 US 713 (1971 ). Also see Catherine Webber 
" Whistleblowing and the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994" (1995) AULR 933,948. 
15 
[ 1989] 2 All ER 852, note that this was prior to the enactment of the Official Secrets Act 1989 which 
made the divulging of information relating to defence issues a criminal offence. 
16 There have been other cases where it has been held that the Crown has to show an extra public interest 
if it wishes to retain confidentiality: Allorney-General v Jonathan Cape limited [ 1976] I QB 753 and 
Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd [ 1980] 147 CLR 39, at 52. Those cases have 
implicitly rather than explicitly considered international instruments and focused more upon the new 
trend towards open government and freedom of information. The focus on freedom of speech is even 
where the whistleblower breaches a term of the employment contract, as did a Royal Servant in Attorney-
General v Barker [ 1990] 3 All ER 257 . Note that while the US Courts focus on freedom of speech, 
concepts like a constructive trust over the proceeds of any breach of confidence ensure that 
whistleblowers do not profit from such breaches of contract: e.g Snepp v United States 62 L Ed 2d 704 
( 1980). 
17 [1994]2NZLR257. 
18 See for instance Ankers v Allorney-General [ 1995] 2 NZLR 595 where the facts indicated that the 
New Zealand Government Departments monitored New Zealand's commitment to international 
instruments, Simpson v Allorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 and Minister of Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353 where it was held that ratification ofan international instrument 
could lead to a legitimate expectation at law that decision makers would conform to that instrument. Also 
see Rodney I larrison QC " Domestic enforcement of international human rights in Courts of law: some 
recent developments" [ 1995] NZLJ 256. 
19 Sec Hobbs (above n 2), 36 - "The Tribunal considers the effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights in 
this particular case to have minimal effect". 
II 
D The Common Law 
I Introduction 
As well as Parliament, the Courts have considered the obligation of confidence in 
employment and have concluded that the obligation is not absolute. It is in the common 
law that the two main protections are found for whistleblowers. The first is the public 
interest defence and the second is the common law surrounding the protection of 
sources. The application of the public interest defence appears to be limited to breach of 
confidence actions taken by the employer and does not, for instance, affect the validity 
of a dismissal. The application of the defence has been the subject of some debate and is 
an issue of considering whether the defence is merely an exception to the duty of 
confidence or removes the obligation of confidence altogether, making any dismissal 
unjustified as well. Most commentators agree that the defence is merely an exception to 
the duty of confidence - only applying in breach of confidence actions.20 Some cases say 
otherwise.2 1 Note that there is no public interest defence to defamation proceedings and 
while truth is a defence, a whistleblower often discloses in the belief a disclosure is true 
hoping that the disclosure will be investigated. The whistleblower may be wrong about 
the truth of the disclosure. Threatened defamation proceedings are used as a way of 
silencing potential whistleblowers.22 
The common law surrounding the protection of sources only serves to protect the 
whistleblower's identity. There are two parts to consider: the "newspaper rule" which 
only applies to disclosures to the media and only at the interlocutory stage of a 
proceeding, and general principles which apply after that stage. Like the public interest 
defence there is some controversy about the application of this protection. The 
application of this rule is unclear. 
2 The public interest defence 
(i) Rationale and scope 
The rationale for the public interest defence began with the idea that confidentiality was 
not always in the public interest. It was developed from the equitable notion of "clean 
20 Sam Ricketson " Public Interest and Breach of Confidence" (I 979) 12 MULR 176; P D Finn 
"Confidentiality and the 'Public Interest'" [I 984] 58 ALJ 497; Jason Pizer "The Public Interest 
Exception to the Breach of Confidence Action: Are the lights about to change?" ( I 994) 20 Monash 
University Law Review 67. 
21 Gari side v Outram ( I 857) 26 LJ Ch 113; Fraser v Evans [ I 969] I QB 349 and Be/offv Pressdram Ltd 
[ 1973] A II ER 241 where it was held that the public interest defence cou Id apply to breach of copyright 
actions. Support can also be found in Geoffrey Robertson QC and Andrew Nicol Media law (Penguin 
Books Ltd, London, 1992) pp 177 - 178. ote that in Hobbs above n 2, a whistleblower's dismissal was 
held unjustified and the public interest defence was not mentioned. 
22 See Dr William de Maria Whistleblowers and Secrecy: Ethical Emissaries from the Public Sect[or} 
(Unpublished paper, presented to the 'Freedom of the Press' Conference, Bond University, 11 November 
1995) at p 2 for an example of when defamation was used to silence a whistleblower. Note however the 
recent more flexible app lication of the defence of qualified privilege (the so-called "public interest 
defamation defence") for the press. That involves estab lishing a legal or moral duty to divulge the 
information that duty being to divulge to the person or persons disclosed to: Independent "The Phillip 
Mills case: One step towards a free press" 13 September 1996, p I 0. 
12 
hands".
23 
If a plaintiff was tainted by some wrongdoing, he or she would be unlikely to 
be successful in a breach of confidence action. Initially the public interest defence was 
narrow in scope with the Courts weighing the balance between retaining confidence and 
allowing disclosure heavily in favour of retaining confidence. Initially a defendant to a 
breach of confidence action could only make out the public interest defence where the 
plaintiff was seeking to restrain disclosure of information showing that the plaintiff had 
committed an iniquity. In Gartside v Outram24 Wood VC held: 
The true doctrine is, that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of an iniquity. You cannot make me 
the confidant of a crime or fraud ... such a confidence does not exist. 
Over time the English Courts moved away from looking at the plaintiffs conduct to 
looking at the gravity of the consequences of disclosure. In Fraser v Evans25 Lord 
Denning stated: 
1 do not look upon the word "iniquity" as expressing a principle. It is merely an instance of just cause for 
breaking confidence. 
In later cases the English Courts developed and extended the public interest defence to 
cover disclosures which revealed civil wrongs,26 misdeeds,27 and finally as far as 
disclosures where the public had a right not be misled. The test moved from being 
weighted heavily in favour of confidentiality with a narrow exception to being weighted 
in favour of disclosure in Woodward v Hutchins. 28 In Woodward v Hutchins Tom Jones, 
Engelbert Humperdink and Gilbert O' Sullivan sued their former manager for publishing 
a book which exposed their antics in detail. In holding that the public interest defence 
was available to Mr Hutchins, Lord Denning stated29 "if the image they fostered was not 
a true image, it is in the public interest that it should be corrected". There has been 
criticism of the Woodward decision from both commentators and Judges. 3° Criticism 
usually focuses on the undermining of the rationale for the defence, moving the concept 
of the ' public interest' towards anything that titillates the public. In Xv Y31 where a 
newspaper sought to publish the names of HIV positive practicing doctors, the English 
Courts refined that approach, balancing competing interests and coming out in favour of 
confidentiality. 
23 Jill Martin Hanbury and Martin Modern Equity (fourteenth edition, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 
1993). 
24 Above n 21 at I 14. 
25 Above n 21 , at 262 . 
?6 
- Weld-Blundell v Stephens [ 1919] I KB 520. 
27 Initial Services Ltd v Putter ill (above n 4) - a price fixing arrangement; Lion laboratories Ltd v Evans 
[ 1984] 3 WLR 539 - a poorly designed breathalyser; Hubbard v Vosper [ 1972] 2 QB 84 - the medically 
dangerous advice of the Church of Scientology. 
28 
[ I 977] I WLR 760 . 
29 Above n 27, at 764. This case was followed by Lennon v News Group Newspapers and Twist [ 1978] 
FSR 373 . 
30 See PD Finn above n 20 at 507 , Leo Tsaknis "The Jurisdictional Basis, Elements and Remedies in the 
Action for Breach of Confidence - Uncertainty Abounds" ( 1993) 5 Bond LR 18, 25 and mith Kline and 
French laboratories (A ustralia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health [ 1990] 
95 ALR 87, at 126: "The English Courts ' approach to the public interest defence [has merged concepts] 
to produce a curious melange without any indication of the seriousness of what is being done" . 
31 
[ 1988] 2 All ER 648. 
13 
The public interest defence has been applied differently by Courts in different countries. 
For instance, in Australia a narrower approach was taken and the defence is a public 
policy defence only available for disclosures of crimes, serious wrongdoing,32 or matters 
injurious to public health. 
Jn New Zealand there have not been a lot of cases directly on point. It seems that on 
occasion an approach of balancing the different public interest in confidentiality and in 
disclosure33 and on occasion an approach which focuses on whether the information 
disclosed reveals an iniquity. In European Pacific Banking Corporation v Television 
New Zealand Limitecf4 the Court of Appeal, while noting that the iniquity rule was only 
an instance of when the public interest defence might apply, called it the 'primary 
instance' of when the defence would apply. 
Given the different approaches across jurisdictions, in terms of the subject matter of 
disclosures that the defence will cover, the scope of the defence remains unclear. A 
further problem is that there are cases which suggest that the means of the disclosure of 
the matter alleged to be a breach of confidence will also affect the applicability of the 
public interest defence. 
(ii) Means of disclosure 
Some cases suggest that disclosure can only be to the 'proper authority'. There are 
conflicting cases about whether disclosure to the media will lead to the public interest 
defence not being available, with cases such as Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers 
Ltcf 5 and British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd36 suggesting that 
disclosure to the media will mean that the defence does not apply, while Lion 
Laboratories Ltd v Evans,37 Initial Services Ltd v Putteril/38 and Cork v Mc Vicar39 
suggest that disclosure to the media will not undermine the applicability of the public 
interest defence. It is notable that both the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 and the 
Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 omit the media from the concept of being an 
appropriate body for whistleblowers to disclose matters to .40 That could be said to make 
the freedom of the press illusory. Clause 18 of the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 
32 For example against Trade Practices legislation: Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd v Trade Practice 
Commission ( 1981) 34 A LR I 05 ; Castro/ Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd [ 1980] 51 FLR 
184. 
33 See Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (above n 7) where a doctor disclosed the 
heart condition of a local bus driver because he feared for public safety. The case was about a disciplinary 
rather than breach of confidence action but the Court ' s approach could be seen to be favouring 
patient/doctor confidentiality over other public interests. For further background to this case see Dr Bruce 
Duncan and Dr Anne Worsnop Submission lo the Parliamentwy Commitlee on the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 199-1 6 September 1994. See a similar approach in X v Y (above n 31 ). Also see Evening 
Post "Jail for doctor" 15 June 1996, p 9 - former French President Francois Mitterand's doctor is in legal 
trouble after revealing that Mitterand had cancer for a long period of hi presidency. 
34 Above n 3, 47. 
35 
[ 1984] I WLR 892. 
36 Above n 2. 
37 Above n 27. 
38 
Above 11 4. 
39 
( 1984) TLR 593 . See also M W Bryan "The Law Commission Report on Breach of Confidence: Not in 
the Public Interest" [ 1982] Public Law 188. 
4° Clause 6(b) Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 and cls 6 to I O Protected Disclosures Bill 1996. 
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expressly preserves the public interest defence, which means that this case law which 
conflicts with the prohibition of the media would have to be considered. 
In addition to the cases about disclosure to the media, there are some cases which 
suggest that internal avenues for disclosure must have been pursued first. 41 Dr William 
de Maria's research in the Queensland Whistleblower Study indicated that 
whistle blowers have a high degree of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of internal 
avenues.42 Clause 6 of the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 makes internal avenues for 
disclosure the favoured means for a whistleblower to make disclosures, and clause 11 
ensures that public sector organisations have such procedures. To add to rather than 
alleviate the confusion about the applicability of the public interest defence, clause 18 of 
the Protected Disclosures Bill preserves the public interest defence, which has on 
occasion been held to apply where disclosures have not been made internally.43 While 
the public interest defence has conflicting decisions about the necessity for a specific 
means of disclosure, the Protected Disclosures Bill does not alleviate that problem. 
(iii) Motive for disclosure 
The motive for the whistleblower making the disclosure may also affect whether the 
public interest defence is available. In Initial Services Ltd v Putter ill Lord Denning 
44 stated: 
I say nothing as to what the position would be if [the whistleblower] had disclosed ... out or malice or spite or sold it 
to a newspaper for money or for reward . That indeed would be a different matter. It is a great evil when people 
purvey scandalous information for reward. 
Note that section 16 of the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, 
section 48 of the Official Information Act 1982 and section 115 of the Privacy Act 1993 
all require a good faith disclosure of information before protection will be given. In Xv 
Attorney-Generaf5 the High Court held that it was for the plaintiff to show a lack of 
good faith before the protection of section 48 of the Official Information Act would not 
apply. Lord Denning 's statement suggests that the defendant must first show that the 
disclosure was made in good faith before the common law public interest defence will 
apply. 
4 1 For instance Hobbs v North Shore City Council (above n 2) at 3 8; NZA LPA v Air New Zealand Ltd 
[ I 992] I ERNZ 353, at 360 where Cooke P ( obiter) indicated that it was only as a last resort that the 
media ought to be used by employees; also Minist,y of Attorney-General Corrections Branch v British 
Columbia Government Employees Union ( 1981) 3 LAC 190, 191: 
[Olnly when th e internal mechanisms prove fruitless may an employee engage in public criti cism or hi s employer 
without violating his duty of (idelity. 
42 Dr William de Maria When the Storm Bird Calls: Whistleblower Warnings in the Age of Corruption 
(unpublished paper presented to the ' Whistleblowers: Protecting the Nation 's Conscience?' Conference, 
Institute of Criminology, Melbourne University, 17 November 1995), page 7; also the stories of 
whi stleblowing set out in Dr William de Maria The Welfare Whistleblower: in Praise a/Troublesome 
People (Unpublished paper presented to the 23rd National Conference of Australian Social Workers, 
Newcastle, September 1993); and Richard Fox "Protecting the Whistleblower" ( 1993) 15 Adel LR 137, 
143 quoting from US studies. 
43 Above n 37 ton 39. 
44 Above n 4, 406. 
45 Unreported, High Court Timaru Registry, Master Hansen , 9 December 1993 , CP3 I /92. 
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In Re A Company 's Application 46 the motive for disclosing (threatened disclosure as a 
tool in employment contract negotiations) was not relevant. It was held that an 
employee could not be restrained from disclosing an iniquity because of an improper 
motive. The conflict between Initial Services Ltd and Re A Company 's Application 
exposes the different public interests that conflict in this area of law. In Initial Services 
Ltd Lord Denning identified with the interest in preserving confidences and his obiter 
comment reveals a view that the public interest defence ought to be narrow ensuring that 
only in very acute circumstances should disclosures be made. In Re A Company's 
Application Scott J' s focus was on the nature of the disclosure. If it is in the public 
interest for the disclosure to be made then the motive for the disclosure is irrelevant. 
Following Scott J's reasoning further , it could be said that the means of disclosure ought 
also be irrelevant. The only matter that would be relevant is whether the disclosure is in 
the public interest or not. However Scott J did not follow that line of reasoning, 
specifically noting that the employee was seeking to make disclosures to the proper 
authorities. Scott J stated:47 
Where the disclosure ... is no more than a disclosure to a recipient which has a duty to investigate matters 
within its remit, it is not, in my view for the Court to investigate the substance of the proposed disclosure 
unless there is grounds for supposing that the disclosure goes outside the remit of the intended recipient 
of the information. 
3. Protection of Source 
This generally relates to disclosures to the media. A whistleblower' s identity can be 
protected in Court if a journalist refuses to reveal the source of the disclosure. There are 
two elements to this protection. The first, known as "the newspaper rule" (but extending 
to all forms of media), gives protection in the early interlocutory stages of proceedings. 
In general, it applies fairly easily. However it is clearly a temporary protection.48 After 
that, in later stages of Court proceedings, other aspects of common law and statutory 
law may apply to protect the identity of a whistleblower, whether the disclosure is to a 
journalist or another person. 
A journalist will be in contempt of Court is he or she refuses to answer questions. 
Journalists have no privilege. Section 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 
confers a statutory discretion on the Court to excuse a witness from answering a 
question or producing a document. That is where to do so would be a breach by the 
witness of a confidence, which, having regard to the special nature of the relationship 
between the witness and the source, he or she should not be compelled to breach. 
Section 35 expressly involves the Court in balancing competing interests - section 35(2) 
states that regard is to be had to the likely significance of the evidence, the nature of the 
confidential relationship and the likely effect of disclosure on the confidant or any other 
person. Section 35 seems to extend to relationships beyond the journalist/source 
relationship, but a confidential relationship has to be established first. For the 
journalist/source relationship there is some common law indicating it is a confidential 
relationship. It may be harder to satisfy the requirements of section 35 for other 
46 
[ 1989] 3 WLR 265. 
47 Above n 46, 270. 
48 Catherine Webber (above n 14), pp 944 to 947 . 
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relationships. In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries 
Ltcf9 the Court of Appeal emphasised the benefit of the freedom of the press: 50 
[T]here [is a] desirability to protect those who contribute [to the media] from the consequences of 
unnecessary disclosure of their identity. 
While the Court of Appeal's statements appear favourable, the limits of section 35 are 
unclear. There are no cases about this section and the protection of journalists' sources. 
It is unclear where the balance will fall. 
In England, section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 has firmed up the law about 
the protection of sources by declaring that a Court cannot compel disclosure of a source 
unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice and national 
securit/ 
1 
or for the prevention of disorder or crime. Before section 10 was enacted the 
English Courts had a similar regime to New Zealand. In British Steel Corporation v 
Granada Television Ltd52 the House of Lords upheld an order to disclose the identity of 
a whistleblowing employee because to protect that identity would be denying the 
company the opportunity to pursue remedies against that employee. The balance 
favoured the interests of justice over the interest in the media protecting its source. 53 
This holding would seem to apply in every case where an employer was seeking to take 
action against a whistleblowing employee. 
From this analysis it can be seen that there are some problems with the common Jaw 
surrounding the protection of sources. Firstly, the "newspaper rule" only provides 
relatively certain protection at the interlocutory stages of a proceeding and there is no 
guarantee that a whistleblower's identity will be protected after that. Secondly, section 
35 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No.2) 1980 does not specify journalists and their 
sources are protected, there have been no cases, and this means that the common law has 
to be relied upon to establish the confidentiality of the relationship. Thirdly, section 35 
specifically directs that the Court balance the competing interests. In England there is 
case law to suggest that when a balance is made, the balance will come out in favour of 
disclosure. None of this leads to certainty for whistle blowers. It seems the only way to 
firm up this area is to ensure that journalists' sources are privileged.54 In the area of 
49 
[ 1980] I NZLR 163 , 172. 
50 More recently re-emphasised by the Court of Appeal and High Court in Television New Zealand Ltd v 
Allorney-Genera/ [ 1995] 2 NZLR 643, 648 and Television New Zealand Ltd v Police [ 1995] 2 NZLR 
541, 556. See also David Lewis " Whistleblowers and Job Security" ( 1995) 58 Modern Law Review 208, 
217 quoting the European Commission " If journalists could be compelled to reveal their sources, this 
would make it more difficult for them to obtain information, and as a consequence to inform the public 
about matters of public interest". Also see The Independent (above n 22). 
51 The Court was so satisfied in Secreta,y of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [ 1985] AC 
339 and the source of leaked information revealing the purchase of 111 issiles by the Government was 
revealed. Sarah Tisdall was later convicted of breaching the Official Secrets Act and spent 6 months in 
jail. 
52 Above n 2. 
53 J F Burrows News Media Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990) at p 357. 
54 
As proposed by the Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (Preliminary paper No.23, May 1994) 
at 132; also Human Rights Comm is ion Submission of the Human Rights Commission to the Justice and 
law Reform Se/eel Commillee on the Whistleblowers Protection Bill July 1994 and Gehan Gunasekara 
"Legislation to protect whistleblowers: ls the proposed solution just what the doctor ordered or is it too 
blunt an instrument?" [ 1994] NZLJ 303, 306. 
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whistleblowing generally the main problem with the protection of sources is obvious. 
The protection is very limited and only goes as far as protecting identity. That does not 
stop reprisals against suspected whistleblowers. 
4. Conclusion 
The two common law protections, the public interest defence and the common law 
about the protection of sources are the main protections available for whistleblowers. 
The law in these areas has limitations. In terms of the public interest defence it is not 
clear when it applies. It seems that the disclosure must be about a certain subject, made 
in a particular way, with a particular motive before there will be protection given. 
Further, the defence only seems to apply to one action taken by an employer and does 
not protect a whistleblower from other forms of retaliation. In a similar vein it is not 
clear when the common law about the protection of sources will apply to protect the 
identity of whistleblowers. It seems that this protection is limited to whistle blowers who 
disclose to the media. Beyond the interlocutory stage of proceedings a balancing 
approach is taken. Overseas case law suggests that the balance favours revealing sources 
leaving a whistleblower without protection. 
E Conclusion 
The current law operates in a piecemeal fashion . 
There are some statutory provisions which protect whistleblowers who disclose certain 
matters from civil and criminal proceedings. Those provisions are limited in terms of 
the subject matters of disclosures and require "good faith" disclosures. The protection 
given does not extend to disciplinary action or other reprisals. Section 66( 1 )( a)(iii) of 
the Human Rights Act 1993 comes closest to an active protection, making it unlawful to 
treat a whistleblower less favourably because of disclosure under the Human Rights 
Act. Again this protection is limited in terms of subject matter, it is unclear what the 
remedies are, and there have been no reported cases. 
While freedom of speech and other :fundamental rights have had an impact in other 
jurisdictions, in New Zealand they have not had great influence. Some case law suggests 
this may change in the future . For whistleblowers there is only uncertainty at present. 
The common law provides some assistance for whistleblowers in the common law 
pub! ic interest defence and the law about the protection of sources. The public interest 
defence seems only to apply to breach of confidence actions, leaving a whistleblower 
open to other reprisals. The defence itself is unclear- it may only apply to disclosures of 
a certain subject matter made to 'appropriate ' authorities (possibly going through 
internal procedures first) and made with an ' appropriate' motive. The application of the 
common law about the protection of sources is also vague. It only protects the identity 
of sources, leaving other reprisals against suspected whistleblowers unchallenged. It 
seems to be limited to whistleblowers who disclose to the media. There is no certainty 
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that there will be protection and any such protection is only after the disclosure has been 
made. 
The current law offers only fragmentary protections. There is no certainty for 
whistleblowers. Dr William de Maria' s study in Queensland55 revealed that 
71 % of whistleblowers experienced "official" reprisals (for example, transfers, 56 failed 
promotions, redundancy, psychiatric examinations, suspension Court action) of which 
only Court action is really covered by any current New Zealand protections, and 94% 
suffered from "unofficial" reprisals (for example, ostracism, difficulty getting the usual 
service from colleagues). Many suffered both. The current law in New Zealand clearly 
does not even come close to alleviating these problems. 
New Zealand has recently changed its electoral system to the mixed member 
proportional system. This is as a result of widespread calls for accountability in 
government. In a number of recent cases whistleblowers have increased public 
awareness of wrongdoing which has led to remedial action. 57 Whistleblowing has led to 
increased accountability. While whistleblowing is valued because it leads to efficient 
systems and enhanced public confidence, the uncertainty of the law means that there is 
active discouragement for potential whistleblowers who will want to be sure they will 
be protected from reprisals. 58 There are no protections available. 
For those reasons and because the current law is so uncertain, reform is necessary. What 
form that reform ought to take is discussed in Part III of this paper. 
55 Above n 42, p 13 . 
56 
Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui (No. I) [1994] I ERNZ 58; (No.2) [1994] I ERNZ 174. Mr Pugmire 
was subjected to both a transfer of duties and a suspension. Castl e J held granting Pugmire and injunction 
(Pugmire (No.2) at 179) that the offer of alternative employment was a " reprehensible abuse of the 
concept of fair dealing by the employer". 
57 
For example the scandal about the overspending at the Ohakea Airbase, the Cook Islands tax saga and 
the problems with the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (the Pugmire 
case). 
58 
Report of the Ministerial Review Team on Whistleb/owing (above n l) noted that the current 
environment for whistleblowers was a "negative one" and that the perceived impediments to disclosure 
ought to be alleviated . Also see J G Starke QC (below n 61) at p 216. Starke suggests that it is also 
unclear whether the public interest defence applies to past misconduct or just to present or continuing 
misconduct and that this too should be clarified . 
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III OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
A Introduction 
Part III considers what is the best mechanism for reforming this area of law. There are 
two main options available. The first is statutory reform. This could take many forms 
with the spectrum running from a declaratory statute to a major piece of reforming 
legislation. The second option is industrial reform. By this it is meant the 
encouragement and facilitation of whistle blowing through the creation of internal 
mechanisms. 
When considering what the best mechanism is for reform, issues about the scope of any 
reform must also be considered. Those issues are considered in Part IV of this paper, but 
it is noted that those issues include determining whether both the public and private 
sectors ought to be covered by any reform, and whether the means of disclosure ought to 
be narrowly specified. 
B Statutory Reform 
Statutory reform has many advantages. Firstly, it could codify the problematic and 
inconsistent common law, clarifying the position for whistleblowers. A statute could 
lead to certainty. Secondly, a statute would ensure a consistent approach across 
organisations. Thirdly, a statute could encourage whistleblowing by both protecting and 
rewarding whistleblowers. 
There are a number of forms that statutory reform could take. At the lower end of the 
scale of reform would be a statute codifying and clarifying the common law public 
interest defence and according privilege to journalists.59 Another option at the lower end 
of the scale of reform is to amend the Employment Contracts Act 1991 to ensure that 
disclosures of information found to be in the public interest are not a ground for 
dismissal nor for disadvantageous action. Both options would be only a part of the 
reform that is needed. The former would not stop reprisal action against whistleblowers, 
while the latter would keep the uncertain common law in place. Both leave it to 
whistle blowers to take Court action. Moving to the middle of the spectrum of reform 
would be reform consisting of a continuation and extension of the current process of 
having various statutory provisions which protect whistleblowers. Reform could be 
targeted to certain areas which are deemed to be acutely in the public interest, for 
example health or the environment.60 There could be duties on individuals to blow the 
whistle in those areas. This could all be in combination with amendments to the 
Employment Contracts Act. This option would also leave the uncertain common law in 
place and would be limited to certain subject areas leaving other public interest matters 
not covered, simply because they had not been thought of. At the far end of the scale 
would be a comprehensive statute codifying and clarifying the common law, setting up 
processes for whistleblowers,61 giving remedies to whistleblowers and making it an 
59 New Zealand Law Society Submissions on Whistleblowers Protection Bill I 99-1 14 September 1994. 
60 Seel luman Rights Commission (above n 54). 
61 Separate whistleblowing authorities arc favoured by Dr William de Maria " Public Interest disclosure 
laws in Australia and New Zealand: Who are they really protecting?" [ 1995] 20 (6) Alternative Law 
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offence with defined consequences (such as large fines) to have reprisals against 
whistleblowers. Penalties for individuals disclosing information knowing it to be false 
ought also to be created. Such reform could even go as far as active encouragement of 
whistleblowing, for instance by awarding a whistleblower a part of any fine awarded. If 
the disclosure is of a crime and any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture order is made under 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 a percentage of the proceeds could be directed to the 
whistleblower. These options are only some of the options available when considering 
statutory reform. 
The main problem with statutory reform is not that it would not alleviate the current 
problems with the common law, but that it would not alleviate all of the problems in this 
area. Some submissions on the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 suggested that 
extensive statutory reform was only required where there was endemic corruption62 and 
that there was no such corruption in New Zealand. In my view whistleblowing is a 
check ensuring that New Zealand remains corruption free. Others suggested that such 
extensive reform would encourage employees to reveal issues that were really policy 
issues or to give more credence to the claims of disaffected employees.63 In my view 
that concern can be alleviated by ensuring there is a proper balance between the right to 
confidentiality, the preservation ofreputation and the public interest in disclosure. This 
reveals another problem for any statutory reform, it will have to be very carefully 
worded. There is another problem with statutory reform that would be a problem with 
any reform in this area and that is the practical effectiveness of any reform. Dr William 
de Maria's research indicated that 94% of whistleblowers suffer unofficial reprisals such 
as ostracism.64 It is hard to imagine how problems like that could be remedied by 
statutory or any reform. However the creation of a more protective and supportive 
environment where reprisal actions are punished would arguably make such reprisals 
less likely. 
C Industrial Reform 
The other main option for reform is industrial reform. By this it is meant that disclosures 
are encouraged by, for example, contractual clauses, and internal mechanisms are 
created which deal with disclosures. Examples of such mechanisms are already in 
existence are the Police Complaints Authority and internal audit functions in various 
Government Departments. This sort of industrial reform could be encouraged by 
Journal 270, pp 272 - 273 and a separate authority was proposed in New Zealand in the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994 (but not in the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996). Also see The Independent 
" Whistleblower Bills put foxes in charge of hen houses" 13 September 1996, p 32. Separate authorities 
are not favoured by others because it is argued that the reasons why current authorities are not utilised 
should be considered, not ignored, and because it arguably undermines the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Courts: Bruce Slane Submission of the Privacy Commissioner on the Whistleblowers Protection Bill July 
1994; J G Starke QC "The Protection of Public Service Whistleblowers" [ 1991] 65 ALR 205, 212. 
62 
See for example Bruce Slane (above n 61 ). Statutes in Queensland and New South Wales were enacted 
as a result of corruption and the creation of new investigatory bodies after Commissions of Inquiry (for 
Queensland the Criminal Justice Commission and for New South Wales the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption). 
63 
New Zealand Employers Federation Inc Submission to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
on the Whistleblowers Protection Bill August 1994. 
64 
See above n 42. 
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specific statutory provisions65 or could be led by the public sector. 66 The public sector 
could ensure internal mechanisms were created and utilised by its employees because 
public sector employees are more constrained by secrecy and confidentiality clauses 
than their private sector counterparts.67 Those who support this sort of reform suggest 
that internal avenues for disclosure are the best way of balancing the rights of the 
whistleblower and the employer. The employer has the right to control its own 
workplace, to have confidentiality and to have its reputation preserved. 68 Opponents 
point out that there would be a lack of consistency across organisations if internal 
mechanisms were relied upon69 and that internal mechanisms would not necessarily 
discourage reprisals. Instead internal mechanisms could discourage whistleblowing. Dr 
William de Maria's research70 indicates a high degree of dissatisfaction with internal 
mechanisms. In my view internal mechanisms are needed and are desirable. The internal 
mechanisms should be encouraging and protective of whistleblowers. To ensure real 
reform is achieved, they should be alongside, rather than instead of statutory reform. To 
ensure consistency, certainty and real protection, statutory reform should take 
precedence over internal mechanisms where they conflict. Statutory reform should also 
set a minimum standard to ensure that disclosures and prohibitions on reprisals are 
effective. 
D Conclusion 
When considering reform options it needs to be recognised that no option will totally 
prevent the more subtle reprisals against whistleblowers. That does not mean that 
reform should not be undertaken. Reform will encourage an environment where 
whistleblowers are valued. The analysis in Part III has revealed that statutory and 
industrial reform together would provide some encouragement and protection for 
whistleblowers, to provide penalties and to discourage those who knowingly disclose 
false information. Industrial reform involving the creation of internal mechanisms is 
needed to balance matters and create a less hostile environment for whistleblowing. A 
combination of the two options are also more likely to satisfy the different agendas of 
the interest groups involved in this issue. Such compromises are likely in ew 
Zealand's new MMP era. 
The relationship between the two (industrial and statutory reform) needs to be clearly 
stated, with statutory reform needing to have precedence. That is necessary to ensure 
consistency and certainty. Statutory reform could provide a minimum standard for any 
internal procedures. 
65 
A current example is the encouragement of disclosures in s 7 of the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act 1992. 
66 
That may require an amendment to the State Sector Act 1988, or it could be achieved administratively 
by, for example, changes to the Public Service Code of Conduct. 
67 
See for example ss 81, 203 and 221 of the Tax Administration Act 1994 and more generally pages 13 , 
14 and 17 of the Public Service Code of Conduct which indicate that a public sector employee is required 
to use internal channels at present. Also see the discussion at pp 36 - 38 of this paper. 
68 
See Bruce Slane (above n 61 ), the Employers Federation (above n 63) . 
69 
Ministerial Review Team (above n I) p 7. 
70 
Above n 42. 
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It is concluded that this two-pronged approach to reforming the law surrounding 
whistleblowing would be the most effective reform option. 
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IV PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A Introduction 
In this part several Acts and Bills will be examined. In particular the Protected 
Disclosures Bill 1996 and the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 will be analysed. 
Each Act or Bill will be examined using six different points of analysis: 
(a) first, what the purpose of the Act or Bill is expressed to be; 
(b) second, who that Act or Bill determines will be covered by it; 
(c) third, what the subject matter of a disclosure has to be before it will be protected; 
( d) fourth , whether a specific means of disclosure is specified; 
(e) fifth, whether the whistleblower' s motive is relevant; 
(f) sixth, what sort of protection is offered. 
The analysis reveals the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 to be flawed. The Public 
Interest Disclosure Bill (Appendix I) seeks to alleviate the problems with the Protected 
Disclosures Bill 1996. In my view a reforming statute in this area should ensure that its 
coverage is not too detailed and narrow, that motive for disclosure is irrelevant and that 
there is real and effective protection against reprisals for whistleblowers; protection that 
is not necessarily whistleblower initiated. 
B Protected Disclosures Bill I 996 
I Introduction 
The Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 was introduced on 1 August 1996. It was drafted by 
the State Services Commission as a result of the report of the Ministerial Review Team 
on whistleblowing. 
2. Analysis 
(i) Purpose 
The purpose of the Protected Disclosures Bill is set out in the long title and in clause 4. 
It is to promote the public interest by protecting employees who make protected 
disclosures of information about serious wrongdoing in or by an organisation ( emphasis 
added). The purpose reveals a lot about this Bill. It is not intended to promote or 
facilitate whistleblowing. It is not intended to protect anyone disclosing public interest 
information, that person has to be an 'employee' .71 There seems to be no purpose served 
by limiting the Bill 's coverage in this way. It is also notable that the purpose reveals that 
this Bill 's coverage is limited to ' serious' wrongdoing. That seems a high threshold. 
(ii) Whistleblower defined 
As already noted, it is an employee (as defined in clause 2) who discloses serious 
wrongdoing (as defined in clause 2) in the means defined in the Bill who is a 
whistleblower (clause 5). 
7 1 
Note that "employee" is defined broadly in cl 2 and includes independent contractors and prior 
employees. Individuals who are not employees can be whistleblowers and it seems meaningless to limit 
the Bill in this way. However even this is less restrictive than the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1995 
(UK) which requires the information disclosed to be gleaned in the course of employment. 
V1 ORI 
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(iii) Subject matter of disclosure 
To be covered by the Bill a whistleblower must disclose 'serious wrongdoing' (clause 
5). 'Serious wrongdoing' is defined in clause 2 and can be wrongdoing occurring before 
or after the enactment of the Bill. It means the unlawful, corrupt or irregular72 use of 
public finds or resources, or any other conduct constituting an offence, 
maladministration,73 or a constituting a serious74 risk to public health, public safety, the 
environment or the maintenance of law and justice. This definition confirms the view 
that this Bill is narrow in focus, only encompassing very serious disclosures. 75 
(iv) Means of disclosure 
The Protected Disclosures Bill specifies in some detail to whom a disclosure ought to be 
made in clauses 6 to 10. Those clauses are worded in a way that makes it clear that some 
recipients are favoured over others. Clause 6 states that internal procedures must be 
used. 76 Clause 7 indicates that the head or deputy head of the organisation can be the 
recipient of the disclosure where there are no internal procedures or if the whistle blower 
believes 77 that using internal procedures will lead to reporting to a "tainted" employee. 78 
Clause 8 states that where the whistleblower believes79 the head is tainted, or that the 
matter is urgent, 80 or that there has been no action within 3 months of a disclosure made 
72 See below n I 07. " Irregular" seems a much lesser matter than "corrupt" or " unlawful". Tenets of 
statutory interpretation such as noscitur a sociis suggest that the term will be coloured by the words 
surrounding it. That may mean that " irregular" use would be a more serious matter than it first appears. 
The purposive approach to statutory interpretation would also support that: J F Burrows Statute law in 
New Zealand (Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd, 1992) pp 99 - I 15. 
73 Defined in cl 2 to mean conduct by a public official (also defined - basically public sector employees) 
that is oppressive, improperly discriminatory, grossly negligent or constituting gross mismanagement. 
Again this is very serious conduct as is emphasised by the use of the word "gross". The Whistleblowers 
Protection Act 1989 (US) was amended to have "gross mismanagement" rather than mismanagement. 
Thus was intended to narrow the sorts of disclosures that could be made - see Fisher below n I 27. 
74 The use of the word "serious" again emphasises that this Bill is intended to be limited to disclosures of 
serious misconduct. This is to be compared with the sliding scale of seriousness in cl 5 of the 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994. It is unclear what degree of conduct is required to make it "serious" 
- would the faulty breathalyser in lion laboratories (above n 27) be enough to be a "serious" risk to the 
maintenance of law and justice. 
75 See Gehan Gunasekara (above n 54) pp 304 - 305 and Catherine Webber (above n 14) pp 956 - 957 
who contend that such limitations of subject matter are not necessary and pointlessly limit protections. In 
Gunasekara's and Webber 's view the focus should be on whether the disclosure is in the public interest. 
That, in my view, does not lead to any real certainty for whistleblowers. Some people have a skewed 
impression of what is in the public interest. A broad and relatively flexible definition setting out broad 
categories seems justifiable. 
76 Note that cl I I requires public sector organisations to have such internal procedures (note that for the 
purposes of cl I I SO Es and Local Government Trading Enterprises (LATEs) are not public sector 
organisations). This clause recognises that public sector employees ought to be treated differently. 
Matters should be dealt with internally. See discussion below at pp 36 to 38 of this paper. 
77 And note that this belief is tested objectively - it must be a belief on reasonable grounds. This is 
different to the US Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 where protection is contingent on a 
whistleblower "reasonably believing" in the truth of the disclosure. This has been argued to be a 
subjective test: J G Starke QC (above n 61) p 257. 
78 
That is where the employee has committed the wrongdoing or has a relationship or association with the 
person who has. 
79 
Again that belief must be on reasonable grounds and is tested objectively. 
80 
Or that there are exceptional circumstances (emphasis added). It is unclear when the circumstances will 
be exceptional. 
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w1der clause 6 or clause 7 and the whistleblower has made at least two written requests 
for action or for information, then the whistleblower can make a disclosure to an 
"appropriate authority". "Appropriate authority" is defined in clause 2. It is stated that 
the definition is not limited in any way and defines the term in an inclusive way. In 
general, apart from private sector disciplinary bodies (such as the Medical Council), 
only public sector organisations are "appropriate authorities". Notably the definition 
specifically excludes Ministers of the Crown and members of Parliament. 81 Supporters 
of this restriction would suggest that this takes whistle blowing out of the political arena. 
In my view this restriction, like the restriction to employees in this Bill, is needless. It 
restricts the rights of citizens to approach their elected representatives. Further, the 
Pugmire affair,82 which effectively triggered the push for reform in New Zealand, is a 
prime example of when a Minister of the Crown or an MP can be the only appropriate 
body to disclose to. 
Clause 9 allows for disclosures to the Chief Ombudsman (as long as the disclosure is 
about a public sector organisation and as long as there has been no disclosure to the 
Ombudsman already under clause 8) or to a Minister of the Crown if: 
(a) the whistleblower has already made substantially the same disclosure83 in terms of 
any of clauses 6 to 8; and 
(b) the whistleblower believes84 the authority disclosed to has decided not to investigate 
or has recommended to action or has decided to investigate but has not made progress 
85 after 6 months; and 
( c) the whistleblower continues to believe86 that the disclosure is true or is likely to be 
true. 
Clause 10 amends the clauses 6 to 9 procedure in so far as the disclosure relates to87 an 
intelligence and security agency88 or is about international relations or intelligence and 
security involving defined Government bodies, including the Ministry of Defence and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 89 Clause 6 is amended to ensure that any 
internal procedure directs the disclosure to someone with the appropriate security 
8 1 
Note that cl 9 allows for disclosures to Ministers of the Crown in more limited circumstances. This is 
different to some overseas provisions. Section 5( 4) of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South 
Australia) specifically allows for disclosures to be to Ministers of the Crown. Sections 8(1)(d) and 19 of 
the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) allow for disclosures to an MP or to the media in defined 
circumstances. Note also that cl 12 Protected Disclosures Bill gives the Ombudsman a counselling and 
advisory role. 
82 
See above n 56. Pugmire first made his disclosure in a letter to his manager, then to the Director of 
Mental Health, then to the Minister of Health , then to the District Inspector of Mental Health, and then to 
the Minister of Police. There was little response . After a patient had been released and reoffended 
Pugmire released his letter to Phil Goff MP. Mr Goff then released the letter to the media. 
83 
How much the disclosure can vary before it would not be ' substantially ' the same would be a matter 
for case law. 
84 
Again that belief must be on reasonable grounds and is objectively tested. 
85 
How much progress will be needed before this clause would not apply would likewise be a matter of 
controversy. 
86 
Again, this belief must be on reasonable grounds. It is objectively tested. 
87 
"Relates to" again seems a flexible concept likely to be the subject of argument. 
88 
Defined in cl 2 as the same as the definition in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 
1996. That definition includes the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Security 
Intelligence Service and any body deemed lo be an intelligence and security agency by Order in Council. 
89 
Also the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the New Zealand Defence Force. 
26 
clearance. Clauses 8 and 9 are amended to state that disclosures must be made to the 
Inspector-General oflntelligence and Security (where about intelligence and security) or 
the Chief Ombudsman (where about international relations) 
The procedure in clauses 6 to 10 is very complex. It would require a well educated 
whistle blower to be sure of protection. 
(v) Motive for disclosure 
Even if a whistleblower is certain of falling within clauses 6 to 10, that whistle blower 
must ensure that he or she had the correct motive. Clause 5 indicates that a 
whistleblower must believe on reasonable grounds in the truth of the disclosure ( or is 
likely to be true) and must be motivated by a desire to have the matter investigated and 
to have the disclosure protected. It is not clear whether that motive needs to be the 
primary motive. Nor is it clear how precisely on a practical level that motive would be 
tested. Clause 17 makes things even more difficult for whistleblowers, indicating that a 
whistleblower who "otherwise acts in bad faith" will not be protected by the Bill. It is 
not clear what sort of conduct will mean that there is no protection. It only adds to the 
uncertainty of the Bill. Whistle blowing by its very nature deals with issues of public 
interest. Ensuring that the disclosure is in the public interest and that the whistleblower 
believes in the truth of the disclosure would be all that is needed to ensure there was an 
adequate balance between encouraging whistleblowing and ensuring that only genuine 
whistleblowing is protected. 
(vi) Protections offered 
Clause 15 of the Protected Disclosures Bill protects whistle blowers from civil, criminal 
or disciplinary proceedings notwithstanding any other enactment or contract.90 This 
clause specifically recognises the range of proceedings that can be taken against a 
whistle blower. Clause 16 indicates that the identity of a whistleblower will not always 
be protected, it only requires best endeavours to be made. 91 One of the exceptions when 
identity can be revealed is where revealing the identity of the whistleblower would be 
"essential having regard to the principles of natural justice" ( clause 16(1 )(b )(iii)). 92 That 
is an extremely wide exception, suggesting that it will be the exception rather than the 
rule for identity to be protected. Clause 14 gives a whistleblower the right to take a 
personal grievance under section 27(1)(a) or section 27(l)(b) of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 93 and clause 21 gives a whistle blower the option of pursuing action 
under the Human Rights Act 1993. 94 Clause 18 expressly preserves any other privilege, 
90 
This is an important clause, ensuring that the Bill is predominant over other obligations - for instance it 
would have precedence over the Public Service Code of Conduct. 
9 1 
Compare with cl 8 of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 which seeks to always protect the 
identity of a wh istleblower. 
92 
See British Steel Corporation v Granada Television lid (above n 2) where a whistleblower's identity 
was released because to have it protected would have emasculated the Corporation's Court proceedings. 
That would be a common situation. 
93 
That is, unjustified dismissal or unjustifiable disadvantage. See the problems with these remedies 
identified above at n 11 and n 12. 
94 
Clause 2 l amends s 66 of the Human Rights Act 1993 by including having made a protected 
disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Bill as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Remedies under 
the Human Rights Act do not include reinstatement. See Gehan Gunasekara (above n 54) p 306 who 
suggests that using the discrimination provisions under the Human Rights Act is illogical. Gunasekara 
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immunity, protection or defence relating to the disclosure of information. This means 
that the common law public interest defence will continue to apply. That defence applies 
to disclosures that involve matters of the same seriousness or less seriousness95 than the 
Protected Disclosures Bill, to disclosures made to the media96 and disclosures made 
with motives that are not necessarily what the Protected Disclosures Bill requires.97 
Having the common law remain in place in this way does not clarify matters for 
whistleblowers. It makes the Bill appear too narrowly focused and defined if disclosures 
that completely contradict the limits prescribed in the Bill can be protected by the 
common law. 
3 Conclusion 
From this detailed analysis of the Protected Disclosures Bill it can be seen to be flawed 
under each of the six points of analysis. Its purpose is narrow, it does not seek to value 
or encourage whistleblowing or to recognise that whistleblowing serves a purpose by 
promoting accountability. Its scope is narrow; only employees can be whistleblowers 
and only very serious matters are deemed protected disclosures. Further a whistleblower 
must be aware of the very detailed clauses about who the disclosure can be made to. At 
every turn a whistleblower's beliefs are objectively tested. There are many hurdles 
where a whistleblower could fall. To make matters worse a whistleblower must ensure 
he or she does not "otherwise act in bad faith" and it is not clear what that means. Still 
further, protections from non-judicial reprisals is not given under the Bill - it is left to a 
whistleblower to take Court action under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 or the 
Human Rights Act 1993. Finally, other statutory and common law protections are 
preserved. The common law public interest defence conflicts with much of the Bill. The 
Protected Disclosures Bill can be seen to not only not fulfil its purpose,98 but also to 
actually make matters more complex, more confusing and more uncertain for 
whistleblowers. 
C Whistleblowers Protection Bill I 994 
I Introduction 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 was the first proposed reform in New Zealand. 
It was introduced by Phil Goff as a Private Member' s Bill on 15 June 1994.99 It went to 
the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee and submissions were heard. The 
Minister of State Services, '00 the Hon. Paul East, then referred the Bill and the matters 
suggests that discrimination is about something external to employment (e.g race, gender) and 
whistleblowing is something directly connected to employment, not a status. Also see John Hughes "The 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994" [ 1994] ELB 71. Note that cls 29 to 32 of the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994 give only discrimination as a remedy under the Employment Contracts Act or 
Human Rights Act. 
95 
For a less serious instance - when the public has been misled about a famous person ' s lifestyle: 
Woodward v Hutchins (above n 28). 
96 
For example, lion laboratories lid (above n 27), Initial Services Ltd (above n 4) and Cork v Mc Vicar 
(above n 39). 
97 
For example, Re A Company 's Application (above n 46) and discussion above on p 14 of this paper. 
98 
That is, it does not protect whistleblowers adequately. 
99 NZPD Volume 540, 15 June 1994, pp 1750 - 1772. The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 is set out 
in Appendix II of this paper. 
100 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 covers both the public and private sectors. The fact that the 
Minister of State Services rather than the Minister of Justice took responsibility for this Bill is indicative 
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raised in the Select Committee to a Ministerial Review Team made up of John Gray, 
John Edwards and Ian Miller. The Ministerial Review Team reported back on 20 
October 1995. Subsequent to that report the Minister referred the matter to the State 
Services Commission who drafted a new Bill, the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996. 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 was a reaction to the Pugmire affair. 101 This 
· 102 103 can clearly be seen from the mtroductory debate and speeches made by Mr Goff. It 
is a very political Bill. To a great extent it is based upon the Whistleblowers Protection 
Act 1993 (South Australia). 
2 Analysis 
(i) Purpose 
The purpose of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill is set out in the long title and in 
clause 4. It is to facilitate and encourage disclosures and correction of activity of a 
specific nature. It also seek to "affirm" both that accountability and openness are 
essential elements of a democratic society and that informants are acting responsibly 
and in the public interest. Clause 4 also indicates that a specialist Whistleblowers 
Protection Authority is set up by the Bill. Clause 4 is a very dramatically worded 
purpose section. 
(ii) Whistleblower defined 
In terms of clauses 4(3)(a) and 5(2) of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill a 
whistleblower is "any person" who discloses public interest infom1ation to the 
Whistleblowers Protection Authority 104 (which is constituted in Part III clauses 9 to 19). 
The Bill specifically recognises that not just employees can be whistleblowers. 105 The 
Bill also encompasses both the public and private sectors (clause 5(1)). 
(iii) Subject matter of disclosure 
of the Government's response to the Bill. It would be fair to say that the Government's view is that any 
such Act should be limited to the public sector. See above n 99, pp 1753-1754. See also New Zealand 
Herald " Protection for whistleblowers" 15 December 1995, p I O and Dominion "Group to report on 
whistle-blowers protection" 3 July 1995 , p 2. 
101 Mr Goff was directly involved in the disclosure: see NZPD (above n 99) p 1753, Dominion "East tries 
to turn tables on Goff on Whistleblowers Bill" 15 June 1994, p 2. See Catherine Webber (above n 14) pp 
935 - 93 7; Neil Pugmire Submission to the Select Committee on the Whist/eblowers Protection Bill 1994 
6 September 1994; New Zealand Herald " Pugmire lends support to bill protecting whistleblowers" 16 
November 1995, p 2 and Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui (above n I I). In order to raise his concerns 
about the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, Nurse Neil Pugmire 
released information about a psychiatric patient who later reoffended. He was suspended and offered a 
demotion or redundancy by his employer. That matter was later settled by the Courts. Also see further 
above n 82. 
102 Above n 99, 1753. 
103 For example, Phil Goff Whistleb/owers and Society Address to the Medico-legal Society, 12 
September 1995. 
104 Whether there is a need for a separate authority is a matter of some controversy: sec Paul East NZPD 
(above n 98) p 1753, Bruce Slane (above n 61 ); State Services Commission Submission on 
Whistleblowers Prolection Bill I O October 1994 and I O November 1995, p 7 and The Independent 
" Wl1istleblower Bills put foxes in charge of henhouse" 13 September 1996, p 32. 
105 
Compare with cl 6 of the Protected Disclosures Bill which limits coverage to employees. 
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The Whistleblowers Protection Bill has three heads under which a disclosure must fall 
before it will be protected (clause 5(1)). 106 It must either concern the unlawful, corrupt 
or unauthorised use
107 
of public funds or resources, or unlawful conduct or activity, or 
concern conduct which constitutes a significant risk or danger or is injurious to public 
health or public safety or the environment or the maintenance of law and justice. The 
third head shows a sliding scale of seriousness ("significant risk or danger or is injurious 
to") which means that more disclosures would fall within the ambit of the 
Whistle blowers Protection Bill. 108 This is to be compared with clauses 2 and 5 of the 
Protected Disclosures Bill which require a degree of seriousness in terms of subject 
matter before a disclosure will fall within its ambit. 
Note that under the Whistleblowers Protection Bill even where the disclosure breaches 
another enactment or a confidence it can be disclosed and protected. ' 09 This has caused 
some concern.' ' 0 The Bill does not mention contractual obligations and it is unclear how 
it works alongside such obligations. 111 
(iv) Means of disclosure 
Under clauses 5(4) to 5(6) the Whistleblowers Protection Bill directs that a disclosure 
will only be protected where it is made to the Whistleblowers Protection Authority 
either orally or in writing. Disclosures to the media or other authorities are not 
protected. Clauses 6 and 7 provide that only "appropriate" disclosures will be protected. 
Apart from the disclosure having to be to the Whistleblowers Protection Authority, the 
only other requirement for a disclosure to be an "appropriate disclosure" is for the 
whistleblower to believe on reasonable grounds' 12 in the truth of the information or in 
the urgent need for an investigation into its truth (clause 6(a)). 
106 See Gehan Gunasekara and Catherine Webber (above n 75). 
107 Compare to the use of the word " irregular" use in the Protected Disclosures Bill. "Unauthorised" 
seems a lesser standard than " irregular" - the use of public funds could be unauthorised but a usual or 
regular usage. It is not clear what would be " irregular use". 
108 Although for some even this sliding scale is not enough - see Diana KB Anstiss Submission and 
Supplementary Submission: Whistleblowers Protection Bill (undated) p I. She proposes coverage for 
disclosures about "unwise use" of public funds or resources. Also NZ Council of Trade Unions 
Submission on Whistleblowers Protection Bi/122 July 1994 at p 3 suggest the addition of the "authorised 
but flagrantly wasteful use of public resources". Those proposals are getting too close to making political 
judgments in my view . 
109 Note the obvious mistake in cl 5(3)(d) - it suggests that a disclosure will be an appropriate disclosure 
unless it is in the public interest. 
11 0 
See for instance Inland Revenue Department Submission on the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 199-1 
July 1994 where concern was expressed that the tax system (which relies upon self-assessment and 
voluntary compliance) would be undermined if the Department's secrecy obligations could be ignored by 
its officers. See also New Zealand Law Society Submissions on Whistleblowers Protection Bill 199-1 J 4 
September 1994 for concern that the Whistleblowers Protection Bill suggests that legal professional 
privilege can be ignored. Clause 25(1) suggests that privilege is retained (at least for witnesses), although 
even that is not directly spelt out. Compare with the express preservation of legal privilege ins 8 of the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT). 
111 
For example the Public Service Code of Conduct - see the National Council of Women Submission on 
the Whistleblowers Protection Bill July 1994. Note Attorney-General v Barker (above n 16) indicates that 
even where there is a confidentiality clause in an employment contract (in Barker it was a clause in the 
contract ofa Royal servant) publication can still occur. 
112 
This objective test of belief is rampant throughout the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 but appears 
only once in the Whistleblowers Protection Bill. 
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(v) Mat ive for disclosure 
Clause 6 requires a whistleblower to believe on reasonable grounds that the information 
disclosed is true or that it may be true and requires urgent investigation. Clause 22(1)(e) 
indicates that the Whistleblowers Protection Authority can choose not to investigate 
where the disclosure is vexatious or not made in good faith. 113 Clause 6 is a requirement 
for good faith to be one of the motives and clause 22(1)(e) is a more overt requirement 
that a whistleblower be motivated by good faith or risk not being protected. Just what is 
required to be good faith is not clear. 114 
(vi) Protections offered 
Clause 7 states that no civil or criminal proceedings can be taken in relation to a 
disclosure. Clause 7 does not mention disciplinary proceedings. To alleviate other 
reprisals, clauses 29 to 32 make it unlawful discrimination to harass or treat a 
whistleblower less favourably because or substantially because' 15 that person has made 
or intends to make an appropriate disclosure (clause 29(1)). A whistleblower suffering 
from such reprisals has the choice of proceeding under the Human Rights Act 1993 116 or 
filing a personal grievance under section 27(1)(c) of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991. I I ? 
Clause 8 firms up the common law by ensuring that the identity of a whistleblower is 
protected. It is an offence punishable by a fine of $2,000 to reveal information which 
could be reasonably expected to reveal a whistleblower's identity. Clauses 25 and 26 
offer protections to witnesses before the Whistleblowers Protection Authority providing 
that disclosures to the Authority will not be in breach of any secrecy enactments. That 
has caused some controversy. 118 Clause 40 lists a number of offences under the 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill. However, all of those offences relate to the proceedings 
of the Whistleblowers Protection Authority. Clause 39 provides that an employer is 
liable for the actions of its employees. This encourages employers to ensure there are no 
breaches of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill by its employees. Clause 41 states that 
the Whistleblowers Protection Bill is in addition to other provisions which give 
immunity from civil or criminal liability for disclosures. Clause 41 does not preserve the 
common law, and it is assun1ed that the Whistleblowers Protection Bill is intended to 
codify the common law. 
The protections offered by the Whistleblowers Protection Bill are generally piecemeal. 
Like the Protected Disclosures Bill, it is left to the whistleblower to take Court action if 
subjected to discriminatory conduct. It is arguable that ' discrimination' is not the 
appropriate means to deal with whistleblowing issues. While it is helpful to codify the 
113 Compare with cl 17 of the Protected Disclosures Bill which indicates that there will be no protection 
where the whistleblower "otherwise acts in bad faith". At least the Whistleblowers Protection Authority 
has a choice here. 
11 4 
See discussion above at n 8. 
11 5 The sliding scale of proof may make the nexus between the disclosure and the reprisal easier to prove, 
but until there is some case law indicating how to fulfil this test (ie what "substantially because" means) 
there seems no certainty for whistleblowers seeking protection. 
11 6 
With the associated limitations in terms of remedy - see discussion above n 94. 
11 7 
Clauses 29(3) and 32 of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill and s 39 of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 and s 64 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
11 8 
See Inland Revenue Department (above n 110). 
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common law, the Whistleblowers Protection Bill does it in such a way that is limiting 
rather than clarifying. For instance the common law allowed disclosures to the media in 
certain circumstances, while the Whistleblowers Protection Bill does not. Finally rather 
than making it an offence under the Bill to take reprisal action, the offences relate to the 
proceedings of the Whistleblowers Protection Authority. A whistleblower is basically 
left unprotected. 
3 Conclusion 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill is only slightly better than the Protected Disclosures 
Bill. It is flawed in many respects. The good things in the Bill are few, but they are 
there. The express recognition that anyone, and not just an employee, can be a 
whistleblower, the sliding scale of seriousness in terms of the subject matter of 
disclosures, and the attempt to make the nexus between reprisal action and the 
disclosure easier to prove, all give the Whistleblowers Protection Bill a greater ambit 
than the Protected Disclosures Bill. Making it an offence to give false information is 
also positive, discouraging vexatious complaints from disaffected employees.' 19 
However, a disclosure must be made to the Whistleblowers Protection Authority and the 
Whistleblowers Protection Authority is a toothless body. Clause 28 indicates that it is to 
be used as a filter 120 for complaints and is to refer complaints to an 'appropriate 
enforcement authority'. That concept is defined in clause 28(6) and means (basically) 
public sector agencies. In the alternative the Whistleblowers Protection Authority can 
recommend action and refer the matter back to the person about whom the investigation 
relates (clause 28(2)). The Whistleblowers Protection Authority has no ability to direct 
action be taken. The toothless nature of the Whistle blowers Protection Authority is 
confirmed by the fact that it is left to the whistleblower to take Court action if subjected 
to discriminatory conduct. It seems redundant having a separate specialised Authority if 
it cannot act on behalf of whistleblowers. 
Still further, there is an undefined obligation on a whistleblower to act in good faith. 
Employers are not encouraged to create their own internal procedures to deal with 
whistleblowers. Finally, despite the fact that the Whistleblowers Protection Authority is 
toothless, the Whistleblowers Protection Bill seeks to codify the common law. It does 
this in such a way that rigidifies the common law. 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill does not fulfil its purpose. It does not encourage 
whistleblowing. It is hard to see how it leads to recognition the whistleblowers are 
acting in the public interest, or affirms accountability and openness are essential to New 
Zealand's democratic society. 
D Overseas Legislation 
1 Introduction 
11 9 Although a $2,000 fine may not be high enough. 
120 Note that cl 20 also gives the Whistleblowers Protection Authority a counselling and advisory role. 
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There are a number of Acts that will be discussed in this part. 121 In particular four 
Australian Acts 122 will be considered. Also noted will be the two United States Acts, 123 
the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1995 (UK) and statutes from Kentucky and Ontario. 
2 Analysis 
(i) Purpose 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) has its purpose expressed in its long 
title. It is simply to encourage the disclosure of conduct in the public sector that was 
adverse to the public interest. 124 The Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) has its 
purpose set out in its long title and in section 3. The Queensland Act seeks to protect 
whistleblowers who disclose certain matters which generally 125 relate to the public 
sector. The Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) has its purpose in its long title and in 
section 3. It seeks to facilitate and encourage disclosures but again, those disclosures are 
limited in terms of subject matter to those about the public sector. The Whistleblowers 
Protection Act 1993 (SA) also has its purpose in its long title and section 3. It seeks to 
facilitate and encourage disclosures and to protect those making disclosures. Again, in 
terms of subject matter, the disclosures must generally 126 relate to the public sector. Like 
the tendency in the Australian Acts, the Whistleblowers Protection Act l 989 (US) and 
the Civil Service Reform Act 1978 (US) both only relate to public sector federal 
127 employees. 
The purpose of these Acts predicts their scope. There is an unwillingness to have any 
.c l · h · 128 re1orm re atmg to t e pnvate sector. 
(ii) Whistleblower defined 
Section 8 of the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) indicates that only a public 
official 129 can make a protected disclosure. Sections 8 and 9 of the Whistle blowers 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld) indicate that depending on subject matter sometimes a 
12 1 
Note that because of space constraints not every Act will be analysed under each of the six points of 
analysis . 
122 The Wh istleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 
(NSW), Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Queensland) , the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 
(ACT) - all reature in Appendix ITI of this paper. 
123 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 and the Civil Service Reform Act 1978. 
124 
See discussion about public and private sector coverage below at pp 36 to 38 of this paper. 
125 
Some types of disclosure have to be made by public sector employees (s 8, Part 111) and others can be 
made by anybody (ss 9 and 19). Some disclosures have to relate to the public sector and others can be 
broader than that. 
126 
Note that the s 4 definition of " public interest information" does extend beyond the public sector - e .g 
a disclosure can relate to an ' adult person ' being involved in ' illegal activity' . Nevertheless it is true to 
say that the Act does in general only relate to public sector information. 
127 
See Bruce Fisher "The Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989" A false hope for whistleblowers" 
[ 1991] 43 Rutgers Law Review 354 for discussion of the process that led the US to limit the Act to the 
public sector. He suggests that the private sector are covered by exceptions to the employment at will 
doctrine. Note that the Ontario Public Service Act deals with whistleblowing in Part IV. That Part was 
inserted in 1994. This Act is also (obviously from its title) limited to the public sector. 
128 
See discussion below at pp 36 to 38 or this paper. 
129 
Defined in s 4 to be a public sector employee or person acting with public powers. 
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whistleblower can only be a public officer130 and sometimes a whistleblower can be any 
person. Section 15(1) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) and section 5 of 
the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) indicate that any person can be a 
whistle blower. 
The Queensland and New South Wales statutes needlessly restrict their ambit by 
limiting those who can be whistleblowers. It seems illogical for a disclosure about a 
public sector organisation to be in the public interest if a public sector employee made it 
but not if a private sector employee made it. 
(iii) Subject matter of disclosure 
In general, all of the Australian Acts have similar restrictions on subject matter. The 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) embraces disclosures which reveal unlawful, 
negligent or improper 131 conduct affecting the public sector and disclosures revealing 
conduct that endangers public health and safety or the environment. 132 It seems strange 
to protect disclosures of unlawful public sector conduct but not unlawful private sector 
conduct. 
Interestingly, section 17 of the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NS W), indicates that a 
disclosure that ' principally involves questioning the merits of government policy' will 
not be protected by the Act. Judging when a matter falls within that section would be 
difficult in my view. For instance, while Neil Pugmire 's 133 disclosure may be argued to 
have questioned Government policy, whether it principally did so would be arguable. 
Section 4 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) specifies that the subject 
matter must relate to various types of conduct of public officials. It must at the least be 
conduct which gives reasonable grounds for dismissing the public official. Section 4 of 
the Whistle blowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) is the only one of the Australian Acts 
which does not limit the subject matter of disclosures to the public sector. 134 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1995 (UK) is even more restrictive in terms of what 
disclosures are covered. The information must be acquired during employment, it must 
tend to show the kinds of wrongdoing specified in the Schedule, and the wrongdoing 
must be of such significance that its disclosure would be a defence in the breach of 
confidence action. This is clearly flawed. The public interest defence to the breach of 
130 Defined in Schedule 6 to be a public sector employee or a member of the Legislative Assembly. Note 
that the US Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 inc ludes applicants for federal employment as 
whistleblowers, but likewise limits its application to federal employees. 
131 A sliding scale of seriousness with " improper" seeming a subjective concept. 
132 Note that the Queensland Act allows for anyone to make disclosures about "substantial and specific 
dangers" to the health and safety of a person with a disability and about reprisals (ss 19 and 20). Dr 
Wi II iam de Maria indicates that that s 19 was as a result of the 'Fanny K' case - see Dr William de Maria 
(above n 61) at p 274. 
133 See above n 82 and n I O 1. 
134 Note however that Dr William de Maria indicates that hi s research has shown that the South 
Australian Act has only be utilised five times since its inception. Dr de Maria suggests that this shows a 
lack of faith in the Act: see William de Maria (above n 61 ), p 272. 
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confidence action is not clear in scope. 135 This only reiterates the uncertainty for 
whistleblowers. 
(iv) Means of disclosure 
Each of the Australian Acts specifies that existing public sector bodies are the 
appropriate recipients of disclosures. The South Australian, Queensland and NSW 
statutes direct that the subject matter of the disclosure determines which is the 
appropriate body to disclose to, 136 with the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) 
having theoretical examples set out in Schedule 3. This leads to a quite complex and 
detailed procedure. Note that in narrow circumstances the Protected Disclosures Act 
1994 (NS W) allows for disclosures to be made to a member of Parliament or the media. 
Media disclosures are controversial. 137 Sections 9 and 10 of the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) appear to favour utilising internal procedures first, 138 and 
ensures that Government agencies are to create such procedures. The US 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 and Civil Service Reform Act 1978 establish a 
two-tiered independent body to receive and investigate disclosures. The Merit Systems 
Protection Board and the Office of Special Counsel are the appropriate bodies. 139 None 
of the Australian statutes create separate whistleblowing bodies. 140 
(v) Motive for disclosure 
Section 9 and sections 16 to 19 of the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NS W) are the 
relevant sections when considering motive. Interestingly, unlike the New Zealand Bills, 
in general terms there is no need in New South Wales for the whistleblower to have a 
belief based on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is true. 141 The only time when 
there is such a requirement is when the disclosure is made to the media or a member of 
Parliament (section 19). The general authorities to whom disclosure is to be made are 
set out in sections 10 to 15. There is no requirement of a belief in the truth of the 
disclosure. The express requirement of motivation is in section 9. What is required is for 
the disclosure to have been made voluntarily (section 9(1)). 142 A whistleblower must 
ensure however that the disclosure is not made frivolously or vexatiously or it will not 
135 
See analysis above at pp I I to 15 of this paper. 
136 For examples 11 Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) indicates that the Ombudsman is the 
appropriate body to disclose information about maladministration to. 
137 See discussion below at p 39 of this paper. The Kentucky Whistleblowers Protection Act also allows 
for media disclosures. 
138 Although the subject matter can mean that another public sector body will be appropriate - for 
example if ACT police officers were failing to pay fringe benefit tax on kickbacks thi s could be reported 
to the Police or to the tax authorities. There is also the catch-all provision ins 9(a)(iv) that an 'appropriate 
authority ' is the government agency that the whistleblower believes is appropriate. 
139 
Note that in the US Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 amendments were made to ensure that the 
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board were related but independent of each 
other - see Bruce Fisher (above n 127). 
140 
See discussion of the value of separate bodies above at n 61 and n I 04. 
14 1 
There is such a requirement in s 5 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) and not 
surprisingly, since the New Zealand Whistleblowers Protection Bill is based upon this Act, it is markedly 
similar to the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 provision. Also see above n 77. 
142 
This is in contrast to s 22 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) which expressly states that 
involuntary disclosures are protected. Involuntary disclosures would be a judicial setting and it may be 
that existing privileges for witnesses are sufficient. Dr William de Maria (above n 61) p 276 suggests that 
the reason that involuntary disclosures are not considered to be whistleblowing is because they are not 
' free acts of conscience ' . 
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be investigated (section 16). Further if the disclosure is motivated by an object of 
avoiding unrelated disciplinary action it will not be protected (section 18). 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) also deals with frivolous and vexatious 
disclosures (section 17) and interestingly, section 16 indicates that a whistleblower 
cannot anonymously make a disclosure, or risk having the disclosure not be 
investigated. This is different to the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) which 
expressly allows anonymous disclosures (section 27(1 )). That is probably to help the 
Criminal Justice Commission which continues its investigations into corruption in 
Queensland. The Queensland statute has no express requirement of good faith 
motivation, the only statute to lack such a requirement. 
The Queensland statute, perhaps reflecting the reason for its enactment, allows 
whistleblowers within its ambit to have any motivation at all. What is important is that 
the disclosure is made not the reason for it. The other Australian statutes have various 
. f d .c: . l 143 reqmrements o goo 1a1t 1. 
(vi) Protections offered 
The final point of analysis is what protection is offered under overseas legislation. 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 (US) offers whistleblowers the chance to take 
court action themselves if subjected to retaliatory conduct. The Office of Special 
Counsel is also available to investigate and take action on its own behest. The Merit 
Systems Protection Board can issue protective orders. Action can be taken against 
employees who instigate reprisals - fines and suspension are available options. 144 The 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 amended the Civil Service Reform Act 1978 in an 
important respect. The nexus between the retaliation and the whistleblowing is easier to 
prove - whistleblowing now has to be a factor behind the retaliatory conduct not the 
significant or motivating factor.
145 
Sections 25 to 32 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) make engaging in an 
'unlav.,ful reprisal' 146 an offence. The penalty is $10,000 147 and/or 1 year's 
imprisonment. Section 25(2) gives a broad defence to an action however. It is similar to 
the Mount Healthy judgment in the United States. 148 Where the reprisal action was 
engaged in prior to the whistleblowing and where there were reasonable grounds for 
engaging in that action, that is a defence to an action alleging an unlawful reprisal. This 
lessens the scope of the provisions. Section 30 gives the Ombudsman the ability to take 
143 See Bruce Fisher (above n 127) p 374. There is a clash of authority in the United States about whether 
motive is relevant - see Gady v Department of Navy 38 MSPR I J 8 ( 1988) and Fiorillo v US Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Prisons 795 F 2d 1544 (Fed.Cir 1986). 
144 J G Starke QC (above n 61) p 259. 
145 See Bruce Fisher (above n 127) p 405. See also Mount Healthy Board of Education v Doyle 429 US 
274 ( 1976) where the Board was able to dismiss an outspoken employee by pointing to other conduct as 
their motivation. 
146 Defined broadly in s 2 as conduct that causes or threatens to cause detriment, either to a person in the 
belief that person has/will make a public interest di closure (testing the repriser1s belief may be difficult), 
or to a public official because s/he has resisted attempts to be involved in the commission ofan offence. 
147 Section 37 allows Court to impose 5 times these penalties if the defendant is a corporation. 
148 See above n 144. 
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the necessary court action on behalf of a whistle blower - not necessarily at its own 
behest. The Authority reported to can also take appropriate disciplinary action to 
prevent reprisals conunencing or continuing (sections 22(1)(e) and 22(1)(f)). Also 
available to whistleblowers is the option of relocation 149 and the possibility of a civil 
claim (with damages (section 29) or injunctions or declarations (section 30) as 
remedies). The whistleblower's identity is protected, but only so far as there is no 
reasonable excuse for revealing it. 1so Section 35 gives whistleblowers a broad 
exemption for liability in any action as a result of having made a public interest 
disclosure, including an exemption from liability under secrecy provisions. Section 34 
has a $10,000 and/or 1 year's imprisonment penalty to be imposed upon a person who 
knowingly or recklessly makes a false or misleading disclosure. 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) also has defined offences for reprisal 
action.1s1 A reprisal is an indictable offence (section 42(2)). Unlike the ACT statute the 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 has broader impact - it is sufficient that the 
whistleblowing is a substantial ground for the reprisal, even if there is another ground 
(section 41(5)). It also allows for civil claims with dan1ages and injunctions as 
remedies. 152 Section 44 directs public sector organisations to have internal mechanisms 
for dealing with whistleblowing and allows for judicial review if reprisals occur (section 
45). Section 56 makes it an offence to intentionally give a false or misleading 
disclosure. That carries the same penalty as taking reprisal action. Section 39 gives a 
broad exemption for whistleblowers from civil, criminal and disciplinary action, and 
indicates that whistleblowing will not be a breach of any secrecy enactment or oath 
either. Section 6 preserves the common law and other remedies available to 
whistle blowers. Retention of the common law leads to some confusion for 
whistleblowers. 
The Queensland and ACT statutes reveal a breadth of protection that is not 
contemplated in either of the New Zealand Bills. 153 Both Acts act against reprisals. The 
Queensland statute encourages there to be effective internal procedures available. Both 
statutes also have reasonably heavy penalties available for false disclosures. The ACT 
statute is undermined by the broad defence in section 25(2) which enables a repriser to 
escape liability. The US Act specifically authorises action to be taken at the behest of 
the Office of Special Council, not necessarily the whistleblower. Neither Australian Act 
has such a provision. 
149 See Dr William de Maria Fridges that Don 't Free::e ... Planes that Don 't Fly ... Laws that don 't work 
... Design Failure in Australia 's Whistleblower Legislation (Unpublished paper presented to the second 
National Whistleblowers Conference, Melbourne, June 1996) p 15 - Dr de Maria suggests that it is 
reprisers who should be relocated. 
150 Section 33 gives a penalty of $5 ,000 for releasing identifying information if there is no reasonable 
excuse for doing so. 
15 1 Section 41 defines reprisals, and s 42 sets out the penalty 167 penalty units or 2 years ' imprisonment. 
152 Relocation is also possible - s 46, buts 46(5) requires the consent of the CEO if transferring across 
Departments. Identity is also generally protected - s 55 - like the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 (New 
Zealand) the broad exception is where natural justice demands release. 
153 Note that the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) has similar remedies to the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994 (New Zealand) - i.e giving immunity from civil and criminal liability (s 5), 
protecting identity (s 7) , establishing a tort of victimisation (s 9) leaving the whistleblower to take action 
and leaving other immunities in place while possibly codifying the common law (s 11). 
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3. Conclusion 
In terms of scope, the overseas legislation is narrower that the New Zealand Bills 
because the overseas legislation generally only relates to the public sector. The 
Queensland and New South Wales statutes go as far as restricting both the subject 
matter and who can be a whistleblower. 154 The Australian statutes also set up an overly 
complex set of procedures where the subject matter of the disclosure defines which 
authorities a disclosure must be reported to. The New Zealand Protected Disclosures 
Bill 1996 also has a complex set of procedures, but does not link those procedures with 
subject matter. However, almost without exception, the Australian and US statutes give 
better protection for whistleblowers that the New Zealand Bill do. Further there is active 
discouragement for people making false disclosures. 
The New Zealand Bills are only more favourable in one respect - they extend into the 
private sector. Whether whistleblowing reform should extend into the private sector and 
whether the media ought to be an appropriate authority to disclose to are discussed 
below. 
·E Two Issues Discussed 
1. Public and Private Sectors 
(i) Whether both should be covered 
There is debate about whether whistleblowing legislation ought to extend into the 
private sector. In the introductory debate for the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994 
the Government's view was that it should not. 155 Many submissions were also of the 
view that this was unnecessary regulation of the private sector, 156 but on the whole it 
was recognised that there were valid reasons to extend whistleblowing reform to the 
private sector. 157 The Ministerial Review Team 158 made it clear that in their view both 
sectors ought to be covered by legislation because of the blurring of the division 
between the two sectors. It was also recognised that a number of significant public 
interest issues would also be significant in the private sector - for example issues of 
health and safety and the environment. It was also recognised that private sector 
employees ought to have the same remedies available as their public sector counterparts. 
Limiting whistleblowing legislation to the public sector is shortsighted in my view. In 
addition to the reasons outlined by the Ministerial Review Team it is clear that public 
154 
The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1995 (UK) is even more restrictive in ambit. See Dr William de 
Maria The British Whistleblowers Protection Bill - A Shield Too Smalt:? Unpublished paper, November 
1995. 
155 
See above n 99 . Although Paul East (at p 1753) proposed 'starting' with the public sector and then 
moving to covering the private sector. Also see Bruce Fisher (above n 127) at p 357 who supports the US 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 not extending into the private sector, partially because the private 
sector is covered by exceptions to the US employment at will doctrine, and partially because in Fisher's 
view the public sector is more susceptible to whistleblowing. 
156 
Notably the New Zealand Employers Federation Inc (above n 63). 
157 
See Bruce Slane (above n 61) and State Services Commission (above n I 04) - who both recognise that 
the blurring of the division between the public and private sectors is an important reason why 
whistleblowing reform ought to cover both sectors. 
158 
See above n I, pp 2 - 4. 
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interest disclosures will also occur in the private sector. Both public and private sector 
organisations can have general impact - for example both sectors have the capacity to 
affect the environment negatively. Both sectors ought therefore to be covered by any 
reform. 
(ii) Treating public sector whistleblowers differently 
While both public and private sector whistleblowers ought to be covered by any reform 
there is a case for saying that public sector whistleblowers should be treated differently 
than their private sector counterparts. That is because public sector employees have 
different obligations to private sector employees. In addition to any professional 
obligations of confidence public servants have greater obligations of secrecy imposed 
by legislation and the Public Service Code of Conduct. Further, the consequences of 
disclosure are harsher for public servants. Section 78A of the Crimes Act 1961 makes it 
an offence punishable by three years' imprisonment to wrongfully communicate or 
retain official information knowing that it is likely to prejudice the security or defence 
of New Zealand. 159 The Public Service Code of Conduct is explicit, requiring public 
. d . . 11 160 servants to commumcate wrong omg mtema y. 
Arguably these obligations of secrecy are necessary because of the special nature of 
public service employment. 161 Public sector employment involves dealing with 
information that has been gathered from the public in the public interest. Public sector 
employees have access to a great deal of information about members of the public. The 
Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 recognises that public service employment has special 
features. Clause 6 requires disclosures to be via internal mechanisms and clause 11 
requires public sector organisations to have internal mechanisms. 
Going against the secrecy provisions and instruments mentioned above which seek to 
limit the disclosure of information, cases for breach of confidence taken by the State 
have been treated differently than other breach of confidence cases. It seems that a 
Government plaintiff must show an additional public interest beyond merely the public 
interest in the preservation of confidence before disclosure of the information will be 
restrained. The additional public interest can be something like national security or 
159 Note that commentary in Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington 1996) pp I F-7 
to I F-10 indicates that this provision has the potential for wide application. Compare with the stricter UK 
Official Secrets Act 1989 where disclosures about certain matters (eg defence, national security) are a 
criminal offence no matter what the knowledge of the offender. See also s 25 of the Armed Forces 
Discipline Act 1971 for a sim i Jar provision with a penalty of two years' imprisonment and s 221 Tax 
Administration Act 1994 for a provision with the possibility of a term of six months ' imprisonment or a 
$15,000 fine. 
160 See pp 13, 14 and I 7 Public Service Code of Conduct. Note that the Code of Conduct suggests that 
there is a responsibility to the Minister of the particular Department and not the public in general. 
161 JG Starke QC (above n 61); Leo Tsaknis (above n 30); Richard Fox Protecting the Whistleblower 
( 1993) 15 Adel LR 137, 148; compare Dr William de Maria Whistleb/owers and Secrecy: Ethical 
Emissaries from the Public Sect[ot] (Unpublished paper presented to the 'Freedom of the Press ' 
Conference, Bond University, I I ovember 1995) who claims that such secrecy requirements run 
counter to the idea of open government and are really indicative of government control of dissent. Dr de 
Maria also points to the extraordinary number of secrecy requirements in Queensland and questions 
whether the public service is really a secret service. 
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defence. In Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Limitei 62 the passage of time (some 6 
years) lessened the impact of disclosure of information from Cabinet meetings. The 
doctrine of joint Cabinet responsibility was not undermined by disclosure. In 
Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Lti 63 the High Court of Australia 
held: 
The Court determines the government claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless 
disclosure is likely to injure the public interest it will not be protected. 
Where the case is finely balanced, the High Court indicated that the public interest in 
knowing and expressing its opinion outweighs the need to protect confidentiality. This 
seems consistent with the focus on freedom of information in Government and on 
accountability. Where national security is threatened however the Courts will not 
hesitate to restrain the information. 164 In general though, while the public sector has 
endeavoured to position itself as a sector requiring secrecy, the Courts have indicated 
that there is a presumption of disclosure when dealing with public sector information. 
There is clear inconsistency between the two positions. 
In a sense the issue of whether a public service whistle blower ought to be treated 
differently depends upon the nature of the disclosure. If the disclosure reveals 
information about a member of the public it is arguable that internal mechanisms ought 
to be used first in order to protect and encourage the public to give information to public 
sector organisations. Privacy issues arise in that situation as well. However of the 
disclosure does not reveal information of that nature it is arguable that public sector 
whistleblowers need not be treated differently than private sector whistleblowers. Often 
the difficulty is that the line between these two sorts of disclosure by public service 
whistleblowers is hard to draw. 165 In other words just because the information is 
governmental does not mean that it requires special protection. This is what the Courts 
were grappling with in the John Fairfax and Jonathan Cape cases. 
It is a difficult balance to strike between the protection of the public through retaining 
secrecy in the public service and encouraging and protecting public servants who 
disclose wrongdoing in the public service. Other policy factors such as freedom of 
information, which suggests that public sector information should not be unduly 
restricted, also have to be considered when dealing with public sector disclosures. 
Public service whistleblowers ensure there is accountability in the public sector. For that 
reason they are valuable and should be protected. To balance all the competing interests 
some specially tailored rules could be created for the public service. Where the 
whistle blowing identifies a member of the public it could be encouraged to be internal 
162 Above n 16. Also note Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd (above n 15) weighs the 
importance of freedom of speech into the mix. 
16" 
J Above n 16, p 52. 
164 See Attorney-Genera/ v Guardian Newspapers (No.2) (above n 2) - the "Spycatcher" case and Snepp 
v United States above n I 6 which has very similar facts. Note however Alforney-Genera/ for UK v 
Wellington Newspapers Ltd [ 1988] I NZLR 129 that it seems that the national security issues have to be 
within the country where the publication is being sought to be restrained otherwise there will not be an 
acute enough public interest in restraining confidentiality. 
165 For instance the Pugmire case involved a disclosure by a public service employee (ifCHEs are viewed 
as public sector organisations) which identified a patient but had its main focus about deficiencies in the 
Mental I lea Ith (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. See above n 82 and n IOI. 
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or to be confidential (perhaps to be made to a Parliamentary Committee if a particular 
issue relevant to the Department of State is being analysed). If the whistle blower uses 
other mechanisms protection could be limited to situations where: 
- the public service whistleblower had reasonable grounds for believing that the 
disclosure was true; 
- the disclosure was shown to be substantially true; and 
- notwithstanding the failure to use established procedures, in the circumstances the 
course taken was excusable. 
Those limitations on disclosing information which identifies member of the public 
would balance the public interest in retaining secrecy alongside the public interest in 
encouraging the efficient operation of the public service, which whistleblowing would 
help regulate. Disclosures of information about maladministration and corruption in the 
public service could be through any channels. This would encourage public confidence 
in the accow1tability of the public sector. Proposals of this nature form a part of the 
Public Interest Disclosure Bill in Appendix I of this paper. 
2. Media Disclosure 
Another issue to consider is whether disclosures to the media ought to be protected. 
Neither New Zealand Bill contemplates disclosures to the media being protected 
disclosures. 166 The freedom of the press may arguably be undermined by these Bills. It 
is consistent with case law to suggest that in certain circumstances disclosures to the 
media can be considered protected. 167 In NZALPA v Air New Zealand Ltd' 68 Cooke P 
specifically noted that in certain acute circumstances, for example public safety, 
disclosure to the media would be justified. Section 19 of the Protected Disclosures Act 
1994 (NSW) allows for disclosures to the media in narrow circumstances. 169 Those 
narrow circumstances require a whistleblower waiting for six months before the media 
can be used. The New South Wales Act and NZALPA contemplate two different 
scenarios when disclosure to the media may be appropriate. In the first situation it is 
where no other avenues have been effective. In the second it is where the matter is of 
such urgency and such general effect that the media ought to be used to inform the 
public as quickly as possible. 
Both situations do seem to warrant disclosures to the media. Another reason to allow 
media disclosures is to promote the freedom of the press. The media is also a useful tool 
to ensure the public accountability of organisations. In my view disclosures to the media 
ought to be contemplated and ought to be protected. There is a risk that a media 
disclosure can harm reputation unduly. Media disclosures could be limited to those 
matters of acute urgency and there would need to be onerous punishments for 
whistleblowers who disclose to the media knowing the disclosure to be false. The focus 
166 Neither does Catherine Webber (above n 14) at p 935 - her definition of "whistleblower" specifically 
excludes those who disclose to the media. 
167 See Lion laboratories Ltd v Evans (above n 27), Initial Services Ltd v Putterill (above n 4) and Cork 
v Mc Vicar (above n 39). 
168 Above n 41. 
169 Where the disclosure is substantially true and the matter had been previously referred to an Authority 
who failed within 6 months to investigate. 
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ought to be on the public interest in the in the subject of the disclosure, not to whom the 
disclosure is being made. 
F Conclusion 
Part IV analysed several Acts and Bills and briefly discussed two important points that 
need to be considered when looking at reform in this area. 
The analysis revealed that the Protected Disclosures Bill is flawed. It did not compare 
favourably with any of the other legislation, except that it applies to the private sector as 
well as the public sector. It creates a complicated procedure and leave protections to the 
whistleblower to instigate. Further, it leaves the unclear common law in place 
presumably on the basis that it will add flexibility. All of this leads to more uncertainty 
for whistleblowers. It does not reform this area. It effectively discourages 
whistleblowers. 
Part IV also considered two particular points: first whether the public and private sectors 
ought both be covered by whistleblowing reform and, if so, whether the public sector 
ought to be treated differently. It was concluded that both sectors ought to be covered 
and that in circumstances where disclosures were about members of the public there was 
a case for public service whistleblowers being treated differently than private sector 
whistleblowers. The second point that was considered was whether the media is an 
appropriate body to make disclosures to. It was concluded that the media can be an 
appropriate body and that the focus should not be on the recipient of the disclosure but 
on the subject matter of the disclosure. It was also considered that media disclosures 
require special protections to be in place to ensure that the media is not used 
inappropriate] y. 
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V CONCLUSION 
[I]t 's a curious culture we have nurtured when special laws must be passed to protect 
peopf e from being ostracised for telling the truth. 
The Independent 
'Whistle blower Bills leave the foxes in charge of I he henhouse' 
13 September 1996, page 32 
Whistleblowing leads to increased accountability and ensures that society's standards 
continue to be high. Whistleblowing by its very nature is in the public interest. Studies 
have shown that whistleblowers suffer from reprisals for acting in the public interest. 
Reprisals can be anything from facing a civil Jaw suit to dismissal from employment to 
demotion and ostracism. This paper started with the premise that reprisals are not 
acceptable and that whistleblowing ought to be encouraged and protected. 
This paper began by considering the current legal position for whistleblowers. Currently 
a whistleblower can be justifiably dismissed from employment for making a public 
interest disclosure, and can face Court action even after dismissal. The defences 
available to whistleblowers are piecemeal, limited to specific statutes or in the ill-
defined common law public interest defence. While international instruments and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 are growing in prominence they have not had a 
great impact in this area in New Zealand and are arguably limited in scope. The reprisals 
suffered by whistleblowers are not contemplated by the current protections which only 
grant limited defences against certain types of Court action. It was concluded that the 
current situation was a negative environment for whistleblowers which did not foster 
accountability and the high standards of behaviour we should expect. The current law 
did nothing to value, encourage and protect whistleblowers. For those reasons reform is 
necessary. 
Two options for reform were considered. There were many options for statutory reform. 
Industrial reform would involve leaving organisations themselves to set up their own 
tailored internal procedures. It was concluded that a combination of the two options 
would be most likely to be enacted. However it was also recognised that to ensure 
reform was effective the statutory reform ought to take precedence where it and internal 
mechanisms conflicted, and to ensure consistency the statutory reform should set a 
minimum standard for internal mechanisms to comply with. A proposal for a new Bill, 
the Public Interest Disclosure Bill, forms Appendix I of this paper. 
It was recognised that any reform could not be completely effective against the more 
subtle sorts of reprisals. However reform could foster a more positive environment for 
whistleblowers which would make such subtle reprisals less likely. It was also 
recognised that any reform had to ensure that there was a balance between the rights of 
the whistleblower and the rights of the subject of the disclosure. For instance any Bill 
ought to have a provision ensuring that intentionally false disclosures would be 
vigorously punished. 
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The current proposal, the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, was analysed and 
comparisons were made with other Acts and Bills including the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994. The Protected Disclosures Bill was revealed to be flawed. It does 
not achieve the reform that is needed . It adds to the current uncertainty, putting in place 
a complex procedure, extremely limited protections, and judging whistle blowers harshly 
in terms of their motives for disclosure. The Protected Disclosures Bill adds to and does 
not alleviate the problems in this area. 
This paper concludes that comprehensive reform is needed and the Protected 
Disclosures Bill does not give that reform. Statutory reform ought to codify and clarify 
the common law, it ought not to be limited unnecessarily, it ought to cover both public 
and private sectors while recognising that public sector whistleblowers ought on 
occasion be treated differently, it ought to provide remedies and penalties for reprisals 
and for intentionally false disclosures, and it ought to provide for a body apart from the 
whistleblower to take action against reprisals at its own behest. Finally the statutory 
reform ought to encourage and value whistleblowing. Industrial reform ought to be 
encouraged with a minimum standard for internal mechanisms set by statute. Only this 
sort of reform would truly alleviate the problems with the law at present and provide 
real protection for genuine whistleblowers. 
A proposed statute which achieves the above forms Appendix I of this paper. 
Commentary is also included in Appendix I. This proposal is in part a compendium of 
the best matters from the Bills and Acts considered in this paper and it also includes 
three matters that are not found in any other proposal: 
(a) it actively encourages whistleblowing by awarding to the whistleblower a part of any 
monetary penalty imposed upon a person or organisation for the wrongdoing that was 
the subject of the whistleblower' s disclosure; 
(b) it allows for disclosures to the media to be protected; and 
(c) it allows for the office of the Ombudsman to investigate reprisals and to take 
prosecution action at its own behest. 
The Public Interest Disclosure Bill is not narrowly defined in scope, provides a means 
of disclosure that is flexible and not too detailed, and provides remedies for 
whistleblowers and active protections against reprisals. It also serves to encourage and 
value whistleblowing while at the same time recognising that other public interests, such 
as the secrecy of some information in the public sector, can outweigh a whistleblower' s 
freedom of speech on occasion. The Bill also encourages organisations to take 
responsibility and create internal mechanisms for such disclosures to be made. The Bill 
recognises that there has to be minimum protection for whistleblowers and ensures that 
any internal mechanisms cannot contract out of the protections available in the Bill. 
It is concluded that the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 is flawed and that the Public 
Interest Disclosure Bill proposed in this paper is the sort of Bill that is really needed to 
reform this area. 
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APPENDIX I 
New proposal 
Commentary and the Public Interest Disclosure Bill 
COMMENT ARY ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE BILL 
This commentary will be a clause by clause commentary. I will indicate the source of 
that clause and any comments about that clause. Naturally the commentary for some 
clauses will be more extensive than for others. 
Clause 1: This is the short title and commencement date of this Bill. 
Clause 2: The definitions in clause 2 are general only. The definition of 
"Ombudsman" is drawn from the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 but is extended to 
allow the Governor-General to appoint an Ombudsman to work with this Bill (like the 
Privacy Commissioner does with the Privacy Act 1993). It may be that the role 
contemplated for the Ombudsman in this Act will require extra funding for that office. 
Clause 3: This is the declaration that the Crown is bound by this Bill. 
Clause 4: This is the purpose of the Bill. It is drawn from the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994 and the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996. The difference in this 
Bill is that it seeks to also reward whistleblowers. Like the Whistleblowers Protection 
Bill , this Bill also specifically identifies how it fulfils its purpose. 
Clause 5: This clause defines the scope of this Bill. It defines who can make a public 
interest disclosure (and hence who is protected by the Bill), and what sort of subject 
matter is a public interest disclosure. Clause 5 is deliberately worded widely ensuring 
optimum coverage; anybody can be a whistleblower and in terms of subject matter 
clause 5(2)( d) is intended to ensure as far as possible that all disclosures made in the 
public interest are covered by this Bill . This Bill keeps in place the sliding scale of 
seriousness for disclosures relating to public health, public safety, the environment 
and the maintenance of law and justice. That sliding scale appears in the 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill. That reflects the view that such matters are acutely in 
the public interest and that only the most frivolous of disclosures about those matters 
will not fall within the Public Interest Disclosure Bill. The only other requirement is 
that the whistleblower believes on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is trne 
(clause 5(3)). Clauses 5(2) and 5(3) are taken in part from the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994. 
As distinct from the Whistleblowers Protection Bill and the Protected Disclosures 
Bill, the Public Interest Disclosure Bill does not restrict to whom the disclosure can be 
made. Clause 5( 4) and 5(5) are new. Those clauses are the start of an active role for 
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is notified of a disclosure and, if the whistle blower 
does not consent, the Ombudsman is consulted when the recipient of the disclosure 
wishes to refer the disclosure to another person or organisation considered more 
appropriate. Clause 5(5) specifically recognises that the whistleblower should be 
consulted when determining which authority a disclosure ought to go to. The 
notification of the Ombudsman predicts the Ombudsman's later role and allows the 
Ombudsman to monitor the situation ensuring no reprisal action occurs. 
This Bill reflects the view that what is important is that disclosures are made in the 
public interest. They should therefore be encouraged. While saying that, this Bill does 
not go as far as forcing disclosures. It does not make it a duty for certain professions 
or groups to make public interest disclosures. Such a proposal has been made for 
receivers appointed as super trustees of superannuation schemes.' Instead this Bill 
seeks to encourage voluntary disclosures in the public interest. 
Clause 6: This is a new clause. This clause follows on from clause S's broad coverage 
indicating that this Bill contemplates the media being recipients of public interest 
disclosures. This clause also reflects the view that what is important is that it is in the 
public interest for such disclosures to be made. There should not therefore be 
unnecessary restrictions on the ability to make disclosures. Clause 6(2) sets out a 
necessary restriction on a public sector whistleblower's ability to make disclosures to 
the media. This restriction is to ensure that public confidence is retained in public 
sector employees keeping information about members of the public confidential. 
Clause 6(2) recognises that in some circumstances it might be necessary for a public 
sector whistleblower to make a disclosure to the media but ensures that it is clear that 
such circumstances will be rare. 
Clause 7: This clause is drawn from section 39 of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 
1994 (Qld) and section 21 of the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW). This clause 
goes much further than do either of the proposals in the New Zealand Bills at present. 
It not only ensures that a whistleblower is not subjected to liability of any sort, it also 
ensures that the publisher of a protected disclosure is protected from a defamation 
action as well. That protects the freedom of the press in particular. 
Clause 8: This clause is loosely based upon the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 but a 
lot of it is new. This clause recognises that on occasion the disclosure of a 
whistleblower' s identity may be necessary to further the investigation of the 
disclosure and to ensure natural justice is complied with. This Bill recognises that 
there are different interests that will need to be balanced. However this clause limits 
such circumstances by ensuring that the whistleblower or the Ombudsman must 
authorise the disclosure. This clause also ensures that the whistleblower is informed 
that his or her identity will be released and when that will be. Because this is a 
statutory power of decision judicial review proceedings may be possible. 
Clause 9: This is a new clause. This clause in particular seeks to encourage 
whistleblowing. It also seeks to recognise that whistleblowing performs a valuable 
role and should be rewarded. Where there is a link between the whistleblowing and 
the monetary penalty imposed on the person or organisation named in the disclosure 
the whistleblower is awarded a portion of that monetary penalty. If property is seized 
the whistleblower may then be rewarded a sum of money which reflects the market 
value of that property. In both cases the amount that may be awarded is left to the 
discretion of the Court or Tribunal which determines the penalty. 
1 
This proposal was buried in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill (No 5) 1996 - see 
Independent "" Whistleblowers infiltrate super schemes" 26 April 1996, p I. 
Clause 10: This clause is loosely based upon the clause 20 of the Whistle blowers 
Protection Bill 1994. It again reflects the role in this Bill for the Ombudsman ensuring 
that office as well as the recipient of the disclosure have a role in informing the 
whistleblower of the rights and obligations involved in this Bill. It is recognised that 
this Bill assumes that the recipients of disclosures will be aware of this Bill and will 
be able to perform this task. That would clearly require publication and education 
across the private and public sectors. 
Clause 11: This is a new clause. It allows for internal whistleblowing procedures to 
be in place within organisations. However it ensures that any whistleblower within an 
organisation continues to have access to the remedies outlined in this Bill if he or she 
is subjected to a reprisal. This clause has at its heart a view that organisations need to 
take responsibility for whistleblowing. 
Clause 12: This clause is in part based upon section 41 of the Whistleblowers 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld). It defines a reprisal action. Clause 12(2) ensures that 
where there are a number of reasons for the reprisal including the public interest 
disclosure made by the whistleblower, that whistleblower can still prove there is a 
nexus between the reprisal and the public interest disclosure. This clause also declares 
that a reprisal is an offence against this Act. Implicitly this Bill recognises that a Court 
determining penalty will consider all of the reasons for the reprisal. 
Clause 13: This clause is based in part upon clause 39 of the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994. It indicates that employers and principals are liable for the 
reprisal actions of their employees or agents. It ensures that there is impetus for 
employers or principals to ensure that their employees or agents do not take reprisal 
action against whistleblowers. Clause 13(2) in combination with clause 11 encourages 
employers or principals to have internal procedures available. Clause 13(2) gives an 
employer or a principal a defence if all reasonable steps have been taken to prevent 
reprisals and internal procedures must form a part of those steps. 
Clause 14: This clause is based in part upon clauses 29 to 32 of the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill 1994, clause 14 of the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 and section 42 
of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) . It sets out the remedies available to 
whistleblowers who are subjected to reprisals. The personal grievance procedures in 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 are available, the procedures in the Human 
Rights Act are available and the Bill also authorises the whistleblower to pursue an 
action in tort for damages, for instance based upon stress and mental anguish. Clause 
14 also specifically recognises that in certain circumstances a judicial review action 
may be possible against a public sector organisation which has internal mechanisms in 
place to deal with whistleblowers. This ensures that public sector organisations have 
judgments and have procedures in place to make internal procedures effective. 
Clause 15: This is a new clause. Again this clause continues the trend of a high level 
of involvement by the Ombudsman. This clause enables the Ombudsman to prosecute 
an individual or company which commits a reprisal. The Ombudsman can do this 
without the necessity for a complaint from a whistleblower. That ensures that there is 
proactive protection for whistleblowers and recognises that reprisal action can leave a 
whistleblower in a very difficult position. It is recognised that such an active role for 
the Ombudsman would require special funding to that office. The Ombudsman was 
chosen for this particularly active role because it is considered that a new specialist 
body is not needed and such a proposal is unlikely to be supported. In my view the 
Office of the Ombudsman has high public standing and epitomises accountability. 
Clause 16: This clause is based upon the penalty sections in the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) (sections 25 - 32) and the Whistleblowers Protection Act 
1994 (Qld) (sections 41 and 42). It provides for monetary penalties to be imposed 
upon individuals and organisations that are responsible for reprisals. Differing 
penalties are imposed, with a higher level of penalty on organisations. This further 
encourages corporates to ensure that the workplace does not cultivate a culture that 
accepts and encourages reprisals. Further, the Court may award that a portion of the 
fine be paid to the whistleblower. This is intended to be a kind of monetary 
compensation for the whistleblower. 
Clause 17: This clause is likewise drawn from the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1994 (ACT) and the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld). This clause indicates 
that it is an offence punishable by a $20,000 fine to knowingly or recklessly make a 
false public interest disclosure. It is important to ensure that the rights of those named 
in such false disclosures are protected (clause 5(3) indicates that knowingly false 
disclosures are not protected under this Bill so proceedings for instance in defamation 
are a possibility) and to ensure that the principle behind this Bill is not undermined. 
That principle is that whistleblowers make disclosures in this public interest. 
Knowingly or recklessly making a false disclosure would not be in the public interest. 
Clause 18: This clause is new. It indicates that the common law public interest 
defence is codified by this Bill. This ensures some certainty in this area of the law. 
The common law public interest defence was uncertain in scope - this Bill clarifies 
what types of disclosure will fall within it and what action a disclosure made under 
this Bill is protected from - the common law public interest defence was uncertain as 
to its requirements - this Bill clears up that uncertainty, in general it does not matter to 
whom the disclosure is made nor the motive of the whistle blower. This clause also 
indicates that there can be specialist protective sections in particular statutes which 
remain in place but that Part III of this Bill is unaffected by any such statutes. This 
ensures that all whistleblowers have access to the remedies available in this Bill. 
Clause 19: This clause simply lists the Acts that will need to be amended as a result 
of this Bill. 
Clause 20: This clause is taken from clause 20 of the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 
and in part from clause 19 of the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994. It provides that 
the Minister of Justice must prepare a report and Parliament must formally review the 
operation of this Bill after it has operated for five years. This would enable Parliament 
to ensure that whistleblowers are effectively protected from reprisals, that the Bill has 
worked to limit the number of reprisals and that the Bill has worked to encourage 
organisations to have procedures to deal with whistleblowing. The move away from 
the State Services Minister ( as in clause 20 of the Protected Disclosures Bill) to the 
Minister of Justice reflects this Bill's focus on justice. 
Concluding comments 
The Public Interest Disclosure Bill is a better BiJl than either of the New Zealand Bills 
in three broad respects: 
- its coverage - this Bill is not narrow in scope. It is directed at providing optimum 
coverage; 
- its requirements - this Bill does not have difficult and detailed requirements. It seeks 
to encourage whistleblowing, not discourage it; 
- its codification of the common law public interest defence - this Bill ensures that 
uncertainty is resolved. 
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A BILL INTITULED 
An Act to promote the public interest by facilitating, encouraging, rewarding 
and protecting persons who make disclosures of information in the public 
interest 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement - (1) This Act may be cited as the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1996. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1st day of July 1997. 
PARTI 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
2. Interpretation - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.-
"Media" includes a journalist and includes all forms of print or electronic media: 
"Ombudsman" means as Ombudsman holding office under the Ombudsmen Act 
1975; and includes -
(a) Any person holding office under an Ombudsman to whom any of the powers of an 
Ombudsman have been delegated under section 28 of that Act; and 
(b) Any person whom an Ombudsman or the Governor-General by Order in Council 
has appointed to perform an Ombudsman's functions under this Act: 
"Organisation" includes all private sector and public sector bodies: 
"Person" includes natural persons: 
"Public interest disclosure" has the meaning set out in section 5 of this Act: 
"Reprisal" has the meaning set out in section 12 of this Act: 
"Whistleblower" means a person who makes a public interest disclosure in terms of 
section 5 of this Act: 
3. Act to bind the Crown - This Act binds the Crown. 
4. Purpose of this Act - (1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the public interest 
by facilitating, encouraging, rewarding and protecting persons who make disclosures 
of information in the public interest. 
(2) For attaining its purpose, this Act -
(a) provides encouragement and rewards for public interest disclosures by awarding a 
whistleblower a portion of any monetary penalty imposed as a result of that 
whistle blower's public interest disclosure; 
(b) clarifies and codifies the common law making the law more certain for 
whistle blowers; 
( c) provides protection from reprisals by providing penalties for reprisals, providing 
whistleblowers with remedies and by providing that the Ombudsman can prosecute 
persons or organisations committing reprisals without the need for a complaint from a 
whistleblower; 
(d) ensures that only genuine public interest disclosures are encouraged by providing 
penalties for intentionally false disclosures. 
PART II 
PUBLIC I TEREST DISCLOSURES 
5. Public interest disclosures - (1) Any person can make a public interest disclosures 
and become a whistleblower in terms of this Act. 
(2) A public interest disclosure is a disclosure which relates to any conduct or activity 
by a person or organisation that-
(a) is unlawful ; or 
(b) involves the unauthorised use of public funds or resources; or 
( c) constitutes a serious risk or is injurious or dangerous to 
- public health or the health of a person; or 
- public safety or the safety of a person; or 
- the environment; or 
- the maintenance of law and justice; or 
(d) constitutes misconduct of a very serious nature. 
(3) A public interest disclosure is only protected where the whistleblower, at the time 
of making the disclosure, believes on reasonable grounds that the information is true 
or that it may be true, and involves matters of extreme urgency which justify its 
disclosure in any case. 
( 4) The person or organisation to whom the disclosure is made shall not less than 5 
days after the disclosure is made inform the Ombudsman that a disclosure has been 
made. 
(5) With the whistleblower' s or Ombudsman's consent the person or organisation to 
whom the disclosure is made may refer the disclosure to a person or organisation 
considered to be an appropriate authority to investigate the matters raised in the 
disclosure. 
6. Media disclosures - (1) A public interest disclosure can be made to the media. 
(2) Where a whistleblower who is a public service employee makes a public interest 
disclosure to the media relating to the conduct or activity of a member of the public 
and where the whistle blower gained knowledge of that conduct as a result of his other 
employment the disclosure will not be protected under this Act unless -
(a) the whistleblower had reasonable grounds at the time the disclosure was made for 
believing that the disclosure was true; and 
(b) the disclosure was shown to be substantially true ; and 
(c) in all the circumstances it was excusable for the disclosure to be made to the 
media. 
7. Immunity for public interest disclosures - (1) A whistleblower is not subject to 
any liability for making a public interest disclosure and no action, claim or demand 
may be taken against the whistleblower for making the disclosure. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) a whistleblower -
(a) does not breach a provision of an Act which imposes an obligation or 
confidentiality; and 
(b) does not breach any contractual obligation of confidentiality; and 
( c) cannot be liable for any disciplinary action; 
by reason of having made a public interest disclosure. 
(3) In a defamation proceeding a person publishing a public interest disclosure has a 
defence of absolute privilege for publishing the disclosure. 
8. Protection of identity - (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, a 
whistleblower' s identity must not be disclosed by the person or organisation to whom 
the disclosure is made, unless the whistleblower consents to its disclosure. 
(2) Where the Ombudsman agrees and where it is essential because of natural justice, 
the person or organisation may release the whistleblower' s identity. 
(3) Before a release is made pursuant to subsection (2) of this section the person or 
organisation must advise the whistleblower that his or her identity will be disclosed 
and of the date that disclosure will be made. 
9. Reward for disclosures in certain cases - (1) Where the public interest disclosure 
discloses conduct or an activity by a person or organisation that results in the 
imposition of a monetary penalty on that person or organisation, a part of that 
monetary penalty shall be awarded to the whistleblower. 
(2) The amount to be awarded shall be determined by the Court, Tribunal or 
organisation imposing that penalty. 
(3) Where the public interest disclosure discloses conduct by a person or organisation 
that results in property or money being seized by the Crown under any Act of 
Parliament a percentage of the market value of that property or a part of that money 
may be awarded to the whistleblower. 
(4) The percentage or amount to be awarded, if any, shall be determined by the Court 
or Tribunal which hears the application for seizure by the Crown. 
10. Advice and counselling - (1) The person or organisation to whom the disclosure 
is made shall inform the whistleblower of the remedies available under this Act and 
any other information relating to this Act that is requested. 
(2) After informing the Ombudsman that a disclosure has been made pursuant to 
section 5( 4) of this Act, the person or organisation to whom the disclosure is made 
shall inform the whistleblower that the Ombudsman can also provide advice and 
assistance. 
11. Internal procedures - (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section where an 
organisation has internal procedures relating to the making of public interest 
disclosures which do not conflict with this Act, those internal procedures are not 
abrogated by this Act. 
(2) Any internal procedures cannot avoid the remedies and penalties in Part III of this 
Act. 
PART III 
REMEDIES FOR REPRISALS 
12. Meaning of reprisal - (1) A reprisal is an act, omission or conduct which causes 
detriment to a whistleblower and occurs because the whistleblower has made or may 
make a public interest disclosure. 
(2) It is sufficient that the making of or possibility of making a public disclosure is 
one of the purposes of the reprisal. 
(3) A reprisal is an offence against this Act subject to the penalties outlined in section 
16 of this Act. 
13. Liability of employers and principals - (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this 
section an employer or principal is liable for acts, omissions or conduct of his or her 
employees or agents which contravenes this Act. 
(2) It shall be a defence for an employer or principal to show that all reasonable steps 
were taken to prevent the employee or agent from contravening this Act. Those 
reasonable steps must include but not be limited to the presence of an internal 
procedure to facilitate whistleblowing and ensuring that reprisals do not occur within 
the employer or principal 's organisation. 
14. Remedies for reprisals - (1) A whistleblower who is an employee within the 
meaning of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and who has suffered reprisal action 
from his or her employer or former employer can -
(a) if the reprisal consists of or includes dismissal, claim the personal grievance of 
unjustifiable dismissal under section 27(1)(a) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
with Part III of that Act applying accordingly; and 
(b) if the reprisal consists of action other than or in addition to dismissal, claim the 
personal grievance of unjustifiable disadvantage set out in section 27(1)(b) of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 , with Part III of that Act applying accordingly; and 
(2) It shall be victimisation in terms of section 66 of the Human Rights Act 1993 to 
treat a whistleblower less favourably because he or she has made a public interest 
disclosure. A whistleblower alleging victimisation shall have access to the remedies in 
the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(3) A whistleblower can also pursue a claim for damages in tort if he or she suffers 
detriment as a result of a reprisal. 
( 4) If a public sector organisation has internal procedures in accordance with sections 
11 and 13(2) of this Act, and a whistleblower is subject to a reprisal by that 
organisation, an employee or agent of that organisation, the whistleblower may pursue 
a judicial review action against that organisation. 
15. Action by Ombudsman - (1) Pursuant to section 12(3) and subsection (3) of this 
section, the Ombudsman can prosecute any person or organisation which commits a 
reprisal against a whistleblower. 
(2) Any action by the Ombudsman is not dependent upon a whistleblower making a 
complaint about a reprisal. 
(3) A prosecution by the Ombudsman under this Act will be filed in the District Court 
and the Rules of that Court will apply accordingly. 
16. Penalties for reprisals - (1) Where a natural person is convicted of the offence in 
section 12(3) of this Act, that person will be fined a sum not exceeding $20,000. 
(2) Where an organisation is convicted of the offence in section 12(3) of this Act, that 
organisation will be fined a sum not exceeding $200,000. 
(3) The Court may award that a portion of the fine imposed be paid to the 
whistleblower. 
17. Other offences and penalties - (1) It is an offence against this Act for a person to 
knowingly or recklessly make a false public interest disclosure. 
(2) The penalty for the offence in subsection (1) of this Act is a fine not exceeding 
$20,000. 
PART IV 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
18. Current protections - (1) The common law public interest defence is codified by 
this Act. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, statutory provisions which provide 
protection for whistleblowers or specifically encourage whistleblowing are not 
affected by this Act. 
(3) Section 7 of this Act and the procedure in Part III of this Act will be available to 
all whistleblowers. 
19. Amendments to other Acts - The following Acts will need to be amended as a 
result of this Act: 
(a) Human Rights Act 1993 (to provide that discrimination of a whistleblower is 
unlawful) 
(b) Ombudsmen Act 1975 (to provide that an Ombudsman's duties include those 
described in this Act). 
20. Review of the operation of this Act - (1) The Minister of Justice must, following 
consultations with the Ombudsman, not sooner than 3 years after the commencement 
of this Act, cause a report to be prepared on -
(a) the operation of this Act since its commencement; and 
(b) whether any amendments to the scope and contents of this Act are necessary or 
desirable, including an amendment to require further periodic reports to the House of 
Representatives on the operation of this Act. 
(2) The Minister of Justice must, not later than 5 years after the commencement of this 
Act lay a copy of the report before the House of Representatives. 
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A BILL INTITULED 
An Act to promote the public interest by protecting 
employees who make certain disclosures of 
information 
5 BE IT ENAGfED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement-(1) This Act may be 
cited as the Protected Disclosures Act 1996. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1st day of July 1997 . 
2. _Interpretation-In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
1 o requires,-
" Appropriate authority", without limiting the meaning of 
that term.-
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{a) Includes-
(i) The Commissioner of Police, a Deputy 
Commissioner of Police, and a senior 
member of the Police: 
(ii) The Controller and Auditor-General holding 5 
office under the Public Finance Act 19 7 7: 
(iii) The Director of the Serious Fraud Office 
under the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990, 
and any designated member of that 
Office within the meaning of that Act: 
{iv) The Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security holding office under section 5 of 
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security Act 1996: 
(v) An Ombudsman: 
{vi) The Police Complaints Authority established 
by section 4 of the Police Complaints 
Authority Act 1988, and the deputy to the 
Police Complaints Authority: 
{vii) The Solicitor-General: 
{viii) The State Services Commissioner appointed 
under section 3 of the State Sector Act 
1988, and the Deputy State Services 
Commissioner, and 
{b) Includes the head of every public sector 
organisation, whether or not mentioned in paragraph (a) 
of this definition; and 
(c) Includes a private sector body which comprises 
members of a particular profession or calling and 
which has power to discipline its members; but 
(d) Does not include-
(i) A Minister of the Crown; or 
(ii) A member of Parliament: 
"Employee", in relation to an organisation, includes-
(a) A former employee: 
(b) A homeworker within the meaning of section 2 
of the Employment Contracts Act 1991: 
{c) A person seconded to the organisation: 
(d) An independent contractor: 
(e) A person concerned in the management of the 
o~ation: 
(f) In relation to the New Zealand Defence Force, a 
member of the Armed Forces: 
"Environment" has the meaning given to it by section 2 of 
the Environment Act 1986: 
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"Intelligence and security agency" has the meaning given 
to it by section 2 (1) of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security Act 1996: 
"Maladministration" means an act, omission, or course of 
conduct that is oppressive, improperly 
discriminatory, or grossly negligent or that 
constitutes gross mismanagement: 
"Ombudsman" means an Ombudsman holding office 
under the Ombudsmen Act 1975; and indudes-
(a) Any person holding office under an 
Ombudsman to whom any of the p0wers of an 
Ombudsman have been delegated unaer section 28 
of that Act; and 
(b) Any person whom an Ombudsman has 
appainted to perform an Ombudsman's functions 
under this Act: 
"Organisation" means a body of persons, whether 
corparate or unincorp0rate, ancf whether in the 
public sector or the private sector, and includes a 
body of persons comprising one employer and one or 
more employees: 
"Protected", in relation to a disclosure of information, 
means a disclosure that is made in accordance with 
this Act: 
"Public funds or public resources" includes-
(a) Public money and public stores within the 
meaning of the Public Finance Act 1 9 7 7 : 
(b) Money and stores of a Government agency, or 
of a local authority, within the meaning of the Public 
Finance Act 19 7 7: 
(c) Money and stores of-
(i) A Crown entity within the meaning of the 
Public Finance Act 1989: 
(ii) A State enterprise within the meaning of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986: 
(iii) A local authority trading enterprise within 
the meaning of section 594B ( 1) of the 
Local Government Act 1974: 
(iv) An air!)Ort company within the meaning of 
the Afrrort Authorities Act 1966: 
(v) A p0rt company within the meaning of the 
Port Companies Act 1988: 
(vi) Any energy company within the meaning of 
the Energy Companies Act 1992, 
including any company or other entity 
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that is deemed, by section 7 8 or section 81 
of that Act, to be an energy company for 
the purposes of sections 36, 3 7, 39 to 46, 
85, 87, and 88 of that Act: 
(vii) Any energy supply operation to which 5 
section OC 2 of the Income Tax Act 1994 
applies: 
(viii) The New Zealand Local Government 
Association limited: 
(ix) Any company or any other organisation (as 10 
defined in section 594B (2) of the Local 
Government Act 1974) of which the New 
Zealand Local Government Association 
Limited has control directly or indirectly 
by any means whatsoever: 15 
"Public official" means a person who-
(a) Is an employee of a public sector organisation; 
or 
(b) Is concerned in the management of a public 
sector organisation: 20 
"Public sector organisation" means-
(a) An organisation named or specified in the First 
Schedule to the Ombudsmen Act 197 5: 
(b) An organisation named in the First Schedule to 
the Official Information Act 1982: 25 
(c) A local authority or public body named or 
specified in the First Schedule to the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 
1987 : 
(d) The Office of the derk of the House of 30 
Representatives: 
(e) The Parliamentary Service: 
(f) An intelligence and security agency: 
"Serious wrongdoing" means-
(a) The unlawful, corrupt, or irregular use of public 35 
funds or public resources: 
(b) Any other act, omission, or course of conduct 
that constitutes-
(i) An offence; or 
(ii) Maladministration by a public official; or 40 
(iii) A serious risk to public health, or public 
safety, or the environment; or 
(iv) A serious risk to the maintenance of law, 
including the prevention, investigation, 
Protected Disclosures 5 
and detection of offences, and the right to 
a fair oial,-
whether the wrongdoing occurs before or after the 
commencement of this Act. 
5 S. Act to bind the Crown-This Act binds the Crown. 
10 
15 
20 
4. Purpose of Act-The purpose of this Act is to promote 
the public interest by protecting employees who, in 
accordance with this Act, make disclosures of information 
about serious wrongdoing in or by an organisation. 
Protected Disclosures 
5. Disclosures to which Act applies-Where an 
employee of an organisation-
(a) Has information about serious wrongdoing in or by that 
organisation; and 
(b) Believes on reasonable grounds that the infonnation is 
true or likely to be true; and 
(c) Wishes to disclose the information so that the senous 
wrongdoing can be investigated; and 
(d) Wishes the disclosure of the information to be 
protected.-
that employee may disclose the information in the manner 
provided by this Act. 
6. Disclosure must be made in accordance with 
internal procedures-Subject to sections 7 to 10 of this Act, an 
25 employee must disclose information in the manner/rovided 
by internal procedures established and publishe in the 
organisation, or the relevant part of the organisation, for 
receiving and dealing with infonnation about serious 
30 
35 
wrongdoing. 
7. Disclosure may be made to head of organisation in 
certain circumstances-Subject to section 10 of this Act, a 
disclosure of infonnation may be made to the head or a 
deputy head of the organisation, if-
(a) The organisation has no internal procedures established 
and published for receiving and dealing with 
inf onnation about serious wrongdoing; or 
(b) The employee making the disclosure believes on 
reasonable grounds that the person to whom the 
wrongdoing should be reported in accordance with 
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the internal procedures is or may be involved in the 
serious wrongdoing alleged in the disclosure; or 
(c) The employee making the disclosure believes on 
reasonable grounds that the person to whom the 
wrongdoing should be reported in accordance with 5 
the mternal procedures is, by reason of any 
relationship or association with a person who is or 
may be involved in the serious wrongdoing alleged in 
the disclosure, not a person to whom it is appropriate 
to make the disclosure. I O 
8. Disclosure may be made to appropriate authority in 
certain circumstances-Subject to section 10 of this Act, a 
disclosure of information may be made to an appropriate 
authority, if the employee making the disclosure believes on 
reasonable grounds-
15 (a) That the head of the organisation is or may be involved in 
the serious wrongcf oing alleged in the disclosure; or 
(b) That immediate reference to an appropriate authority is 
justified by reason of the urgency of the matter to 
which the disclosure relates, or some other 20 
exceptional circumstance; or 
(c) That there has been no action or recommended action on 
the matter to which the disclosure relates within 
3 months after the date on which the disclosure was 
made, despite at least 2 written requests by the 
employee for action on, or information about, the 
matter. 
25 
9. Disclosure may be made to Minister of Crown or 
Chief Ombudsman in certain circumstances-(1) Subject 
to section 10 of this Act, a disclosure of information may be 30 
made to a Minister of the Crown or the Chief Ombudsman, if 
the employee making the disclosure-
(a) Has already made substantially the same disclosure in 
accordance with section 6 or section 7 or section 8 of this 
Act; and 35 
(b) Believes on reasonable grounds that the person or 
appropriate authority to whom the disclosure was 
made-
(i) Has decided not to investigate the matter; or 
(ii) Has decided to investigate the matter but has 40 
not made progress with the investigation within 6 
months after the date on which the disclosure was 
made to the person or appropriate authority; or 
_____ ......,, ....... --~----
5 
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(iii) Has investigated the matter but has not taken 
any action in respect of the matter nor 
recommended the talcing of action in respect of the 
matter, as the case may require; and 
(c) Continues to believe on reasonable grounds that the 
information disclosed is true or likely to be true. 
(2) A disclosure under this section may be made to the Chief 
Ombudsman only if-
(a) It is in respect of a public sector o~tion; and 
10 
(b) It has not already been ma.de to an Ombudsman under 
section 8 of this Act. 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
10. Special rules on disclosures relating to intelligence 
and security and international relations-(!) Except as 
provided in this section, sections 6 to 9 of this Act do not apply 
to-
(a) Information relating to an intelligence and security 
agency; and 
(b) Information relating to the international relations of the 
Government of New Zealand or intelligence and 
security matters involving-
(i) The Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet; or 
(ii) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; or 
(iii) The Ministry of Defence; or 
(iv) The New Zealand Defence Force. 
(2) The disclosure of such information-
(a) Must be made in the manner provided by internal 
procedures established and published in the 
organisation, or the relevant part of the organisation, 
for receiving and dealing with informauon about 
serious wrongdoing, to a person holding an 
appropriate security clearance and authorised to 
have access to the information; and 
(b) May be made to the head or a depury head of the 
organisation, if the conditions for a disclosure under 
section 7 of this Act are met; and 
(c) May be made, if the conditions for a disclosure under 
section 8 or section 9 of this Act are met, -
40 
(i) To the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, where the information relates to an 
intelligence and security agency; and 
(ii) To the Chief Ombudsman, where the 
information relates to the international relations of 
the Government of New Zealand or intelligence and 
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security matters involving an organisation ref erred to 
in subsection (1) (bi of this section,-
and to no other person. 
(3) Neither the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
nor the Chief Ombudsman shall disclose information received 5 
under this section except in accordance with the provisions of 
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996 or 
the Ombudsmen Act 19 7 5, as the case may be. 
11. Public sector organisations to establish internal 
procedures-( 1) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, not later 1 O 
than 6 months after the commencement of this Act, every 
public sector organisation must have in operation appropriate 
mtema.l procedures for receiving and dealing with information 
about serious wrongdoing in the organisation. 
(2) The internal procedures referred to in subsection (1) of this 
section must comply with the principles of natural justice. 
15 
(3) Infonnation about the existence of the internal 
procedures referred to in subsection (1) of this section, and 
adequate information on how to use those procedures, must 
be widely published within the organisation and must be 20 
republished at regular intervals. 
(4) This section does not apply to-
(a) A State enterprise within the meaning of the State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986: 
(b} A local authority trading enterprise within the meaning 
of section 594B (1) of the Local Government Act 
1974. 
25 
12. Information and guidance for employees malc.ing 
disclosures-( 1) Subject to subsections (2) and (31 of this section, 
where an employee notifies the Office of the Ombudsmen, 30 
orally or in wnting, that he or she has disclosed, or is 
considering the disclosure of, information under this Act, an 
Ombudsman must provide information and guidance to that 
employee on the following matters: 
(a) The kinds of disclosures that are protected under this Act: 
(b) The manner in which, and the persons to whom, 
information may be disclosed under this Act: 
(c) The broad role of each authority referred to subparagraphs (i) 
to (viii) of paragraph (a) of the defmition of the term 
"appropriate authority" in section 2 of this Act: 
(d) The protections and remedies available under this Act 
and the Human Rights Act 1993 if the disclosure of 
35 
40 
0 
5 
0 
5 
) 
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inf orrnation in accordance with this Act leads to 
victimisation of the person making the disclosure: 
(e) How particular information disclosed to an appropriate 
authority may be referred to another appropriate 
authority under this Act. 
10 
(2) Where the information referred to in subsection (11 of this 
section relates to an intelligence and security agency, 
notification must be given to the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security (and to no other person) who shall 
perform the functions of an Ombudsman under subsection (11 of 
this section. 
15 
(3) Where the information referred to in subsection (11 of this 
section relates to the international relations of the Government 
of New Zealand or intelligence and security matters involving 
the organisations listed in section 10 (11 (bl of this Act, notification 
must be given to the Chief Ombudsman (and to no other 
person). 
13. Reference from one appropriate authority to 
another of information disclosed-(!) Where an 
20 appropriate authority to whom a protected disclosure of 
information is made considers, after consultation with another 
appropriate authority, that the information disclosed can be 
more suitably and conveniently investigated by that other 
appropriate authority, the appropriate authority to whom the 
25 information is disclosed may refer that information to that 
other appropriate authority. 
(2) Where, under subsection (11 of this section, information is 
referred from one appropriate authority to another, the 
appropriate authority to whom the information has been 
30 referred must promptly notify the person by whom the 
protected disclosure of information was made that the 
mformation disclosed has been so referred. 
(3) A protected disclosure of information does not, by reason 
of the mforrnation being referred under subsection (1) of this 
35 section, cease to be a protected disclosure of information. 
( 4) Nothing in this section prevents a protected disclosure of 
information being rransferred from one appropriate authority 
to another on more than one occasion. 
Protections 
40 14. Personal grievance-(1) Where an employee who 
makes a protected disclosure of information under this Act 
claims to have suffered retaliatory action from his or her 
employer or former employer, that employet, -
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(a) If that retaliatory action consists of or includes dismissal, 
may have a ix:rsonal grievance, for the purposes of 
section 27 (1) (a) of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, because of a claim of unjustifiable dismissal, 
and Part m of that Act shall apply accordingly; and 5 
(b) If that retaliatory action consists of action other than 
dismissal or includes an action in addition to 
dismissal, may have a personal grievance, for the 
purposes of section 2 7 ( 1) (b) ot the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, because of a claim described in 1 O 
section 2 7 ( 1) (b) of that Act, and Part m of that Act 
shall apply accordingly. 
(2) This section applies only to employees within the 
meaning of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
(3) This section does not apply in respect of a disclosure of 15 
information that an employee has chosen to make otherwise 
than in accordance with this Act. 
15. Immunity from civil and criminal proceedings-
( I) No person who-
(a) Makes a protected disclosure of information; or 20 
(b) Refers a protected disclosure of information to an 
appropriate authority for investigation-
is liable to any civil or aiminal proceeding or to a disciplinary 
proceeding by reason of having made or referred that 
disclosure of information. 25 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies notwithstanding any 
prohibition of or restriction on the disclosure of information 
under any enactment, rule of law, contract, oath, or practice. 
16. Confidentiality-{l) Every person to whom a protected 
disclosure is made or ref erred must use his or her best 30 
endeavours not to disclose information that might identify the 
person who made the protected disclosure unless-
(a) That person consents in writing to the disclosure of that 
information; or 
(b) The person who has acquired knowledge of the protected 35 
disclosure reasonably believes that disclosure of 
identifying information-
(i) Is essential to the effective investigation of the 
allegations in the protected disclosure; or 
(ii) Is essential to prevent serious risk to public 40 
health or public safety or the environment; or 
(iii) ls essential having regard to the principles of 
natural justice. 
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(2) A request for information under the Official Information 
Act I 982 (other than one made by a member of the Police for 
the purpose of investigating an offence) may be refused, as 
contrar}' to this Act, if it migbt identify a person who has made 
a protected disclosure. 
Miscellaneous Praui.swns 
17. False allegations-The protections conferred by this 
Act and by section 66 (1) (al of the Human Rights Act 1993 do not 
apply where the person who makes a disclosure of information 
10 makes an allegation known to that person to be false or 
otherwise acts m bad faith. 
18. Other protections preserved-This Act does not limit 
any protection, privilege, immunity, or defence, whether 
statutory or otherwise, relating to the disclosure of 
15 information. 
19. Provisions relating to Orobudsroen-(1) The 
functions and pcwers of Ombudsmen under the Ombudsmen 
Act 19 7 5 are not limited by this Act. 
(2) The Chief Ombudsman has the same pcwers in relation 
20 to investigating a disclosure of information made under-
(a) Section 9 of this Act; or 
(b) Section 10 (21 (cl of this Act where the conditions for a 
disclosure under section 9 are met, -
as Ombudsmen have in relation to a complaint under the 
25 Ombudsmen Act 197 5, but is not bound to investigate the 
disclosure of information. 
20. Review of operation of Act-(1) The Minister of State 
Services must, not sooner than 3 years after the 
commencement of this Act, cause a repcrt to be prepared 
(a) The operation of this Act since its commencement; and 30 on-
(b) Whether any amendments to the scope and contents of 
this Act are necessary or desirable, including an 
amendment to require further periodic repcrts to the 
35 House of Representatives on the operation of the 
Act. 
(2) The Minister of State Services must, not later than 
4 ye= after the commencement of this Act, lay a copy of the 
report before the House of Representatives. 
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Amendment to Human Rights Act 1993 
21. Victimisation-Section 66 (1) of the Human Rights Act 
1993 is hereby amended by repealing paragraph (a), and 
substituting the following paragraph: 
"(a) On the ground that that person, or any relative or 5 
assoaate of that person,-
"(i) Intends to make use of his or her rights under 
this Act or to make a disclosure under the Protected 
Disclosures Act 1996; or 
"(ii) Has made use of his or her rights, or 10 
promoted the rights of some other person, under 
this Act, or has made a disclosure, or has 
encouraged disclosure by some other person, under 
the Protected Disclosures Act 1996; or 
"(iii) Has given information or evidence in 15 
relation to any complaint, investigation, or 
proceeding under this Act or arising out of a 
disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 1996; 
or 
"(iv) Has declined to do an act that would 20 
contravene this Act; or 
"(v) Has otherwise done anything under or by 
reference to this Act; or". 
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A BILL INTITULED 
An Act-
(a) To facilitate and encourage, in the public interest, 
the disclosure, investigation, and correction of 
unlawful, improper, or injurious conduct or 5 
activity: 
(b) To constitute the Whistleblowers Protection 
Authority and establish procedures to deal with 
such disclosures: 
(c) To protect persons who make appropriate 10 
disclosures of public interest information: 
(d) To make provision on matters incidental thereto 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement-(1) This Act may be 
cited as the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994. 15 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1 st day of July 1995. 
PART I 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
2. _Interpretation-In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
reqwres,- 20 
"Appropriate disclosure of public interest information" 
means a disclosure made in accordance with section 6 
of this Act: 
"Complaints Division" means the Complaints Division 
referred to in section 12 ( 1) of the Human Rights Act 2 5 
1993: 
"Environment" has the same meaning as in section 2 of 
the Environment Act 1986: 
"Informant" means a person who makes a disclosure of 
public interest information under section 5 of this Act: 30 
"Protected informant status" has the meaning given to it 
in section 29 (3) of this Act: 
"Public funds or public resources" includes-
(a) Public money within the meaning of the Public 
Finance Act 19 77: 35 
(b) Public stores within the meaning of that Act: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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(c) Money and stores of a Government agency 
within the meaning of that Act: 
(d) Money and stores of a local authority within the 
meaning of that Act;-
and also includes like money and stores of-
( e) A Crown entity within the meaning of the Public 
Finance Act 1989: 
(D A State enterprise within the meaning of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986: 
(g) A local authority trading enterprise within the 
meaning of section 594B ( 1) of the Local Government 
Act 1974: 
(h) An airport company within the meaning of the 
Airport Authorities Act 1966: 
(1) A port company within the meaning of the Port 
Companies Act 1988: 
"Public interest information" means information relating 
to conduct or activity of the kind specified in 
section 5 (1) of this Act: 
"Whistleblowers Protection Authority" or "Authority" 
means the Whistleblowers Protection Authority 
constituted under section 9 of this Act. 
S. Act to bind the Crown-This Act binds the Crown. 
4. Purpose of Act-( 1) The purpose of this Act is to 
25 facilitate and encourage, in the public interest, the disclosure, 
investigation, and correction of any conduct or activity that-
( a) Concerns the unlawful, conupt, or unauthorised use of 
public funds or public resources: 
(b) Is otherwise unlawful: 
30 (c) Constitutes a significant risk or danger, or is injurious, 
to-
(i) Public health: 
(ii) Public safety: 
(iii) The environment: 
35 (iv) The maintenance of the law and justice, 
including the prevention, investigation, and detection 
of offences, and the right to a fair trial. 
(2) The purpose of this Act is further to affi.rm-
(a) That public accountability and the ethic of openness are 
40 essential elements of a democratic society and for 
promoting the wellbeing of the community: 
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(b) That informants who act in accordance with this Act 
should be recognised as acting responsibly and in the 
public interest. 
(3) For attaining its purpose, this Act-
(a) Constitutes a Whistleblowers Protection Authority and 5 
establishes procedures to facilitate and encourage 
disclosure of public interest information: 
(b) Provides for such disclosures to be properly investigated 
and dealt with: 
(c) Provides for the protection of persons (commonly known I 0 
as whistleblowers) who make disclosures of public 
interest information to the Authority: 
(d) Provides for remedies for such persons who encounter 
discrimination or harassment for disclosing public 
interest information. 15 
PART II 
DISCLOSURE OF PUBLIC INTEREST INFORMATION 
5. Making disclosure of public interest information-
( I) Public interest information is information which relates to 
any conduct or activity, whether in the public sector or in the 20 
private sector, that-
(a) Concerns the unlawful, corrupt, or unauthorised use of 
public funds or public resources: 
(b) Is otherwise unlawful: 
(c) Constitutes a significant risk or danger, or IS ll1Junous, 
to-
(i) Public health: 
(ii) Public safety: 
(iii) The environment: 
(iv) The maintenance of the law and justice, 
including the prevention, investigation, and detection 
of offences, and the right to a fair trial. 
(2) Any person may disclose public interest information to 
the Authority. 
(3) A person may disclose to the Authority-
(a) Information the disclosure of which could properly be 
withheld in accordance with-
(i) The Official Information Act 1982; or 
(ii) The Local Government Official Information and 
Meetings Act 198 7: 
(b) Personal information the disclosure of which would 
breach the Privacy Act 1993 or a code of practice 
issued under section 63 of that Act: 
25 
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(c) Information the disclosure of which another enactment 
prohibits or regulates: 
(d) Information the disclosure of which would breach a 
confidence, unless the disclosure would be in the 
public interest. 
(4) A person may disclose public interest information to the 
Authority either orally or in writing. 
(5) If a person discloses public interest information orally, 
that person shall put the information in writing as soon as is 
practicable. 
(6) The Authority shall assist any person who wishes to 
disclose public interest information to the Authority to put the 
disclosure in writing. 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 16; 1993, No. 28, ss. 34, 68; 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), 
s. 4 ( 1) 
6. Appropriate disclosures of public interest 
information-A person discloses public interest information 
appropriately if, and only if,-
(a) The person-
(i) Believes on reasonable grounds that the 
information is true; or 
(ii) Is not in a position to form a belief on 
reasonable grounds about the truth of the 
information but believes on reasonable grounds that 
the information may be true and is of sufficient 
significance to justify its disclosure so that its truth 
may be investigated; and 
(b) The person discloses that information to the Authority. 
Cf. Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), 
s. 5 (2) 
7. Immunity for appropriate disclosures of public 
interest information-No person who makes an appropriate 
disclosure of public interest information shall be subject to civil 
or criminal proceedings concerning that disclosure. 
Cf. Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), 
SS. 5 ( 1 ), 10 
8. Offence to disclose identity of informant-Every 
person commits an offence against this Act and is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $2,000 who 
discloses, or who attempts or conspires to disclose, to any 
person any information which could reasonably be expected to 
6 Whistleblowen Protection 
identify any person who has disclosed public interest 
information appropriately under this Act without that person's 
consent. 
Cf. 1985, No. 120, s. 140 ( 1) 
PART III 
WHJSTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION AUTHORITY 
9. Whistleblowers Protection Authority constituted-
( 1) There shall be appointed, as an officer of Parliament, a 
Whistleblowers Protection Authority. 
(2) Subject to section 15 of this Act, the Authority shall be 
appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of 
the House of Representatives. 
(3) The Authority shall be a corporation sole with perpetual 
succession and a seal of office, and shall have and may exercise 
all the rights, powers, and privileges, and may incur all the 
liabilities and obligations, of a natural person of full age and 
capacity. 
Cf. 1986, No. 127, s. 4; 1993, No. 28, s. 12 
5 
10 
15 
10. Functions of Authority-( 1) The functions of the 
Authority shall be- 20 
(a) To investigate any disclosure of public interest 
information made to the Authority: 
(b) To provide advice, counselling, and assistance to 
prospective informants and protected informants: 
(c) To monitor developments in relation to disclosures of 25 
public interest information: 
(d) To report to the House of Representatives or, as the case 
may be, the Prime Minister from time to time on any 
matter relating to the disclosure of public interest 
information, including the need for, or desirability of, 30 
taking legislative, administrative, or other action to 
give better protection to informants: 
(e) To make public statements in relation to disclosures of 
public interest information: 
(D To review the operation of this Act as required by 35 
section 19 of this Act: 
(g) To do anything incidental or conducive to the 
performance of the preceding functions: 
(h) To exercise and perform such other functions, powers, 
and duties as are conferred or imposed on the 40 
Authority by or under this Act or any other 
enactment. 
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11. Deputy Authority-( 1) There may from time to time 
be appointed a deputy to the person appointed as the 
Whistleblowers Protection Authority. 
(2) The Deputy Authority shall be appointed in the same 
manner as the Authority, and sections 12 to 16 of this Act shall 
apply to the Deputy Authority in the same manner as they 
apply to the Authority. 
(3) Subject to the control of the Authority, the Deputy 
Authority shall have and may exercise all the powers, duties, 
and functions of the Authority under this Act or any other 
enactment. 
(4) On the occurrence from any cause of a vacancy in the 
office of the Authority (whether by reason of death, 
resignation, or otherwise), and in the case of the absence from 
duty of the Authority (from whatever cause arising), and so 
long as any such vacancy or absence continues, the Deputy 
Authority shall have and may exercise all the pawers, duties, 
and functions of the Authority. 
(5) The fact that the Deputy Authority exercises any power, 
duty, or function of the Authority shall be conclusive evidence 
of the Deputy Authority's authority to do so. 
(6) Subject to this Act, the Deputy Authority shall be entitled 
to all the protections, privileges, and immunities of the 
Authority. 
Cf. 1993, No. 28, s. 15 
12. Term of office-(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
Act, the Authority shall hold office for a term of 5 years. 
(2) The Authority shall be eligible for reappointment from 
time to time. 
30 Cf. 1986,No. 127,s. 6(1) 
1 ~- Continuation in office after term expires-
( 1) Where the term for which a person who has been appainted 
as the Authority expires, that person, unless sooner vacating or 
removed from office under section 14 of this Act, shall continue 
35 to hold office, by virtue of the appointment for the term that 
has expired, until-
(a) That person is reappointed; or 
(b) A successor to that person is appointed. 
(2) The person appointed as the Authority-
40 (a) May at any time resign his or her office by notice in 
writing addressed to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, or to the Prime Minister if there is 
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no Speaker or Deputy Speaker or if both the Speaker 
and Deputy Speaker are absent from New Zealand: 
(b) Shall resign the office on attaining the age of 72 years. 
Cf. 1986, No. 127, s. 6 (2); 1991, No. 126 s. 9 (3); 1993, 
No. 28, s. 17 5 
14. Removal or suspension from office-( l) Subject to 
subsection (2) of this section, the person appointed as the 
Authority may be removed or suspended from office only by 
the Governor-General, upon an address from the House of 
Representatives, for disability, bankruptcy, neglect of duty, or I 0 
misconduct. 
(2) At any time when Parliament is not in session, the person 
appointed as the Authority may be suspended from office by 
the Governor-General in Council for disability, bankruptcy, 
neglect of duty, or misconduct proved to the satisfaction of the 15 
Governor-General in Council; but any such suspension shall not 
continue in force beyond the end of the 24th sitting day of the 
next ensuing session of Parliament and the salary of the 
Authori~y shall continue to be paid notwithstanding the 
suspension. 20 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 6; 1986, No. 127, s. 8; 1988, No. 2, s. 7 
15. Filling of vacancy-( l) If the person appointed as the 
Authority dies, or resigns from office, or is removed from 
office, the vacancy thereby created shall be filled as soon as 
practicable in accordance with this section. 25 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, a vacancy in the 
office of Authority shall be filled by the appointment of a 
successor by the Governor-General on the recommendation of 
the House of Representatives. 
(3) If- 30 
(a) A vacancy occurs while Parliament is not in session or 
exists at the close of a session; and 
(b) The House of Representatives has not recommended an 
appointment to fill the vacancy,-
the vacancy, at any time before the commencement of the next 35 
ensuing session of Parliament, may be filled by the 
appointment of a successor by the Governor-General in 
Council. 
(4) Any appointment made under subsection (3) of this section 
shall lapse and the office shall again become vacant unless, 40 
before the end of the 24th sitting day of the House of 
Representatives following the date of the appointment, the 
House confinns the appointment. 
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(5) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply where the 
Authority is a Judge; but nothing in this subsection shall limit 
the application of that subsection where the Authority ceases to 
be a judge during that person's term of office as the Authority. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 7; 1986, No. 127, s. 8; 1991, No. 126, 
s. 11; 1993, No. 28, s. 18 
16. Holding of other offices-( 1) The Authority shall not 
be capable of being a member of Parliament or of a local 
authority, and shall not, without the approval of the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives in each particular case, hold any 
office of trust or profit or engage in any occupation for reward 
outside the duties of the Authority's office. 
(2) The appointment of a Judge as the Authority, or service 
by a judge as the Authority, does not affect that person's 
tenure of his or her judicial office or his or her rank. title, status, 
precedence, salary, annual or other allowances, or other rights 
or privileges as a Judge (including those in relation to 
superannuation), and, for all purposes, that person's service as 
the Authority shall be taken to be service as a judge. 
Cf. 1991, No. 126, ss. 8, 10; 1993, No. 28, s. 19 
17. Further provisions relating to Authority-The 
provisions of the Schedule to this Act apply to the Authority and 
the Authority's affairs. 
Reporting and Review Provisions 
18. Annual report-( 1) Without limiting the right of the 
Authority to report at any other time, the Authority shall in 
each year make a report to the House of Representatives on the 
performance of the Authority's functions under this Act. 
(2) The report shall include information on the number and 
kinds of disclosures of public interest information made to the 
Authority. 
(3) The annual report shall be laid before the House of 
Representatives in accordance with section 39 of the Public 
Finance Act 1989. 
19. Review of operatio~ of Act-As soon _as _practicable 
after the expiry of the penod of 3 years begmrung on the 
commencement of this section, and then at intervals of not 
more than 5 years, the Authority shall-
(a) Review the operation of this Act since-
10 Whistleblowers Protection 
(i) The date of the commencement of this section 
(in the case of the first review canied out under this 
paragraph); or 
(ii) The date of the last review carried out under 
this paragraph (in the case of every subsequent 5 
review); and 
(b) Consider whether any amendments to this Act are 
necessary or desirable; and 
(c) Report the Authority's findings to the House of 
Representatives. 10 
Cf 1990, No. 7 2, s. 12; 1993, No. 28, s. 26 
PART IV 
PROCEDURES 
Advice and Counselling 
20. Advisory and counselling service-The Authority 15 
shall provide advice, counselling, and assistance on the 
following matters to any person who discloses, or who notifies 
the Authority that he or she is considering disclosing, public 
interest information under this Act: 
(a) The kinds of disclosures that may be made under this Act: 20 
(b) The manner and form in which public interest 
information may be disclosed under this Act: 
(c) How particular information disclosed to the Authority 
may be disclosed under this Act and what 
consequences disclosure may have: 25 
(d) The protections and remedies available under this Act or 
otherwise in relation to discrimination or harassment: 
(e) The operation of this Act in any respect. 
Investigation by Authority 
21. Action on rece1v1ng disclosure of rublic interest 30 
information-On receiving a disclosure o public interest 
information under section 5 of this Act, the Authority shall-
(a) Investigate the disclosure of public interest information; 
or 
(b) Decide, in accordance with section 22 of this Act, to take 35 
no action on the disclosure. 
Cf. 1993,No. 28,s. 70 
22. Authority may decide to take no action on 
disclosure of public interest information in certain 
circumstances-(1) The Authority may decide to take no 40 
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action or, as the case may require, no further action, on any 
disclosure of public interest information if, but only if,-
(a) The Authority considers that under the law there is an 
adequate remedy, right of appeal, or agency for 
investigation to which it would have been reasonable 
for the person disclosing the public interest 
information to resort; or 
(b) The Authority considers that the information disclosed is 
already publicly known or concerns a matter of public 
policy or debate on which diverse opinions may 
reasonably or sincerely be held, unless in the 
circumstances of the particular case there are other 
considerations which render it desirable in the public 
interest for the Authority to investigate the matter; or 
(c) The length of time that has elapsed between the date 
when the subject-matter of the disclosure of the 
public interest information arose and the date when 
the disclosure was made is such that an investigation 
of the information is no longer practicable or 
desirable; or 
(d) The subject-matter of the information is trivial; or 
(e) The making of the disclosure is frivolous or vexatious or is 
not made in good faith; or 
(D The information is insufficient to allow an investigation to 
proceed. 
(2) In any case where the Authority decides to take no action 
or, as the case may be, no further action, on any disclosure of 
public interest information, the Authority shall inform the 
person who made the disclosure of that decision and the 
reasons for it. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s_ 17; 1977, No. 49, s_ 35; 1981, No. 127, 
s. 3; 1982, No. 156, s. 9 (I); 1993, No. 28, s. 71 
Proceedings 
2~L Proceedings of Authority-(!) Before investigating 
any matter under this Part of this Act, the Authority shall inform 
the person to whom the investigation relates of the Authority's 
intention to make the investigation_ 
(2) Every investigation by the Authority under this Part of this 
Act shall be conducted in private. 
(3) The Authority may hear or obtain information from such 
persons as the Authority thinks fit, and may make such 
inquiries as the Authority thinks fit. 
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( 4) It shall not be necessary for the Authority to hold any 
hearing, and no person shall be entitled as of right to be heard 
by the Authority: 
Provided that if at any time during the course of an 
investigation it appears to the Authority that there may be 5 
sufficient grounds for making any report or recommendation 
that may adversely affect that person, the Authority shall give 
that person an opportunity to be heard. 
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority may 
regulate the Authority's procedure in such manner as the I 0 
Authority thinks fit. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 18; 1993, No. 28, s. 90 
24. Evidence- (1) The Authority may summon before him 
or her and examine on oath any person who in the Authority's 
opinion is able to give information relevant to an investigation 
being conducted by the Authority under this Part of this Act. 
(2) The Authority may administer an oath to any person 
summoned pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) Every examination by the Authority under subsection (1) of 
15 
this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within 20 
the meaning of section 108 of the Crimes Act 1961 (which 
relates to perjury). 
(4) The Authority may from time to time, by notice in 
writing, require any person who in the Authority's opinion is 
able to give information relevant to an investigation being 25 
conducted by the Authority under this Part of this Act to furnish 
such information, and to produce such documents or things in 
the possession or under the control of that person, as in the 
opinion of the Authority are relevant to the subject-matter of 
the investigation or inquiry. 30 
(5) Where the attendance of any person is required by the 
Authority under this section, the person shall be entitled to the 
same fees, allowances, and expenses as if the person were a 
witness in a court and, for the J?urpose,-
(a) The provisions of any regulations in that behalf under the 35 
Summary Proceedings Act 195 7 shall apply 
accordingly; and 
(b) The Authority shall have the powers of a court under any 
such regulations to fix or disallow, in whole or in part, 
or to increase, any amounts payable under the 40 
regulations. 
Cf. 1977, No. 49, s. 73 (1), (2), (7); 1991, No. 126, ss. 24, 
26 (5) 
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25. Protection and privileges of witnesses, etc.-
( 1) Except as provided in section 35 of this Act, every person 
shall have the same privileges in relation to the giving of 
information to, the answering of questions put by, and the 
5 production of documents and things to, the Authority or any 
employee of the Authority as witnesses have in any court. 
(2) No person shall be liable to prosecution for an offence 
against any enactment, other than section 40 of this Act, by 
reason of that person's compliance with any requirement of the 
10 Authority or any employee of the Authority under section 24 of 
this Act. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 19 (5), (7); 1977, No. 49, s. 73 (3), (6); 
1991, No. 126, s. 26 (1), (4); 1993, No. 28, s. 94 
26. Disclosures of information, etc.-( 1) Subject to 
15 subsection (2) of this section and to section 25 of this Act, any 
person who is bound by the provisions of any enactment to 
maintain secrecy in relation to, or not to disclose, any matter 
may be required to supply any information to, or answer any 
question put by, the Authority in relation to that matter, or to 
20 produce to the Authority any document or thing relating to it, 
notwithstanding that compliance with that requirement would 
otherwise be in breach of the obligation of secrecy or non-
disclosure. 
(2) Compliance with a requirement of the Authority (being a 
25 requirement made pursuant to subsection (1) of this section) is 
not a breach of the relevant obligation of secrecy or non· 
disclosure or of the enactment by which that obligation is 
imposed. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 19 (3), (4); 1987, No. 8, s. 24 (l); 1991, 
30 No. 126, s. 26 (2), (3); 1993, No. 28, s. 95 (1 ), (2) 
27. Proceedings privileged-( 1) This section applies to-
( a) The Authority; and 
(b) Every person engaged or employed in connection with 
the work of the Authority. 
35 (2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section,-
(a) No proceedings, civil or criminal, shall lie against any 
person to whom this section applies for anything he 
or she may do or report or say in the course of the 
exercise or intended exercise of his or her duties 
40 under this Act, unless it is shown that he or she acted 
in bad faith: 
(b) No person to whom this section applies shall be required 
to give evidence in any court, or in any proceedings 
14 Whistleblowers Protection 
of a judicial nature, in respect of anything coming to 
his or her knowledge in the exercise of his or her 
functions. 
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section applies in respect of 
proceedings for-
(a) An offence against section 7 8 or section 7 8A (1) or section 
105 or section 105A or section 105B of the Crimes Act 
1961; or 
(b) The offence of conspiring to commit an offence against 
section 7 8 or section 7 8A ( 1) or section 105 or section 
105A or section I 05B of the Crimes Act 1961. 
5 
10 
(4) Anything said or any information supplied or any 
document or thing produced by any person in the course of any 
inquiry by or proceedings before the Authority under this Act 
shall be privileged in the same manner as if the inquiry or 15 
proceedings were proceedings in a court. 
(5) For the purposes of clause 3 of Part II of the First 
Schedule to the Defamation Act 1992, any report made under 
this Act by the Authority shall be deemed to be an official 
report made by a person holding an inquiry under an Act of 20 
Parliament. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 26; 1982, No. 164, s. 5; 1991, No. 126, 
s. 29; 1993, No. 28, s. 96 
28. Procedure after investigation-( 1) The provisions of 
this section shall apply in every case where, after making any 25 
investigation under this Act, the Authority is of the opinion that 
the matter disclosed as public interest information to the 
Authority-
(a) Has substance; and 
(b) Appears to- 30 
(i) Concern the unlawful, corrupt, or unauthorised 
use of public funds or public resources; or 
(ii) Be otherwise unlawful; or 
(iii) Constitute a significant risk or danger, or be 
injurious, to- 35 
(A) Public health; or 
(B) Public safety; or 
(C) The environment; or 
(D) The maintenance of the law and justice, 
including the prevention, investigation, 40 
and detection or offences, and the right to 
a fair trial. 
(2) The Authority shall, where appropriate, ref er the 
matter-
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(a) To the person to whom the investigation relates with a 
recommendation that appropriate corrective action 
be taken: 
(b) To an appropriate enforcement agency for investigation 
and, where that agency is so empowered, decision 
whether to institute proceedings. 
(3) In any case where the Authority has referred the matter 
in accordance with paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, the 
Authority may request the person to notify the Authority, 
within a specified time, of the steps, if any, that that person 
proposes to take to give effect to the Authority's 
recommendation. 
(4) If within a reasonable time no action is taken that seems 
to the Authority to be adequate and appropriate, the Authority 
may report to the Prime Minister accordingly, and may 
thereafter make such report to the House of Representatives on 
the matter as the Authority thinks fit. 
(5) The Authority shall, in any case to which this section 
relates, inform the person who made the disclosure of public 
interest information of the result of the Authority's 
investigation. 
(6) In subsection (2) (b) of this section, the term "appropriate 
enforcement agency" includes (but without limitation)-
(a) The Solicitor-General: 
(b) The State Services Commissioner appointed under 
section 3 of the State Sector Act 1988: 
(c) The Audit Office (as defined by section 14 of the Public 
Finance Act 197 7 ): 
(d) The Commissioner o( Police: 
(e) The Police Complaints Authority established by section 4 
of the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, in 
relation to information alleging Police misconduct: 
(D The Director of the Serious Fraud Office within the 
meaning of the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990: 
(g) The Public Health Commission established by section 2 7 
of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993: 
(h) The Director-General of Health, in relation to information 
relevant to the administration of-
(i) The Toxic Substances Act 1979; or 
(ii) The Medicines Act 1981; or 
(iii) The Food Act 1981: 
(i) The Director of Mental Health appointed in terms of 
section 91 of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, in relation to 
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information relevant to the administration of that 
Act: 
U) The Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries or, as 
the case may require, the Registrar of the Pesticides 
Board, in relation to information relevant to the 5 
administration of the Pesticides Act 1979: 
(k) The Director-General defined by the Biosecurity Act 1993 
as responsible for the time being for the 
administration of that Act: 
(1) The Hazards Control Corrunission established by I 0 
section 346 of the Resource Management Act 1991: 
(m) The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
appointed under section 4 of the Environment Act 
1986: 
(n) The Secretary for Justice, in relation to information 15 
relevant to the administration of-
(i) The Penal Institutions Act 1954: 
(ii) The Criminal Justice Act 1985: 
(o) The Director-General of Social Welfare, in relation to 
information relevant to the administration of the 20 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 
1989: 
(p} The Secretary of the Department defined by the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992 as responsible 
for the administration of that Act: 25 
(q) The Secretary of Labour,-
(i) As Chief Inspector of Explosives under the 
Explosives Act 195 7: 
(ii) As Chief Inspector of Dangerous Goods under 
the Dangerous Goods Act 1974: 30 
(r) The Transport Accident Investigation Corrunission 
established by section 3 of the Transport Accident 
Investigation Corrunission Act 1990: 
(s) The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand established 
by section 7 2A of the Civil Aviation Act 1990 (as 35 
inserted by section 31 of the Civil Aviation 
Amendment Act 1992) or, as the case may require, 
the Director of Civil Aviation appointed under 
section 7 21 of that Act (as so inserted): 
(t) The General Manager of the Aviation Security Service 40 
appointed under section 7 2L of the Civil Aviation Act 
1990 (as inserted by section 14 of the Civil Aviation 
Amendment Act 1993) or, as the case may require, 
an authorised provider of aviation security service 
under Part VIII of that Act: 45 
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(u) The Land Transport Safety Authority of New Zealand 
established by section 15 of the Land Transport Act 
1993 or, as the case may require, the Director of 
Land Transport Safety appointed under section 24 of 
5 that Act: 
(v) The Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand 
established by section 3 of the Maritime Transport 
Act 1993 or, as the case may require, the Director of 
Maritime Safety appointed under section 13 of that 
10 Act. 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 22 
PART V 
REMEDIES FOR INJURY TO PROTECTED INFORMANTS 
29. Unlawful discrimination-( 1) Subject to subsection (2) 
15 of this section, it shall be unlawful for any person to subject a 
person to any detriment, or to treat or threaten to treat that 
other person less favourably, or to harass that person, on the 
ground, or substantially on the ground, that the other person 
has made or intends to make an appropriate disclosure of 
20 public interest information. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies in relation to any of the 
following areas: 
(a) The making of an application for emploFent: 
(b) Employment, which term includes unpaid work: 
25 (c) Participation in, or the making of an application for 
participation in, a partnership: 
(d) Membership, or the making of an application for 
membership, of an industrial union or professional or 
trade association: 
30 (e) Access to any approval, authorisation, or qualification: 
(D Vocational trainin~, or the making of an application for 
vocational traming: 
(g) Access to places, vehicles, and facilities: 
(h) Access to goods and services: 
35 (i) Access to land, housing, or other accommodation: 
U) Education. 
(3) The status of being a person who has made an 
appropriate disclosure of public interest information (in this Act 
referred to as protected informant status) shall be regarded as if 
40 it were a prohibited ground of discrimination within the 
meaning of the Human Rights Act 1993; and the provisions of 
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Part II of that Act shall apply accordingly with the necessary 
modifications. 
Cf. 1993, No. 82, ss. 62 (3), 63 (2) 
30. Complaints relating to breach of protection of 
informant-Any informant may make a complaint to the 5 
Complaints Division that-
(a) His or her identity has been disclosed; and that 
(b) He or she is being or has been subjected to detriment or 
less favourable treatment or harassment in any of the 
areas described in section 29 of this Act,- 10 
on the ground, or substantially on the ground, that he or she 
has made or intends to make an appropriate disclosure of 
public interest information. 
3 I. Procedures under Human Rights Act 1993 to apply 
to comrlaints-Where any informant makes a complaint in 
terms o section 30 of this Act, Parts III, IV, V, and Vll of the 
Human Rights Act 1993, so far as applicable and with all 
necessary modifications, shall apply in relation to that 
complaint as if it were a complaint under that Act. 
Cf. 1956, No. 65, s. 22F 
Extension of Grounds of Prohibited Discrimination 
15 
20 
32. Application of provisions relating to Human 
Rights Act 1993-Every reference to a complaint under the 
Human Rights Act 1993 shall be construed in the following 
enactments (which relate to choice of procedure where 25 
circumstances give rise to a personal grievance by an employee) 
as including a reference to a complaint under section 30 of this 
Act: 
(a) The Police Act 1958: section 95: 
(b) The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986: section 6: 
(c) The New Zealand Symphony Orchestra Act 1988: section 
10: 
(d) The Broadcasting Act 1989: clause 7 of the First Schedule: 
(e) The Employment Contracts Act 1991: sections 26 (e) and 
39. 
(2) Every reference to the Human Rights Act 1993 in 
section 12 (5) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (which 
relates to the letting of residential premises) shall be construed 
30 
35 
as if it included a reference to protected informant status. 
(3) The grounds of prohibited discrimination specified in 40 
section 28 ( 1) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 shall be 
deemed to include protected informant status. 
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PART VI 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Integrity of Information 
19 
33. Authority and staff to maintain secrecy-( 1) Every 
person to whom section 27 of this Act applies shall maintain 
secrecy in respect of all matters that come to that person's 
knowledge in the exercise of that person's functions under this 
Act. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of this section, 
the Authority may disclose such matters as in the Authority's 
opinion ought to be disclosed for the purposes of an 
investigation under this Act. 
(3) The power conferred by subsection (2) of this section shall 
not extend to-
(a) The disclosure of any information which would be likely 
to prejudice-
(i) The security or clef ence of New Zealand; or 
(ii) Any interest protected by section 7 of the 
Official Information Act 1982; or 
(iii) The prevention, investigation, or detection of 
offences; or 
(iv) The safety of any person; or 
(b) Any information, answer, document, or thing obtained by 
the Authority by reason only of compliance with a 
requirement made pursuant to section 24 (1) of this 
Act. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 21 (2), (4), (5); 1987, No. 8, s. 24 (2); 
1991, No. 126, s. 30; 1993, No. 28, s. 116 
34. Corrnpt use of official information-Every person to 
whom section 27 of this Act applies shall be deemed for the 
purposes of sections 105 and 105A of the Crimes Act 1961 to be 
an official. 
Cf. 1977, No. 49, s. 77; 1987, No. 8, s. 25 (l); 1991, 
No. 126, s. 31; 1993, No. 28, s. 118 
35. Exclusion of public interest immunity- The rule of 
law which authorises or requires the withholding of any 
document, or the refusal to answer any question, on the ground 
that the disclosure of the document or the answering of the 
question would be injurious to the public interest shall not 
apply in respect of-
(a) Any investigation by or proceedings before the Authority 
under this Act; or 
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(b) Any application under section 4 (l) of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 197 2 for the review of any decision 
under this Act;-
but not so as to give any party any information that he or she 
would not, apart from this section, be entitled to. 5 
Cf. 1982, No. 156, s. 11; 1987, No. 174, s. 9; 1991, 
No. 126, s. 28 
Delegations 
g6. Delegation of functions or powers of Authority-
( 1) The Authority may from time to time delegate to any 10 
person holding office under the Authority. all or any of the 
Authority's functions and powers under this Act or any other 
Act. . 
(2) Every delegation under this section shall be in writing. 
(3) No delegation under this section shall include the power 15 
to delegate under this section. 
(4) The power of the Authority to delegate under this section 
does not limit any power of delegation conferred on the 
Authority by any other Act. 
(5) Subject to any general or special directions given or 20 
conditions imposed by the Authority, the person to whom any 
functions or powers are delegated under this section may 
exercise any functions or powers so delegated to that person in 
the same manner and with the same effect as if they had been 
conferred on that person directly by this section and not by 25 
delegation. 
(6) Every person purporting to act pursuant to any delegation 
under this section shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
be presumed to be acting in accordance with the terms of the 
delegation. 30 
(7) Any delegation under this section may be made-
(a) To a specified person or to persons of a specified class, or 
to the holder or holders for the time being of a 
specified office or specified class of offices: 
(b) Subject to such restrictions and conditions as the 35 
Authority thinks fit : 
(c) Either generally or in relation to any particular case or 
class of cases. 
(8) No such delegation shall affect or prevent the exercise of 
any function or power by the Authority, nor shall any such 40 
·• 
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delegation affect the responsibility of the Authority for the 
actions of any person acting under the delegation. 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 28; 1991, No. 126, s. 33 (1 )-(8); 1993, 
No. 28, s. 12 
5 37. Delegation to produce evidence of authority-Any 
person purporting to exercise any power of the Authority by 
virtue of a delegation under section 36 of this Act shall, when 
required to do so, produce evidence of that person's authority 
to exercise the power. 
10 Cf. 1991, No. 126, s. 33 (9); 1993, No. 28 , s. 122 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
38. Revocation of delegations-( 1) Every delegation 
under section 36 of this Act shall be revocable in writing at will. 
(2) Any such delegation, until it is revoked, shall continue in 
force according to its tenor, notwithstanding that the Authority 
by whom it was made may have ceased to hold office, and shall 
continue to have effect as if made by the successor in office of 
the Authority. 
Cf. 1991, No. 126, s. 34; 1993, No. 28 , s. 123 
Liability and Offences 
39. Liability of employer and principals-(!) Subject to 
subsection (3) of this section, anything done or omitted by a 
person as the employee of another person shall, for the 
purposes of this Act, be treated as done or omitted by that 
other person as well as by the first-mentioned person, whether 
or not it was done with that other person's knowledge or 
approval. 
(2) Anything done or omitted by a person as the agent of 
another person shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as 
done or omitted by that other person as well as by the first· 
mentioned person, unless it is done or omitted without that 
other person's express or implied authority, precedent or 
subsequent. 
(3) In proceedings under this Act against any person in 
respect of an act alleged to have been done by an employee of 
that person, it shall be a clef ence for that person to prove that 
he or she or it took such steps as were reasonably practicable to 
prevent the employee from doing that act, or from doing as an 
employee of that person acts of that description. 
Cf. 197 7, No. 49, s. 33; 1993, No. 28, s. 126 
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4-0. Offences- Every person commits an offence against this 
Act and is liable on summary conviction to a fme not exceeding 
$2,000 who,-
(a) Without reasonable excuse, obstructs, hinders, or resists 
the Authority or any other person in the exercise of 5 
their powers under this Act: 
(b) Without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails to comply with 
any lawful requirement of the Authority or any other 
person under this Act: 
(c) Makes any statement or gives any information to the 
Authority or any other person exercising powers 
under this Act, knowing that the statement or 
. information is false or misleading: 
(d) Represents directly or indirectly that he or she holds any 
authority under this Act when he or she does not hold 
that authority. 
Cf. 19 7 5, No. 9, s. 30; 1991, No. 126, s. 35; 1993, No. 28, 
s. 127 
Savings 
10 
15 
4-1. Act not to derogate from protection under other 20 
Acts-This Act is in addition to, and does not derogate from, 
any privilege, protection, or immunity existing apart from this 
Act under which information may be disclosed without civil or 
criminal liability. 
Cf. Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), 25 
s. 11 
Amendments 
4-2. Official Information Act 1982 amended-The First 
Schedule to the Official Information Act 1982 is hereby 
amended by inserting, in its appropriate alphabetical order, the 30 
following item: 
"Whistleblowers Protection Authority". 
4-3. Public Finance Act 1989 amended-Section 2 ( 1) of 
the Public Finance Act 1989 is hereby amended by repealing 
the definition of the term "Office of Parliament" (as substituted 35 
by section 129 ( 1) of the Privacy Act 1993), and substituting the 
following definition: 
"'Office of Parliament' means the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment (and that 
Commissioner's office), the Office of Ombudsmen, 40 
the Whistleblowers Protection Authority (and that 
' 
• 
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Authority's office), and the Audit Office (including the 
Audit Department):". 
44. Privacy Act 1993 amended-Section 2 (1) of the 
Privacy Act 1993 is hereby amended by inserting in 
5 paragraph (b) of the definition of the term "agency", after 
subparagraph (ix), the following new subparagraph: 
"(ixa) The Whistleblowers Protection Authority; 
or". 
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Section 17 SCHEDULE 
PROVISIONS APPLYING IN R£5PECT OF AUTI-IORITY 
I. Employment of experts-(l) The Authority may, as and when the 
need arises, appoint any person who, in the Authority's opinion, possesses 
expen knowledge or is otherwise able to assist in connection with the 
exercise by the Authority of the Authority's functions to make such 
inquiries or to conduct such research or to make such repons or to render 
such other services as may be necessary for the efficient performance by 
the Authority of the Authority's functions. 
(2) The Authority shall pay persons appointed by the Authority under 
this clause, for services rendered by them, fees or commission or both at 
such rates as the Authority thinks fit, and may separately reimburse them 
for expenses reasonably incurred in rendering services for the Authority. 
2. Staff-( I) Subject to the provisions of this clause, the Authority may 
appoint such employees (including acting or temporary or casual 
employees) as may be necessary for the efficient carrying out of the 
Authority's functions, powers, and duties under this Act. 
(2) The Authority, in making an appointment under this clause, shall 
give preference to the person who is best suited to the position. 
(3) The number of persons that may be appointed under this clause, 
whether generally or in respect of any specified duties or class of duties, 
shall from time to time be determined by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. 
(4) Subject to subclause (5) of this clause, employees appointed under 
this clause shall be employed on such terms and conditions of employment 
as the Authority from time to time determines. 
(5) The Authority shall-
(a) Before entering into a collective employment contract in relation to 
all or any of the Authority's employees appointed under this 
clause, consult with the State Services Commissioner with respect 
to the terms and conditions of employment to be included in the 
collective employment contract; and 
(b) From time to time consult with the State Services Commissioner in 
relation to the terms and conditions of employment applying to 
those employees appointed under this clause who are not 
covered by a collective employment contract. 
g_ Salaries and allowances-( l) There shall be pa.id to the Authority 
and the Deputy Authority-
(a) A salary at such rate as the Higher Salaries Commission from time to 
time determines; and 
(b) Such allowances as are from time to time determined by the Higher 
Salaries Commission. 
(2) Subject to the Higher Salaries Commission Act 19 7 7, any 
determination made under subclause ( l) of this clause may be made so as 
to come into force on a date to be specified for that purpose in the 
determination, being the date of the making of the determination, or any 
other date, whether before or after the date of the making of the 
determination. 
(3) Every determination made under subclause (I) of this clause in 
respect of which no date is specified as provided in subclause (2) of this 
' 
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SCHEDULE-continued 
PROVISIONS APPLYING IN RE.sPECT OF AUTHORITY-continued 
clause shall come into force on the date of the making of the 
determination. 
(4) There shall also be paid to the Authority and the Deputy Authority, 
in respect of time spent in travelling in the exercise of the Authority's or, 
as the case may be, the Deputy Authority's functions, travelling allowances 
and expenses in accordance with the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 
1951, and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly as if the 
Authority and the Deputy Authority were members of a statutory Board 
and the travelling were in the service of the statutory Board. 
4. Superannuation or retiring allowances-( I) For the purpose of 
providing superannuation or retiring allowances for the Authority, the 
Deputy Authority, and for any of the employees of the Authority, the 
Authority may, out of the funds of the Authority, make payments to or 
subsidise any superannuation scheme that is registered under the 
Superannuation Schemes Act 1989. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, any person who, immediately 
before being appointed as the Authority or the Deputy Authority or, as the 
case may be, becoming an employee of the Authority, is a contributor to 
the Government Superannuation Fund under Pan II or Part IIA of the 
Government Superannuation Fund Act 1956 shall be deemed to be, for the 
purposes of the Government Superannuation Fund Act 1956, employed in 
the Government service so long as that person continues to hold office as 
the Authority or the Deputy Authority or, as the case may be, to be an 
employee of the Authority; and that Ace shall apply to that person in all 
respects as if that person's service as the Authority or the Deputy 
Authority or, as the case may be, as such an employee were Government 
service. 
(3) Subject to the Government Superannuation Fund Act 1956, nothing 
in subclause (2) of this clause entitles any such /erson to become a 
contributor to the Government Superannuation Fun after that person has 
once ceased to be a contributor. 
(4) For the purpose of applying the Government Superannuation Fund 
Act 1956, in accordance with subclause (2) of this clause, to a person who 
holds office as the Authority or the Deputy Authority or, as the case may 
be, is in the service of the Authority as an employee and (in any such case) 
is a contributor to the Government Superannuation Fund, the term 
"controlling authority", in relation to any such person, means the 
Authority. 
5. Application of certain Acts to Authority and staff-No person 
shall be deemed to be employed in the service of the Crown for the 
purposes of the State Sector Act 1988 or the Government Superannuation 
Fund Act 1956 by reason only of that person's appointment as the 
Authority, or the Deputy Authority, or a person appointed under clause I 
or clause 2 of this Schedule. 
6. Services for Authority- The Crown, acting through any 
Department, may from time to time, at the request of the Authority, 
execute any work or enter into any arrangements for the execution or 
provision by the Department for the Authority of any work or service, or 
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SCHEDULE-continiu:d 
PROVISIONS APPLYING IN REsPECT OF AUTiiORITY-conlinued 
for the supply to the Authority of any goods, stores, or equipment, on and 
subject to such tenns and conditions as may be agreed. 
7. Seal-The Authority's seal of office shall be judicially noticed in all 
courts and for all purposes. 
8. Exemption from income tax-The income of the office of 
Authority shall be exempt from income tax. 
Wa.uNCTON, N,:w l.£.Ai.ANo: Pubwh<d under thc ;authority of the 
Nc-w Zcua.nd Govcnuncnt-1994 
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APPENDIX III 
Australian Statutes 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) 
Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) 
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A.O. 1993 
******************************************************************************** 
No. 21 of 1993 
An Act to protect persons disclosing illegal, dangerous or improper conduct; 
and for other purposes. 
[Assented to 8 April 1993] 
The Parliament of South Australia enacts as follows: 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993. 
-;:... Commencement 
2. 1l1is Act will come into operation on a day lo be fixed by proclamation. 
Object of Ad 
3. The object of this Act is lo facilitate the disclosure, in the public interest, of maladministra-
t.ion and waste in the public sector and of corrupt or illegal conduct generally-
( a) by providing means by which such disclosures may be made; and 
( b) by providing appropriate protections for those who make such disclosures. 
lnterprelalion 
4. ( l) ln this Act, unless the conLrary intention appears-
"adult" means of or above tbe age of 18 years; 
"government agency" means--
( a) a department or administrative urut of the Public Service; or 
(hf a body corporate that is an instrumentality or agency of the Crown; 
"maladministration" includes impropriety or negligence; 
"public interest information" means information that tends to show-
(a) lhal an aduJl person (whether or nol a public officer), body corporate or 
government agency is or has been involved (either before or after the commence-
ment of this Act)-
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(i) in an illegal activity; or 
(ii) in an irregular and unauthorised use of public money; or 
(iii) in substantial mismanagement of public resources; or 
(iv) in conduct that causes a substantial risk to public health or safety, or to the 
environment; or 
(IJ) that a public officer is guilty of maladministration in or in relation to the perform -
ance (either before or after the conunencement of this Act) of official functions; 
"public officer" means-
( a) a person appointed to public office by the Governor; or 
(b) a member of Parliament; or 
( c) a person employed in the Public Service of the State; or 
(d) a member of the police force; or 
(e) any other officer or employee of the Crown; or 
(fj a member, officer or employee of-
(i) an agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or 
(ii) a body that is subject to control or direc tion by a Minister, agency or instru-
mentality of the Crown; or 
(iii) a body whose members, or a majority of whose members, are appointed by 
the Governor or a Minister, agency or instrumentality of tl1e Crown; or 
(g) a member of a local government body or an officer or employee of a local 
government body. 
(2) The 4uestion whether a public officer-
(a) is or has been involved in-
(i) an irregular and unauthorised use of public money; or 
(ii) substantial mismanagement of public resources; or 
(h) is guitty of maladministration in or in relation to the performa11ce of offic ial 
functions, 
1s lo be determined with due regard to relevant statutory provisions and administrative instruc-
tions and directions. 
Immunity for appropriate disclosures of public interest information 
5. (I) A person who makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest iuformation incurs no 
c ivil or criminal liability by doing so. 
) 
) 
) 
1 
I 
( 
( 
( 
( 
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(2) A person makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest information for the purposes of 
this Act if, and only if-
( a) the person-
(i) believes on reasonable grounds l11at l11e information is true: or 
(ii) is not in a position to form a belief on reasonable grounds about tJ1e truth of the 
information but believes on reasonable grounds Lhat Lhe information may be true 
and is of sufficient significance to justify its disclosure so that its Lruth may be 
investigated; and 
(b) the disclosure is made to a person to whom It 1s, in l11e circumstances of tJ1e case, 
reasonable and appropriate to make the disclosure. 
(3) A disclosure is taken to have been made to a person to whom it is, in the circumstances of 
the case, reasonable and appropriate to make the disclosure if it is made to an appropriate 
authority (but this is not intended lo suggest Lhat an appropriate authority is tJ1e only person to 
whom a disclosure of public interest information may be reasonably and appropriately made). 
( 4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a disclos1,1re of public interest information is made to an 
appropriate aul11ority if it is made to a Minister of the Crown or-
( a) where the information relates to an illegal activity-to a member of Lhe police force: 
(b) where the information relates to a member of the police force-to the Police Com -
plaints Aulliority; 
( c) where t11e informatio11 relates to t11e irregular or unauthorised use of public money--to 
the Auditor-General: 
(d) where the information relates to a public employec---to Lhe Commissioner for Public 
Employment; 
( e) where Lhe i.nfonnation relates to a member of tl1e judiciary--to the Chief Justice; 
(f) where l11e informatio11 relates to a member of Parliament--to Lhe Presiding Officer of 
the House of Parliament to which the member belongs; 
(l) where l11e information relates to a public officer (olher Lhan a member of lllc police 
force or a member of the judiciary}-to t11e Ombudsman; 
(h) where t11e information relates to a matter falling within the sphere of responsibility of 
an instrumentality, agency, department or atlministrative unit of govenunent- lo a 
responsible officer of that instrumentality, agency, department or administrative UJ1it; 
(i) where l11e information relates to a matter falling within the sphere of responsibility of a 
local Government body--to a responsible officer of that body; 
(i) where t11e information relates to a person or a mailer of a prescribed class- to an 
autJ1ority declared by the regulations to be an appropriate authority in relation to such 
information. 
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(5) U a disclosure of information relating to fraud or corruption is made, the person to whom 
the disclosure is made must pass the information on as soon as practicable to-
( a) in the case of information implicating a member of I.he police force in fraud or corrup-
tion-the Police Complaints Authority; 
(b) in any other case--the Anti-Corruption Branch of the police force. 
Informant to assist with official investigation 
6. (l) A person who discloses public interest information must assist with any investigation 
of the malters lo which the information relates by the police or any other official investigating 
authority. 
(2) Such a person is not, however, obliged to assist with an investigation by an aut11ority or 
body to which, or a person to whom, the public ioterest information relates. 
(3) A person who fails, wilhout reasonable excuse, lo comply wit11 the obligation imposed by 
subsection (I) forfeits U1e protection of this Act. 
Identity of informant to be kept confidential 
7. (I) A person to whom anolher makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest 
information must not, without the consent of that person, divulge the identity of that otJ1er person 
except so far as may be necessary to ensure that the mailers to which the information relates arc 
properly investigated. 
(2) The obligation to maintain confidentiality imposed by tJ1is section applies despite any other 
statutory provision, or a common law rule, to the contrary. 
Informant to_ be informed of outcome of complaint 
8. If an appropriate disclosure of public interest information is made to a public official. l11at 
official must, wherever practicable and in accordance with the law, notify the iufonn,mt of the 
outcome of any investigation into the matters to which the disclosure relates. 
Victimisation 
9. (l) A person who causes detriment to another on tJ1e ground, or substantially on the 
ground, that the other person or a third person has made or intends to make an appropriate 
disclosure of public ioterest information commits an act of victimisation. 
(2) An act of victimisation under tJ1is Act may be dealt with-
( a) as a tort; or 
(b) as if it were an act or victimisal.ion under the Equal 011portunity Act 1984, 
hut, if the victim commences proceedings in a court seeking a remedy in tort, he or she ca11no1 
subsequently lodge a complaint wider the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 ,md, conversely. ir the 
victim lodges a complaint under tJ1at Act, he or she cannot subsequently commence proceedings 
in a court seeking a remedy in tort. 
) 
) 
) 
(3) Where a complaint alleging an act or victimisation under l11is Act has been lodged with the ) 
Co,runissioner for Equal Opportw1ity and the Commissioner is or tlle opinion that t11e subject 
matter of the complaint has already been ade4uately dealt with by a co111pcte111 autJ1ori1y, the 
Commissioner may decline to act on the complaint or to proceed further with action 011 the 
complaint. 
( 
( 
( 
( 
(4) In this section-
"detriment" includes-
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(a) injury, damage or loss; or 
(b) intimidation or harassment; or 
5 
( c) discrimination, disadvantage or adverse treatment in relation to a person's employ-
ment; or 
( d) threats of reprisal. 
Offence to make false disclosure 
10. (1) A person who makes a disclosure of false public interest information knowing it to be 
false or being reckless about whether it is false is guilty of an offence. 
Penally: Division 5 fine or division 5 imprisonment. 
(2) A person who makes a disclosure of public interest information in contravention of this 
section is not protected by this Act. 
Non-derogation 
11. This Act is in addition to, and does not derogate from, any privilege, protection or 
immunity existing apart from Ibis Act under which information may be disclosed without civil or 
criminal liability. -
Regulations 
12. TI1e Governor may make regulations for purposes contemplated by this Act. 
In the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, I hereby assent to this Bill. 
ROMA MITCHELL Governor 
BY Atrr110RITY: A. J . SECKER. Government Printer, South Australia 
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SCHEDULE 1-AMENDMENr OF ACTS 
--
PROTECTED DISCLOSURES ACT 1994 No. 92 
(Reprinted a~ al - not r,, ... ..:~,-..11 
............. -.---·-· .... ------
-~~~- -----,··-PROTECTED DISCLOSURES ACT 1994 No. 92 
(Reprin(ed as at - not reprinted] 
An Act lo provide protection for public officials disclosing corrupt conduct, 
maladministration and waste in the public sector, and for reJatcd purposes [Assented to 12 
December 1994) 
PART 1-PRELIMINARY 
Short title 
l. Tu.is Act may be cited as the Protected Disclosures Act 1994. 
Commencement 
2. Tius Act commences on a day or days to be appoint~ by proclamation 
Objecl 
l 
J , 
3. (1) The ol>jecl of I his Act is lo cncournge :u1d facilitate the disclosure, u1 ll1c public 
interest, of com1pt wu<lucl, maladministmtiou and SL-nous and substnnti;il waste u, tlic 
public. sector by · 
(a) cul,:mc.: i11g a11d ri11g111cnting establislicd procedures for 11,aku,g disclos11rcs 
couccming such matters ; and 
(b) protecting pcrso11s from rcpris:ils 111:11 inig.lil ,)lhcrv:ise he innictcd on lhern bcc.1usc 
or thPSC di:;c:Jt)SllfCS, and 
(c) pmv1d111/.'- tor tlH•sc d1scllls11rcs lo be pn>pcrly mvcst1gatcd and dealt w1Lh 
(2) NoU1111g 11, ll11 ~ /\cl ,~ intended lo alTecl Ilic !'rope, adn1i11istrntio11 and 111a11agc111cnl of an 
investigating a11lfu 1, 11 .) or public authonty (m<.:lud111g ricliou iliat may or ts required to be t;1kcn 
in re:;pcct uf tJ1, s;,1;11 \', w:iges, C:OlldJ[tOllS or Clll['IO)'lllClll ur dtSCtpltnc or :t p11bltc oflic1;il), 
subject lo the followiug 
(a) dctni11e11!Jtl act1011 1s not to be taken against a person ifto do so would be 111 
contra vc11l1on of this Act; and 
(b) l>encfici:il trclltmcnt is not to be g1vc11 in favour ofn )>C!SOII if the prn-posc (or one of 
the purposes) for doiug so 1s to i11fluc11ce 1hc person lo nia.ke, to refrain from ni:ibnp., 
or lo wiU1draw a disclosure. 
Definitions 
4. Jn this Act: 
··commission" means the Independent Commission Against Com1pt1on; 
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.. corrnpt conduct" bas Uic meaning gtveu to it by 1l1e Independent ( 'omm1ss10n 
Against Corruption Act 1988; 
.. detrimental action" is defined in section 20; 
"'disciplinary proceeding" includes a disciplinary inquiry withw U1e meaning of"U1e 
Public Sector Management Act 1988: 
··exercise" of a functio11 includes, where U1e fw1ction is a duly, the pe1fonruu1ce of the 
duty, 
"'function" includes power, authority or duty; 
"investigate" includes inquire or audit; 
"investigating authority" means: 
(a) the Auditor-General; or 
(b) 
(c) 
fue Commission; or 
the Ombudsman; 
"investigation Act" means: 
( a) the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988; or 
(b) the Ombudsman Act 197 4; or 
(c) the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983; . . . . . 
"journalist" means a person engaged in the occupation of wnhng or edit.mg matcnal 
intended for publication in the print or electronic news media; 
"maladministration" is defined in section 11 {2); 
··protected disclosure" means a disclosure satisfying the applicable requirements of 
Part 2; 
"oublic authorih'" rnemis anv oublic authoritv whose conduct or actiy:i~~<; llll\V be 
, .,ve.:stt0ate.d bj ovi rviv-esjoh(S o U fvt-ovi·5 
••• • "- •• ••:.,'"•-•• '',) ,.,, ••• '"-'"'''h .. ~''''6 UUl.&..J,,11.ll.J ~ • 
"public official" means a person employed under the Public Sector Mmagcmcnt Act 
1988, an Ci11rloycc of a local govcrnmcnl autl101ily or any otl1cr inclivid11al l1avi11g 
public. official functions or acting in a publ ic official capacity, whose eo11d11cl and 
activ1t1cs may be invcstigalcd by an 111vcstiµat111g autJ1orily; 
.. rclc"an( invc~(igation Ad", in rdatio11 lo ru1 investigating autlwrity, u1caus Ilic /\cl 
that apµo111ts c,1 constitutes the 111vcsligating amhority 
Hcla(ionsltip of 1hi~ Ad :md other Ads 
5. (1) This Acl pn-v:11ls . lo the exlcnl l)f :u1y lllL'<)11s1sl..:11L·y, ,wu the pr,1v1s101,, of a11y 
i11,'Cstigati0u i\ct. 
(2) 1 !owever, 11otJ11ng 11, tl1is Act otherwise l11n1ls ,x alkds 11,e npcrnl101 1 of' any/\(;( lll the 
cxerusc of tlic r w1c tio11s co111<:rrcd or i111posed 0 11 ;u, i,,vcs l igal i11g authority L>r m,y L>tl,er 
person or body under tl 
(3) NotJ,ing in 11,is J\ct (except section 13 (2) /1(1(1 (-1)) a11lho1iscs au inves tigatmp, :11111,onty IL, 
i.11vesligak any co1rtpbi111 th:1t ii is uol autl,nriscd lo iuvcsligalc 1111dcr the n:lev,1111 
investigation Act. 
Act hinds the Crnwn 
6. 'This Act binds U1e Crown iu right of New Soulh Wale.~ . 
PART 2-PROTECTED DISCLOSURES 
F:ITe.ct of Part 
Copyriglit Aunty Abha's Electronic PublJshing 1995 & LI3C Wormation Services 1995 
7. A disclosure is protected by this /\.et if it satisfies t.l,e applicable requiremcnls of this 
Part. 
Disclosures must be made by public officials 
8. (1) To be protected by this Act, a disclosure must be made by a public official: 
(a) to an investigating authority; or 
(b) to the principal officer of a public authority or investigating authority or officer who 
constitutes a public authority, or · 
(c) to another officer of the public authority or investigating authority to which the 
public official belongs in accordance with an internal procedure established by the 
authority for the reporting of allegations of conupt conduct., maladministration or 
serious and substantial waste of public money by the authority or any of its officers; 
or 
(d) to a member of Parliament or to a journalist. 
(2) A disclosure is protected by this Act even if it is made about conduct or activities engaged 
in, or about matters arising, before the commencement of this section. 
(3) A disclosure made while a person was a public official is protected by Olis Act ~ e4 if tl1e fa!$' 
·~~ ,,.,I"""-" _,...n , lo ~, ;$ •'V' I".,.,..~.-~ ~ ... h.1: .,.. n.ff': .... :"1 t f> "1 0 
, l~J A dlSChlSlJIL" Jll;llJl: awu1 Ute CUllulJCI l)) ,11-c1so11 \,\,IIIIC UIC llCISUII w;i ~ .1 p11l>lh. , >IIIClilf IS 
protected by tl1is Act even if the person is no longer a public oflicia\. 
Disclosures mus( he made voluntarily 
9. (l) To be protected by tl1is Act, a disclosure must be uu1dc volunl:11 ily 
(2) A disclosure is not made volw1t.;uily for tlic purposes of U1is scclio11 if it 1s 11wdc by a 
public offici;tl in the exercise of a duty imposed on tJ1c public official b1· or u11dcr an /\et 
(3) A disclo"urc is made voluntarily for the p11qxises oftltis section 11" 11 ,, 1nadc l,~ a p11bl1 c 
official in accordance with a code of conduct (11\lwcvcr dei;crilicd) aduplc,I h; ;111 1111•cs11wi1111;.> 
authority or public auU1ority and setlu1!!. out iulcs or guidelines lo be oi>sc, ,·c,I by public 
officials for repo1ii11g conupt conduct, tnal:1d1111111stralio11 or scrious a11d s11l,, 1a1111:il was le 1>f 
public money by investigating authorities. public authorities or public <>llir ,al , 
Disclosure to Commission concel"ning nirn111( co11duct 
10. To be prnt.cctcd by this Act, a disclosure by a public oflicial lo the C\>1111111ss1u11 
must : 
(a) be made in accordance with the Independent C~mmission Ap.a111sl Coffupt1011 Act 
1988;and 
(b) be a disclosure of infonnation that shows or tends to show tl1al a p11blic aulliority or 
another public official bas engaged, is engaged or proposes to engage m corrupt 
conduct. 
Disclosure lo Ombudsman concerning maladministration 
11. (1) To be protected by this Act, a disclosure by a public ollicial to 1Lc Onibudsiuau 
must: 
(a) 
(b) 
be made in accordance wiU1 the Ombudsman Act I 97 4; and 
be a disclosure of informalion that shows or lends to show that, 111 tJ1c cxere1sc of a 
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function rela.ting to a matter of administration conferred or iln1x)scd ou a public 
authority or anoU1er public official, the public authority or public official has 
engaged, is engaged or proposes to engage in conduct of a kind that amounts to 
maladministration. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, conduct is of a kind that amounts to maladministration if it 
involves action or inaction of a serious nature that is: 
(a) contrary to law; or 
(b) unreasonable, lllljust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory; or 
(c) based wholly or partly on improper motives. 
Disclosure to Auditor-General concerning serious and substantial waste 
12. (1) To be protected by this Act, a disclosure by a public official to the 
Auditor-General must: 
(a) be made in accordance with the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 ; and. 
(b) be a disclosure of infonnation that shows or tends to show that llil au~honly or officer 
., . .-, .... ..,.. ~• •••·--• ..... .., •·-·• •· •·-"·) ••••·• ........ . , ... .,...,. ., , ....... ) .......... I -···- ....... - .. : 
(2) ln U1i s section., " authority" and "officer of an au(lwrit:r" have the mca111ngs grvrn l.i 
those expressions u1 Uie Public Firnmcc and Audit Act 198) 
Disclosures about investiga(iug authorities 
13. (I) Despite section 10, 11 disclosure by a public offic,11110 1hc l "< •1111rnssl()11 tk11 
shows or tends to show Uiat , in tl1c exercise of a flmct1 on 1clal 111 g t, , a 111allc1 of 
adrninislration conferred or 1IJ1rosed on Oic Ombudsman, the< J11tl,udsn 1:111 ,lr 111, ,,tli,·c, ,,1 
U,c Ombudsman has engaged , is engaged or pruposcs IP e11g;1gc 111 C'P11d11 r t nf a l.111.-I Jl r:1 1 
alllounls lo maladmiuislr<1tion 1s µrolcded by U1i s /\cl 
(2) ·111c Commission may mvesl1gatc , and report, m accn1,ia11cc with 1hc lndepc11dc,1t 
Commission Against Com1ption Acl 1988 on ,my rnaltcr raised l,v ;1 rl1sclost1n: mack i.,,, 1li;l! 
is of II kind referred lo w subscdioll (I) . 
(3) Despite section 1 l, a disclosure by a public official to the ( l111buds111,1.11 tha: shows rn le nd s 
lo show· 
(a) that the Commissio11 or au officer of 01e Comn11ss1ou has rn12.agcd , is e11~aµ.c'{l. u1 
proroses lo engage, in corrupt conduct; or 
(h) in the exercise of a function relating to a matter of admJ11istrali(>11 e<'nfcrrcd ut 
imposed oo the Conunission, the Commission 01 iln oflice1 of tlie Com1uiss io11 l,:i ,, 
engaged, is engaged, or proposes to engage, in con<luct of a kind 01at amounl s lo 
maladministration; or 
( c) that the Auditor-General or a member of 01c staJT of the A u<litor-Gcnera.l has 
seriously and substantially wa.~ted public money. 
is protected by this Act. 
.(4) 'llie Ombudsman may investigate, aud report, in accordance with lhc Ombudsman Act 
l 974 oo any matter raised by a disclosure made to it that is uf a lind relemxl to in subsccl 1rn1 
(3). For the purposes of such an investigation the Ombudsman may engage consultants or 
other persons for the purpose of getting expert assistance 
(S) An investigating authority may decline to investigate 01 1nay di scontinue the i11 ves l1~a1io11 
of any matter referred to in thi s section 
(6) A disclosure referred lo tn lh.is section is protccte.i by tl11s /\cl ,,nl y ,I II s;,t1 ,; fws a ll nlh,:1 
applicable requirements of this Part . 
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Disclosures to public officials 
14. (1) To be protected by this Act, a disclosure by a public official lo the principal 
officer of, or officer who constitutes, a public authority must be II disclosure of information 
that shows or tends to show conupt conduct, maladministration or serious and substantial 
waste of public money by the authority or any of its officers . 
(2) To be protected by this Act., a disclosure by a public official to another officer of tile public 
authority to which the public official belongs in accordance with an internal procedure 
established by the authority for the reporting of allegations of corrupt conducl. 
maladministration or serious and substantial waste of public money by tile authority or any of cJ" 
its officers must be a disclosure of information that shows or tends to show such corrupt co!Ad ~/ 
·-.- , ..t_. ,-:_! .--:-.~·'.'~(:': •• ;_,_,; __ - ---...:-.. _---A _,..__, __ ,,:_1 ____ , _ . .. 0; $IZ.¥) j,vQSf 
, (J) 111 llll:; $l,'Cll011 
.. public autho,;ty" inclucies an investigating authority. 
Referred disclosures prnlcctcd 
15. (I) A cJiscloswl' 1s protectccJ by Uus Act if ii is made by II public oflici1t! lo a11 
11,vesligati11p. a11tl1011ty and is referred (whctltcr because ii is 11ot auUiorisc<l to i11vcs t1 gall: 
lhc matter u11cicr Ilic relcvm1t investigation Act or 0U1crwisc) by the invcstigaling autlionly 
u11dcr l'a1i 11 to another 111vcst1p,aling authority or to a µublic oflicial or public autl,o rrty 
(2) A d1sclns111c 1s p1otcctc<l by this Act if ii 1s made by a public official to another p11l ,l1 l 
0 (hc1al It\ ac.u)1dancc witli scct1(1n R (I) (b) or (c) and is referred under Par1 4 by tlac 1)llacr 
p11bl1 c official to au 1r.vcs t1g:itmg :iuUwnly or In another public official or public aulhrn ,ty 
Oisdosurcs made m1 frivolous or other grounds 
16. (I) /\n mvcstigat111g authority, or princip:il officer of or officer constituting a publi c 
:iuU,only, may decline lo investigate or may disco11linuc U,e investigation of nny 111atter 
rnise<l by a <lisclosure 11111de to the authority or officer of a'k.ind rcfetTed to in this Part if U1e 
investigating authority or officer is of tl1e opinion that lhe disclosure was made frivolously 
or vexatiously. 
(2) A disclosure is uol (despite auy other provision of this Part) protected by tliis Act if an 
investigating authority or officer declines to inV"eSligate or discontinues the investigation of a 
matter under this section. 
(3) Nothiug i.u this scc1ion linlit.s any discretion an investigating authority has to decline to 
u1vestigate or(() discontinue U1e investigation of a matter under the relevant investiirntion Act 
Disclosures concerning merits of government policy 
17. A disclos ure made by a public official tltat principally u1Volves questioning tl1e 
men ls of p_ovemmcnt policy is not (despite any other provision of this Pnrt) protecle<I by 
tlus Ac-I 
Disclosures moti\'atcd uy objccl uf :noiding disciplinary action 
18. A disclosure that as made solely or substantially with the motive of avoidu1g 
dis1111ssal or other disciplinmy action, not bci.ug disciplinary action taken ill reprisal fo r the 
making of a protected disc.losure, is not (despite any olber provision of this Pa.r1) a 
protected disclos ure 
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Disclosure to a member of Parliament or journalist 
19. (1) A disclosure by a public official lo a member of Parliament, or lo a journalist, is 
protected by lliis Acl if the following subsections apply. . 
(2) The public official making the disclosure must have already made subs~tially ~e same 
disclosure to an investigating authority, public authority or officer of a pub he authonty ill 
accordance with another provision of this Part. 
(3) The investip_atinR a11th01ity. public auilmritv or officer to whom the disclosurc~'.as mad'?_ 
O'(: l~fft'.l"Y!Qtet~~/ef~11'h2'"' '-'·' f, fr ""'o .,uth<J,.i), ""\,Ii, ,1111h, 11 11y '" "f,u:, IC> wl..1>111 
the matter was retcrred 11 -
(a) must have decided 1101 to investigate the matter; or 
(b) 10ust have decided to investigate U1e matter but not completed the i.nvestigatiou 
wiU1i.n 6 rnonl11s of U1c original discl0sure being made; or 
(c) must have investigated tl1c matter but not rccorru11e11rled the taking of any action u1 
resp<.'Ct of the matter; or 
(d) must have failed to notify the person making the disclosure, with.in 6 montlt~ of the 
disclosure be111g made, ol"whether or not the 1nalter 1s 1(, I~ investigated 
(4) The public official must have reasonable ~rounds fo1 behevi11g that the disclosu1e 1s 
substantially true . 
(S) The disclosure must Ix s11l,sli111l1ally true 
PART 3-PROTECTIONS 
Prntcc(ion a~ainst reprisals 
20. (1) A person v;l10 lakes detriment.al act.ion again.~t li.uot..lier person that is 
substaut.ially in reprisal for the other person making a protected disclosw-e is guilty of au 
offence. 
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 mouths, or boU1. 
(2) In this Act, "detrimental action" meaus action causing, comprising or involving any of 
the following: 
(a) injury, damage or loss ; 
(b) intimidat.iou or harassment; 
(c) discrimination, disadvantage or adverse tr-ealmcnf in relation to employment , 
(cl) dismissal from, or prejudice in, employment; 
(e) disciplinary proceeding. 
Protection against actions etc. 
2 t. (1) A person is not subject lo any liahility for maku1g a prolcc.tcxl disclosure and u,, 
action, claim or demand may be t'll-:en or made of or against t.l,c person for mabng the 
disclosure. 
(2) Tius sect.ion has effect de:,;pite any duty of secrecy or confidcnlialit.y or ru1y 0U1e1 rc::itrict.io11 
on disclosure (whetlter or not imposed by a.n Act) applicable to I.he person. 
(3) The follm,ving arc examples oft.he ways in which Utis section protects persons who make 
protected disclosures . A perso11 who has made a protected disclosure: 
has a defence of absolute privilege in respect of U1c publication to lhi.: rclcva111 
investigating 11utho1ity, public auU1orit.y, public official, member of Parliament or 
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joumal.ist of the disclosure in proceedings for defamation 
on whom a provision of an Act (other than this Act) imposes a duty to maintain 
confidentiality with respect to any information disclosed is taken not to have 
committed an offence against the Act 
who is subject to an obliAalion by way ?f oath., mle of law or practice to maint:w1 
covi/,/Jevih:.al,0:J- .y\/Jfh .. <€sf2ec,r_10 .1Y1.Q._c)/$Clffi-l>-e. ,·:s. t.aKeJ'l not 10 vo 
ontf(, rnlc of law or prnclice or 11 law relevant to the oath, mlc or pJ11cl1cc 
is ool lial>lc to disciplinary action because ofU1c discloswc. 
ConfidcntialitJ guideline 
22. An investignting authority or public auU10rity (or officer of an investigating autlionty 
or public auU1ority) or public official lo whom a protected disclosure is 111adc or n: li:nl'd 1s 
not to disclose mfonnatin11 Iha! mip_ht idenlif)1 or tend to i<lenllfy a J)CfSl)ll whu has 11iadc 
the protected disclosure 1111less : 
(a) Uie perso11 Cl>1tsc11ls in writi11v, to the d1sclus11rc of U1at in.to11nal1011 . 01 
(b) it is essential , having regard to !11e pri11ciples of 11.aluml justice, that tJ1e 1deul tl) 111g 
information he disclosed to a person whom the information pr<>Vl(kd hy the 
disclosure may concern: or 
(c) !11e investigating a11U1ority, public authority, officer or public o!Tiual is of the op1111011 
that disclosure of'thc i<lcntilyiug information is necessary to i11ve~tig:1tc the 111altc1 
effectively or it is otherwise in U1e public interest to do so. 
Rights and privil~cs of Parliament 
) 
23. Nothing in this Act affects ilic rights and privileges of Parliament in rclat1v11 tu the 
freedom of speech, aud debates and proceedings, in Parliament. 
Other protection preserved 
24. 'Ibis Act does not limit the protection given by any other Act or law lo a person who 
makes disclosures of any kind. 
PART 4-MISCELLANEOUS 
Referral of disclosures by investigating authorities 
25. (1) An investigating auU1ority m.ay refer any disclosure concemiug m, allegatro11 of 
corrupt condud, maladministratioo or serious and substantial waste tlmt is mnde to ii by n 
public official lo another investip,ating autho1ity or to a public official or public authority 
considered by the authority to be appropriate in the circwnstances, for investigation or 
other action. 
(2) The investigatwg authority must refer such a disclosure if: 
(a) it is not auU1orised to investigate the matter concerned under the relevant 
investigation Act; and 
(b) it is of the opinion tliat another investigating authority or some public otlicial or 
public a11!11ority may appropriately deal with the matter concerned 
(3) A disclosure may be referred before or after the matter concerned has been invcstiRatcd and 
whether or not any investigation of the matter is complete or any findings have been made by 
the investigating authority. 
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(4) Tue investigating aut110rity may communicate to tJ1e other investiga~ au~ority ~rt~ tJ1e 
r::~j;~~b')!;~ifj··tiJ·';},f}:}:jn 
dtH111g lit<: u1vest1gauon (tl any; ol tllc n1.atte1 concerned. 
(5) "The investigali.ng authority m11y recommend what action should l,e takrn by Ute olhcr 
investigating authority or the public official or public authority. 
(6) The investigating autbority is not to refer the disclosure to another invcst1gallllP, authonty, 
01 lo 11 public official or public aulliorily, except atlcr taki11g iHlo co11s1dcrntH>11 tl,c views of 111<· 
auU101ity, public official or public autborily . 
(7) An investigating authority rcfcn-ing a matter to another i!lvcsl1p.al111g a11flio1 ity 111ay e11fcr 
into arrangements wilh llie 0U1er authority : 
(a) to avoid <luplication of action; and 
(h) to allow the resources ofbollt auUiorilies to be etr1c1c11fly a11d ,·co1101111c;illy used lo 
take action; and 
( c) lo ensure that action is taken m a ruarmcr prov1d111g the 111us1 l'lfocl 1vc I csu II 
Referral of disclosures by public officials 
26. (1) A public official may refer any disclosure concerning an allcgal 1011 of com1pl 
conduct, maladministration or serious and substantial waste made to tl,e public official 
under Part 2 to an investigating authority or to another pu
1
blic official or a public authority 
considered by the public official to be apprnprinte in the circwnst;u1ccs, fo1 i11vcstigalio11 01 
oilier action . 
(2) 'The public official may conunwucate to the investigating authority, the otl1er public official 
or ilie public authority any information the public official has obtained dwinp_ i.uvestip,ation (if 
any) of ilic matter concerned. 
Nohfication to person making disclosure 
27. 111c investigating authority, public auU1ority or ofticer to whom a disclosure 1s made 
under Ill.is Act or, ifilie disclosure is referred, ilie i1wcstigating aulhrnity, public autl1ority 
or officer to whom the disclosure is referred must notify the person who made !.lie 
disclosw-e, within 6 months oftlie disclosure being made, of the action taken or proposed 
to be taken in respect of ilie disclosw-e. 
False or misleadin~ disclos,u-cs 
28. A public official must not, ill makll.lg a disclosure to an iiwestigatmg aulltorily, 
puhlic authority or public official, wilfully make any false statement to, or mislead or 
attempt to misle.-1d, the investigating auiliority, public authority or public official. 
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 monU1s, or both . 
Proceedings for offences 
29. Proceedings for an offence agairlst this Act are to be dealt with swnrnanly before a 
Local Court constituted by a Magistrate sitting a.lone. 
Regulations 
30. The Governor may make regulations, not inconsistent wiili this Act, for or wit.Ii 
respect to any matter that by this Act is required or pennitted to be prescribed or that is 
necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act. 
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Amendment of Ads 
31. 'D1e Acts specified in Schedule J arc amended as set out io Uiat Schedule. 
Review 
32. (1) A joint committee of members of Parliament is to review tins /\cl 
(2) Toe review is to be undertaken as soon as practicable after the expiration of one year aficr 
the date of assent lo this Act, and aft.er the expiration of each following pcnod of 2 years. 
(3) 111e committee is to report to both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after the 
completion of each review. 
SCHEDULE I-AMENDMENT 'OF ACTS 
Defamation Act 1974 No. 18 
Sections 17Q, 17QA: 
) 
(Sec. 31) 
After section 17P, insert: 
Matters arising under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 
l 7Q. There is a defence of absolute privilege for a publication to or by the 
Auditor-General or a member of the Auditor-General's Office as such a 
member of a disclosure made in relation to a complaint under section 
38B (lA) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. 
Matters relating to the Protcded Disclosures Act 1994 
l 7QA. There is a defence of absolute privilege for a publication to or by a 
public official or public authority referred to iu section 8 (1) (b) or (c) of 
the Protected Disclosures Act 1994 of a disclosure made to U1e public 
official or public authority in relation to an allegation of corrupt 
conduct, maladministration or serious and substantial waste of public 
money if the publication is for the purpose of investigating that 
allegation. 
Freedom of Information Act 1989 No. 5 
Schedule 1 (Exempt documents): 
At the end of clause 20, insert: 
. or 
( d) matter rela~ to a protected disclosure within the meaning of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 1994. 
\ ; ,.·. 
:,;. ·~ -~ 
{ .-.~.:.. :,. :. ~~ 
. , -··- _ :!. _: _ _; __ ;.:,~:_ ... -.·~.'. -.· ·:-: ~ :_ ~:-·:t_ __ _:__ 
-- ~ -~·~· . - . - .-C-
Section 3811 (Spccial audit bJ Auctitor-(;cncral) · 
/\llci 8ccliou 38B (I), i1L~crt 
( l t\) I\ public official wilJun tlie mcamng of the Protected U1sdosurcs Act 
1994 may compla111 1,1 the J\wlitor-Gcncrnl (whcthc, 01;tlly 0r Ul 
wiiting) that public 111n11ey has bceu senou8ly am! s11l>sla11tmlly wasted 
by a11 authority or an 0ll"1< .. :cr of an aulJ1orily. When a public ,)llicial 
t1V1kcs sucl , ., c1111q,la11,t IJ,c A11dit0r-Ge11cral r11ay comJ11ct a.11 audit 
1u1dcr this sectw11 
PubLi(.· Sedor Management Ad 1988 No. 33 
Section 66 (Breaches of disciplinc) : 
(a) At the cud of section 66 (I), inscr1 
; or 
(g) takes any detrimental action (witlun the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 
I 994) against a person that is substantially in reprisal for the person making a 
prnlecte<l disclosure within the meaning ofiliat Act; or 
(h) takes any disciplinary proceedings or disciplinary action against another officer that 
is substantially in reprisal for an internal disclosure made by lha1 0fficer. 
(b) At ilie end of section 66, insert : 
(2) 1n this section, "internal disclosure" means a disclosure made by an 
officer regarding ;u, alleged breach of discipline by ai1olher ofiicer 
belonging to the same Department as that lo which IJ1t:; ofticer belongs. 
~-. 
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WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT 1994 
(reprinted as in force oti 2 March I 995) 
An Act to protect whistleblowers and for other purposes 
PART 1-PRELIMINARY 
Division I-Title and commencement 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994. 
Commencement 
2. This Act commences on a day to be fi.xed by proclamation. 
Division Z-.Object of Act 
Principal object of Act 
3. This Act's principal object is to promote the public interest b: 
protecting persons who disclose-
unlawf ul. negligent or improper conduct affecting the publi 
sector 
danger to public health or safety 
danger to v,e environment. 
v,.,hom 
.·-·-o- ..... .. ........ .... au disclosures a.re ;;:;:d~o ~ e ~e putauons o f per s . . o n s agai n st dec lared to be a " repris nl " and u nlawful both . under the c1v11 ,aw or n:,n 
s4 6 s7 
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Division 3-DefinitUJns 
Definitions and dictionary 
4.(1) The diction 1 • S Act ary m chedule 6 defines parti I . cu ar words used in this 
(2) Schedule 5 contains certai d fi . . . n e iruuons m separate . 
(3) Schedule 5 defi . . sect10ns. . m1uons and defi · · signposted in the dictionary. iruuons found elsewhere in this Act are 
Division 4-0peration of Act 
Act generally binding 
S. 11us Act binds a1J . persons, including the State. 
Other protection saved 
6. This Act does not limit the . . who makes disclosures of any ~otec;n given by another Jaw to a person 
person. or ect another remedy available to the 
PART 2-GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ACT 
What is the 1 genera nature of the Act' h 
7 
. s sc eme? 
• (1) This Act provides a scheme th . 
protection to disclosures about uh; 1 at,fml the public interest, gives special 
sector d aw u negli · con uct or danger to public h aJth ' gent or improper public 
(2) Because the protecti . e or safety or the environment. 
on is very broad, the scheme has a number of 
In some Acts , definitio ns are c . . 
Schedule and fo rms part o f the .:c~uu::1s '1:1: di ctio~ary that appears as the last rpr~tanon Act 1954, section 14. 
s S 
7 
s 8 
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balancing mechanisms intended to--
(a) focus the protection where it is needed; and 
,. , 
I 
~ 
t· •,: 
t, 
0 
(b) make it easier to decide whether the special protection applies to a 
disclosure; and 
(c) ensure appropriate consideration is also given to the interests of 
persons against whom disclosures are made; and 
(d) encourage the making of disclosures in a way that helps to 
remedy the matter disclosed; and 
(e) prevent the scheme adversely affecting the independence of the 
judiciary and the commercial operations of GOCs. 
(3) The scheme gives protection only to a "public interest disclosure" ,2 
which is a particular type of disclosure defined by reference to the person 
who makes the disclosure, the type of infonnation disclosed and the entity 
to which the disclosure is made (the " appropriate entity"). 
(4) Certain types of public interest disclosures may be disclosed under 
the scheme by a '<public officer'', which includes any officer of a •<public 
sector entity" . 
(5) The expression •<public sector entity" is widely defined and a lis 
can be found in Schedule 5, section 2. 
(6) Other types of public interest disclosures may be made under th, 
scheme by anybody. 
Public disclosures made by public officers (Pt 3) 
8 .(1 ) Under section I 5, a public officer may disclose " offi ci1 
misconduct", an expression defined in the Criminal Justice' Act J 989 . 
( 2 ) Under secti on 16, a publi c office r ma y disclo 
'maladministration" that specifically, substantially and adversely affe, 
someone's interests . 
(3) Maladministration is widely defined to cover illegal, arbitra 
oppressive or improper public sector "administrative action" . 
• 
Each expression in this Part that is in bold type and in quotation marks is dcf 
either in the di ctionary or in a section signposted by the dictionary. 
s9 
8 
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(4) Under section 17, a public officer may disclose negligent or improper 
management involving a substantial waste of "public funds". 
(5) The disclosure may concern the conduct of any public officer or 
public sector entity or anyone contracting to supply goods or services (other 
than as an employee) to a public sector entity. 
(6) Under section 18, a public officer may disclose a substantial and 
specific danger to ''publlc health or safety" or the "environment". 
(7) Public health or safety is widely defined in this Act and the wide 
definition of environment in the Environmental Protection Act 1994 is 
introduced by cross reference. 
Public Interest disclosures made by anybody 
9.(1) Under section 19, anybody may disclose a substantial and specific 
danger to the health or safety of a person with a "disability". 
(2) The wide definition of disability in the Disability Services Act 1992 is 
introduced by cross reference. 
(3) Under section 19, anybody may disclose a substantial and specific 
danger to the environment from contraventions of, or of conditions under, 
provisions of Acts listed in Schedule 2. 
(4) Under section 20, anybody may disclose a "reprisal" taken against 
anybody for making a public interest disclosure. 
How must a pub!Jc Interest disclosure be made (Pt 4)? 
10.(1)' Under Part 4, Division 2, a public interest disclosure must be 
made to .'an appropriate entity, which is a ''public sector entity" identified 
under the Division. 
(2) This requirement ensures that-
(a) public interest disclosures are made to public sector entities that 
have responsibility or power to take appropriate action about the 
information disclosed or to provide an appropriate remedy; and 
(b) 
unfair da..rnage is not caused t o the reputations of persons against 
whom disclosures arc made b i · 
•. ~.-~,,,,.,..,.y,..1-tJr, .. :.J.~l"l&<,...~"'' 
s 11 9 
s 11 
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D .. ·on a public interest disclosure m (3) Under the 1v1s1 ' 
ay be made to an 
appropriate unit- . tions apply including, for 
(a) in any way, unless certa1~ _exc:pparticular procedure or the 
1 ther law requmng d d 
examp e, ano . . blished reasonable proce ures; an . ate ent.tty having esta 
appropn . l . g always to specified 
· otherwise app yin • · 
(b) despite any except.ton . t ntity including the appropnate 
persons within the appropna e e ' 
entity ' s "chief executive officer'' . 
U d Pa.rt 4 Division 3-
(4) n er • . . blic interest disclosures are 
(a) public sector entities receiving pu th because of the special 
r records about em, 
required to keep prope di closures· and 
. bli · terest s · protection given for pu c in · ired to 
. b t public interest disclosures is requ 
(b) certain !nfonnat.to~t t:uthe Legislative Assembly; and 
be provided arrnu Y blic interest 
. . about action taken on a pu 
(c) reasonable mfonnatlon d n appropriate entity, and the 
de or referre to a 
disclosure ma . th discloser or referrer. 
l . s required to be given to e 
resu ts, i . . f the Act to courts, 
. des for the applicat.ton o , (5) Part 4, Division 4 prov1 . . t ded to prevent the Act s 
d ' . 1 fficers in a way in en 
tribunals and ju 1c1a o f . . dicial work or independence. 
administration adversely af ecung JU . GOCs in 
. f th applicat.ton of the Act to . 
(6) Pa.rt 4, Division 5 provides or, ~ drninistration adversely affect.tog 
a way intended to preve_nt the Act s a 
GOCs commercial operat.tons. 
. f blic interest disclosures What is the special protection given or pu 
(Pt 5)? . d '"lared not to be !Jable, · · · 2 a person 1s e.. . 11 (1) Under Part 5, D1v1s1on '. . . cess for making a public 
· adrruruscrau ve pro , civilly' criminally or under an 
interest disclosure. . pting or conspiring ro 
. . . 3 5 causrng or anem . (2) Uoder Part 5, D1v1s10ns to ' of a public interest disclosure ,s 
se "detriment" to any person b~ca~s~ both under che civil law of tort 
~:~la.red to be a urcprisaJ" and un aw u . 
s8 
s 12 JO 
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(3) Under Part 5 D ' . • lVISJOn 6--
(a) public sector entities protect their officers fro:u:;p~:~b~ish reasonable procedures t 
(b) publi s, and o c officers with existin . for a review of d ' . .  g nghts to appeal agai ? unfair tr , isc1plinary action . nst, or to apply , eatrnent are permited ' appointments transf } and to use these rights : ers or a against reprisals· ~ 
(c) officers of the b . ' &,. given th . ~u he service and de I Public s:c~:i;oi_al right to appeal ~~ ~~  en:pl~yees are 
reprisals q ty to be relocated t mnuss10ner for · o remove th d (4) u e anger of 
nder Part 5 n· . . Indusuial Commiss· ' ~v1s1on 7, the Industrial C . . grant injunctions ag~t oes ~ot have jurisdiction th omnuS ss1on, or, if the nst repnsals. • e upreme Court - . ,m~ 
General sections (Pt 6) 
12.(1) Part 6 . 
bo 
provides for c . a ut the offences erta.tn offences and th . . · e crurun1 (2) The p . a proceedings 
art makes It an offence-
(a) for a public offi information i~er to record or disclose c . admi . . gamed through . 1 ertain confidential rustratJon other th ID vo vemen t in th. for exam I . an under certain cir is Act's disclos d  p e, the investigation und cumst.ances including e under a public . . er an Act of inf . ' 
(
b) f mterest disclosure·  d ormauon 
mape~o · . ,an n mtenuonaly t . as a public interest . ogive false or mislead.in . person's disclosure disclosure or in subsequent in g. ~o:711ation (3) Th . qu111es mto the 
e Part also declare th ' offences or the offence of s a~ a p~blic officer who commi under which the offi repnsal is guilty of.,.,; ts one of these 1cer may be di . . .. sconduct u d snussed or di tin n er any Act sc1p ed for misconduct. 
s 15 11 s 13 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 
PART 3-DISCLOSURES THAT MAY BE MADE 
Purpose of Part 13. The purpose of this Part is to describe the type of disclosures that 
may be made as public interest disclosures under this Act and who may 
make them. 
What type of information can be disclosed? 
14.(1) The types of information that may be disclosed by a public interest 
disclosure, and who may make the disclosure, are specified in sections l S 
to 20. (2) A person has information about conduct or danger specified in 
sections 15 to 20 if the person honestly believes on reasonable grounds that 
the person has information that tends to show the conduct or danger. 
(3) If information is about an event, it may be about something that has 
or may have happened, is or may be happening, or wil or may happen. 
(4) If the information is about someone else's conduct, the information 
may be about conduct in which the other person has or may have engaged, 
is or may be engaging, or is or may be intending to engage. 
(5) The information need not be in a form that would make it admissible 
evidence in a court proceeding. 
Example-
The information may take lhe form of hearsay. 
Public officer may disclose official misconduct 
, 15, A public officer3 may make a public interest disclosure about 
someone else's conduct if-
This and other secuons alowing a person to make public interest disclosures as 
a pubh c officer do not generaly contain rules ltmiung the disclosures 1c 
d isclosures about the public sector unit of which the person is an officer. 
•••••.•.• ., . ..... . ,. ...... - - ....... ,.. .. ,... • ....-< . ,. ... o. . ,'1-~ 
s 23 
13 
16 · · nAct1994 
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(a) the officer has information about the conduct; and 
(b) the conduct is official misconduct. 
Public officer may disclose maladministration 
. with disability or to 
danger to person 
. Anybody may disclose icular contraventions 
: vironment from part h information about-
- en li if anybody as son 
;~ 19.(1) This section app es . er to .the health or safety of a per 
') . al and specific dang 
·; ) a substanU . . 
16. A public officer may make a public interest disclosure 
someone else's conduct if-
$ (a with a disability; or . t a provision menuoned m 
about i the commission of an ~ff~nceo?~:s offence is or would be a ~ (b) Schedule 2, if cor:1m1ss1oner to the environment; or .. (a) the officer has information about the conduct; and 
(b) the conduct is maladministration that adversely affects anybody's 
interests in a substantial and specific way. 
Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds 
17.(1) A public officer may make a public interest disclosure about the 
conduct of another public officer, a public sector entity or a public sector 
contractor if-
(a) the officer has information about the conduct; and 
(b) the conduct is negligent or improper management directly or 
indirectly resulting, or likely to result, in a substantial waste of 
public funds . 
(2) The disclosure cannot be based on a mere disagreement over policy 
that may properly be adopted about amounts, purposes and priorities of 
expenditure. 
Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safety or 
environment 
18.(l)'This section applies if a public officer has information about a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety or to the 
environment. 
(2) The public officer may make a public interest disclosure of the 
information. 
~ tial and specific dang d der a prov1s1on a substan . . 'mpose un b 
:, . f a cond1t1on 1 . . s or would e a ~ (c) a contravenuon o d 1 2 if the contravenuoo 1 
mentioned in Sche . u e • er to the environment. . 
. al and specific dang f th informauon . 
substanU bli . nterest disclosure o e 
(2) The person may make a pu c 1 
. 1 e reprisal someone b dy may disc os . 1 ure about Any o make a public interest disc os 
20. Anybody may 
else's conduct if- . bout the conduct; and 
h 'nformauon a (a) the person as i 
the conduct is a reprisal. (b) 
nknown person . whether or not the 
Conduct of u blic interest d1sclosur~ th information 
make a pu t which e 21 A person may . articular person o 
. . ble to idenufy a p person is a 
disclosed relates. 
, th h it is 1 tary d1sclosure_s . disclosure even oug 
Invo un be a public interest 
22 A disclosure may · irement. made under a legal requ 
fore commencement 
ts that happened be . Act about events 
Disclosure of even . may be made under this eot of this Acl. 
23 A public interest disclosure ed before the commencem 
. d or may have happen that happene 
s 15 
s 24 14 s 26 
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PART 4-DISCLOSURE PROCESS 
Division I-Purpose of Part 
Purpose of Part 
24. The purpose of this Part is to describe the ways in which a person 
may make a public interest disclosure and provide for related processes. 
Division 2-Disclosure must be to appropriate entity 
Disclosure must be made to an appropriate entity 
25.(1) Sect.ion 26 specifies appropriate entities to which public interest 
discl6su·res may be made .4 
(2) Section 27 provides more detail on how and to whom the public 
interest disclosure may be made within the appropriate entities. 
(3) To be treated as a public interest disclosure, a disclosure under 
sections 15 to 20 must be made to an appropriate entity. 
(4) The fact that a public interest disclosure may be made under a 
particular provision to a particular appropriate entity does not exclude it 
from being made under another provision to the same or another 
appropriate entity. 
Every public sector entity Is an appropriate entity for certain things 
26.(1) Any public sector entity is an appropriate entity to receive a public 
interest disclosure-
(a) about its own conduct or the conduct of any of its officers ; or 
(b) made to it about anything it has a power to investigate or remedy; 
or 
See Division 4 for overriding limitations about couns, tribunals and judicial 
officel'li and Division 5 for overriding limitations about statutory GOCs . 
~ 
j 
,!I 
•i 
{' 
- ~ - ---·- --- ~-·----··-·· ----~·-···-~·---··-... ... --.. ----- - -
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(c ) made to it by anybody who is entitled to make the public intere: 
disclosure and honestly believes it is an appropriate entity t 
receive the disclosure under paragraph (a) or (b) ; or 
(d ) referred to it by another public sector entity under section 28.5 
(2) Subsection ( l) (c) does not permit a public sector entity to receive 
public interest disclosure if, apart from this section, it would not be ab le 1 
receive the disclosure because of Division 4 or 5.6 
(3) If a person makes a public interest disclosure to an appropriate entit: 
the person may also make a public interest disclosure to the entity abou t 
reprisal taken against the person for making the disclosure. 
E=mp/es-
Schedule 3 has examples of the operation of subsection (l )(a) and (b). 
How to disclose to appropriate entity 
27.(1) A public interest disclosure may be made to an appropriate enti1 
in any way, including anonymously. 
(2) However, if an appropriate entity establishes a reasonable procedu 
for making a public interest disclosure to the entity, the procedure must I 
used by a person making a public interest disclosure to the entity. 
(3) Despite subsection (2), a public interest disclosure made to , 
appropriate entity may always be made to-
(a) its chief executive officer;? or 
(b) if the appropriate entity has a governing body-a mem ber of 1 
governing body; or 
(c) if an officer of the entity is making the disclosure-a person wt: 
directly or indirectly , supervises or manages the officer; or 
(d) an officer of the entity who has the task of recei ving or taki1 
Section 28 (Disclosure may be referred to an appropriate entity) 
6 Division 4 (Limitation on disclosure process for courts , tribunals and j udic 
officers) 
Divis ion 5 (Limitation on disclosure process for GOCs) 
See Schedule 5, sec ti on l for the defin ition of "chief executive ". 
s 27 16 
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action on the type of information being disclosed. 
(4) This Act does not affect a procedure required under another Act for 
disclosing the type of information being disclosed. 
(5) If a public interest disclosure is properly made to an appropriate 
entity, the entity is taken to have received the disclosure for the purpose of 
this Act. 
(6) However, subsection (5) is subject to Division 4 and 5.8 
Examples of substction (3)(d)-
I. The entity's internal auditor, if the public interest disclosure is made under 
section 17.9 
2. A health officer or environment.al officer of the department having a statutory or 
administrative responsibility to investigate something mentioned in a disclosure 
under section 18(1) or 19(1).tO 
3. The officer of the entity in charge of its human resource management if the 
public interest disclosure is made under section 20 I I and is about detriment to the 
career of-an employee of the entity. 
E.xamplt of subucrion ( 4 )-
This Act does not affect the requirement under the Criminal Justict Act 1989 that 
all complaints and information about misconduct to be brought to the notice of the 
Criminal Justice Commission must be communicated to the Commission's 
Complaints Section.12 
Division 4 (Limitation on disclosure process for courts, tribunals and judicial 
officers) 
Division S (Limitation on disclosure process for GOCs) 
9 Settion J 7 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds) 
to Section J 8 (Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safety or 
environment) 
Section 19 (Anybody may disclose danger to person with disability or to 
environment from particular contraventions) 
I I Section 20 (Anybody may disclose reprisal) 
ll Sec Criminal Jusria Acr 1989. section 36(5). 
-· 
t 
'lh• ·,- .._,._. ,~ .. 
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Disclosure may be referred to an appropriate entity 
28.(1) If a public interest disclosure received by an appropriate entity 
about-
(a) the conduct of another public sector entity or the actions of 
officer of another public sector entity; or 
(b} the conduct of anybody, including itself, or anything that anotl 
public sector entity has a power to investigate or remedy; 
the entity may refer the public interest disclosure to the other public sec 
entity . 
(2) If the entity refers the disclosure to another public sector entity, 
power to investigate or remedy is unaffected by the reference . 
(3) An appropriate entity must not refer a public interest disclosure 
another public sector entity unless it first considers whether there is 
unacceptable risk that a reprisal would be taken against any person beca1 
of the reference. 
(4) In considering whether there would be an unacceptable risk, 
appropriate entity must, if practicable, consult with the person who m, 
the public interest disclosure. 
(5) An appropriate entity must not refer a public interest disclosure 
another public sector entity if it considers there is an unacceptable risk. 
(6) This section does not affect another law under which the entity m 
refer a report, complaint, information or evidence to another entity . 
E.xamplt-
The duty of a principal officer in a unit of public administra1ion within 
meaning of the Criminal Justict Act 1989 to refer suspected official misconduct to 
Criminal Justice Commission a.s required by that Act is unaffected.13 
13 See Crimin.a/ Jusria Act 1989, section 37(2). 
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Division 3-Records and reports about disclosures 
Records must be kept of disclosures 
29.(1) In this section-
s 30 
"dlscl?sure" means a public interest disclosure or purported public interest 
disclosure. 
''public sector entity" does not include-
(a) the Executive Council; or 
(b) a court or tribunal. 
(2) The objectives of this section are to-
(a) ensure that disclosures are sufficiently identifiable to allow 
Part 514 to be easily applied; and 
(b) · assist in the preparation of accurate reports to the Legislative 
Assembly under sections 30 and 31. 
(3) The chie.f executive officer of a public sector entity must ensure that a 
~rope~ record 1s kept about disclosures received by the public sector entity 
including- ' 
(a) the name of the person making the disclosure, if known; and 
(b) the information disclosed; and 
(c) any action taken on the disclosures. 
Units must report to Legislative Assembly on disclosures 
30.(1) In this section-
"~is~losure"_ means a public i~terest disclosure or a purported public 
interest disclosure. 
''public sector entity" does not ~clude-
(a) the Executive Council; or 
(b) a court or tribunal; or 
14 Pan 5 (Privilege, protection and compensation) 
I 
r; 
~-' 
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(c) a GOC. 
"report period" of an annual report means the period covered by the 
report. 
"substantially verified" disclosure includes a disclosure for which an 
offence prosecution or disciplinary action has been taken 01 
recommended. 
(2) A public sector entity or an officer of a public sector entity requirec 
under an Act to prepare an annual report of the entity's activities during 1 
report period for tabling in the Legislative Assembly must include statistica 
information about-
(a) the number of disclosures received by it over the report perioc 
for each type of information disclosed; and 
(b) the number of disclosures substantially verified over the repo1 
period, even if received before the period, for each type o 
information verified. 
Minister must report to Legislative Assembly on Act's adminlstratio1 
31.(1) In this section-
''public sector entity" does not include-
(a) the Executive Council; or 
(b) a court or tribunal; or 
(c) a GOC. 
(2) The Minister must prepare for each financial year an annual report 
the Legislative Assembly on the administration of this Act. 
(3) lf asked by the chief executive of the department in which this Act 
administered, a public sector entity must provide reasonable assistance 
the chief executive to enable the department to compile information a 
statistics for inclusion in the annual report. 
(4) The report may be included in the department's annual report. 
··- .. ,, ....... ~ .... ~~··· ·-·-·--·········· .... ~,.~ ... ~ ........ ,_....,..._.., 
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Reasonable Information about result of disclosure must be given to 
discloser or referring agency 
32.(1) If asked by a person who makes a public interest disclosure or by 
a public sector entity that has referred a public interest disclosure to it, an 
appropriate entity must give the person or the referring entity reasonable 
infonnation about action taken on the disclosure and the results . 
(2) If the request is for written inforrnation, the inforrnation must be 
written. 
(3) Inforrnation need not be given under subsection (I) to a person who 
makes a public interest disclosure, if-
(a) giving the infonnation would be impractical in the circumstances; 
or 
(b) the infonnation requested has already been given to the person; or 
(c) the request is vexatious. 
(4) Inforrnation must not be given under subsection (1), if giving the 
infonnation would be likely to adversely affect-
(a) anybody's safety; or 
(b) the investigation of an offence or possible offence; or 
(c) necessary confidentiality about an inforrnant' s existence or 
identity. 
(5) If the public interest disclosure is made to the Criminal Justice 
Commission in a complaint of misconduct or official misconduct, this 
section does not impose on the Commission any duty that the director of 
the Commission's Official Misconduct Division does not already have 
under that Act IS 
15 The Criminal Jusric~ Act 1989, under section 33(4) to (6), regulates the release 
of information to complainants under that Act by the director of the Criminal 
Justice Commission's Official Misconduct Division. 
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Division 4-Limitation on disclosure process for courts, tribunals and 
judicial officm 
Object of Division 
33.(1) This Division deals with some issues about the treatment of cou~ 
and tribunals as public sector entities and judicial officers as public officer: 
under th.is Act. 
(2) The purpose of the Division is to clarify the application of this Ac1 
and to ensure this Act's administration does not detrimentally affect judicia 
work or independence. 
(3) Section 34 deals with public interest disclosures made 
administratively about judicial officers. 
(4) Section 35 deals with public interest disclosures made in proceeding! 
before courts or tribunals . 
Disclosures made administratively to or about a judicial officer 
34.(1) This section applies to public interest disclosures made 
administratively about judicial officers . 
(2) A person may make a public interest disclosure about the conduct o· 
a judicial officer only under this section, despite any other provision of thi : 
Act. 
(3) A public interest disclosure under section 15 16 about the conduct of , 
judicial officer may be made only-
(a) to the chief judicial officer of the relevant court or tribunal; or 
16 Sectio n IS (Public officer may disclose official misconduct) 
< "\' 
I 
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(b) to the Criminal Justice Commission. 
(4) A public interest disclosure under section 16, 17, 18 or 1917 about the 
conduct of a judicial officer may be made only to the chief judicial officer of 
the relevant court or tribunal. 
(5) If a reprisal that is conduct of a judicial officer is taken against a 
person for making a public interest disclosure under this section, the person 
may make a public interest disclosure about the reprisal only te>-
(a) the chief judicial officer of the relevant court or tribunal; or 
(b) if the reprisal is offi~ial misconduct-the chief judicial officer of 
the relevant court or tribunal or the Criminal Justice Commission. 
(6) A chief judicial officer may receive a public interest disclosure only if 
the disclosure is about the conduct of another judicial officer. 
(7) Under section 28, 18 the chief judicial officer may refer a public 
interest disclosure made to the chief judicial officer about the conduct of 
another judicial officer to an appropriate entity. 
Disclosures in court or tribunal proceedings 
35.(1) The purpose of this section is to declare how this Act applies to 
disclosures made to a court or tribunal in a proceeding. 
(2) This section applies if a person-
(a) has information that the person may disclose as a public interest 
disclosure to an appropriate entity; and 
(b) discloses the information to a court or tribunal in a proceeding in 
which the information is relevant and admissible. 
17 Section 16 (Public officer may disclose maladministration) 
Section 17 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds) 
Section 18 (Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safety or 
environment) 
Section 19 (Anybody may disclose danger to person with disability or to 
environment from particular contraventions) 
18 Section 28 (Disclosure may be referred to an appropriate entity) 
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(3) The disclosure is a public interest disclosure made to the court or 
tribunal as an appropriate entity under section 26( 1 )(b ). 19 
(4) The court or tribunal may refer the disclosure to another appropriate 
entity under section 28.20 · 
(5) The fact that a court or tribunal is treated as a p~blic se~tor entity 
under this Act, and therefore can be an appropnate entity u.nder 
section 26(1)(b) to receive a public interest disclosure, does not give a 
person a right to take a proceeding before the court or tribunal that the 
person does not have apart from this Act. 
Division 5-Limitation on disclosure process for GOCs 
Object of Division 
36.(1) This Division deals with some issues about the treatment o.f 
GOCs as public sector entities and their officers as public officers under this 
Act. 
(2) The purpose of the Division is to clarify the ap~lication of this Act 
and to ensure this Act's administration does not detnmentally affect the 
commercial operation of GOCs. 
Application of Act to GOCs 
37.(1) An officer of a statutory GOC may, under section 15, 16 or 18. 21 
make a public interest disclosure to the statutory GOC about its conduct or 
the conduct of another officer of the statutory GOC. 
(2) An officer of a statutory GOC may, under section 15, make a public 
interest disclosure to the Criminal Justice Commission about the conduct of 
19 Section 26 (Every public sector entity is an appropriate entity for cenain things ) 
20 Section 28 (Disclosure may be referred to an appropriate entity) 
21 Section l 5 (Public oCf,cer may disclose official ~sconduct) 
Section 16 (Public officer may disclose maladrrurustrallon) 
Section 18 (Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safet y or 
environment ) 
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the statutory GOC or the conduct of another officer of the statutory GOC. 
(3) An officer of a statutory GOC may, under section 17,22 make a 
public interest disclosure to the statutory GOC about its conduct, the 
conduct of another officer of the statutory GOC or the conduct of a public 
sector contractor contracting with the statutory GOC. 
(4) An officer of a statutory GOC may also make a public interest 
disclosure about a reprisal taken against the officer for making the public 
interest disclosure under subsection (I) or (3)-
(a) under section 26(3),23 to the statutory GOC; or 
(b) if the reprisal is official misconduct-to the Criminal Justice 
Commission. 
(5) For the purpose of public interest disclosures under subsections (1) to 
(4) and of applying any Jaw about the disclosures-
(a) the statutory GOC is a public sector entity; and 
(b) the officer making the public interest disclosure is a public officer; 
and 
(c) if the public interest disclosure is made under section J 724 about 
the conduct of another officer of the statutory GOC-the other 
officer is a public officer. 
(6) Other than as provided by subsection (5)-
(a) a GOC is not a public sector entity under this Act; and 
(b) an officer of a GOC is not a public officer under this Act; and 
(c) an officer of a GOC cannot, as a public officer, make a public 
interest disclosure. 
Section 17 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds) 
Section 26 (Every public sector entity is an appropriate entity for certain things) 
Section 17 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds) 
s3S 22 s 35 
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(7) This section does not affect the making of a public interest disclosure 
by anybody under section 19 or 20.25 
(8) This section does not affect the reference under section 2826-
(a) from a statutory GOC to anoi}1er public sector entity of a public 
interest disclosure made to the statutory GOC in accordance with 
this section; or 
(b) from a public sector entity to a statutory GOC of a public interest 
disclosure made to the public sector entity. 
PART 5-PRIVILEGE, PROTECTION AND 
COMPENSATION 
Diviswn I-Purpose of Part 
Purpose of Part 
38. The purpose of this Part is to describe the legal privilege, protection 
and rights of compensation given to a person who makes a public interest 
disclosure . 
Diviswn 2-Limitation of action 
General limitation 
3 9. (1) A person is not liable, civilly, criminally or under an 
aqministrative process, for making a public interest disclosure. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1)-
25 Section 19 (Anybody may disclose danger to person with disability or to 
environment from pahicular contraventions) 
Section 20 (Anybody may disclose reprisal) 
26 Section 28 (Disclosure may be referred to an appropriate entity) 
s 36 23 s 37 
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(a) in a proceeding for defamation the person has a defence of 
absolute privilege for publishing the disclosed information; and 
(b) if the person would otherwise be required to maintain 
confidentiality about the disclosed information under an Act, oath, 
rule of law or practice-the person-
(i) does not contravene the Act, oath, rule of law or practice for 
making the disclosure; and 
(ii) is not liable to disciplinary action for making the disclosure . 
Liability of discloser unaffected 
40. A person's liability for the person's own conduct is not affected only 
because the person discloses it in a public interest disclosure . 
Division 3-Reprisal unlawful 
Reprisal and grounds for reprisal 
41.(1) A person must not cause, or attempt or conspire to cause, 
detriment to another person because, or in the belief that, anybody has 
made, or may make, a public interest disclosure. 
(2) An attempt to cause detriment includes an attempt to induce a person 
to cause detriment. 
(3) A contravention of subsection (1) is a reprisal or the taking of a 
reprisal. 
(4) A ground mentioned in subsection (I ) as the ground for a reprisal is 
the unlawful ground for the reprisal. 
(5) For the contravention to happen, it is sufficient if the unlawful ground 
is a substantial ground for the act or omission that is the reprisal, even 'if 
there is another ground for the act or omission. 
s 42 2 7 
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Division 4-Criminal prosecution about reprisal 
Reprisal is an indictable offence 
42.(1) A public officer who takes a reprisal commits an offence. 
Maximum penalty-167 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment 
(2) The offence is an indictable offence. 
s ... 
(3) If a public officer commits the offence, the Criminal Code, sections 
and 8 27 apply even though a person other than a public officer may also t 
taken to have committed the offence because of the application. 
Division 5-Civil claims about reprisal 
Damages entitlement for reprisal 
43.(1) A reprisal is a tort and a person who takes a reprisal is liable 1 
damages to an yone who suffers detriment as a result. 
(2) Any appropriate remedy that may be granted by a court for a tort m; 
be granted by a court for the taking of a reprisal . 
(3) If the claim for the damages goes to trial in the Supreme Court or 
District Court. it must be decided by a Judge sitting without a jury . 
Division 6-Administrative action about reprisal 
Public sector entity must protect its officers against reprisals 
44. A public sector entity must establish reasonable procedures to prou 
its officers from reprisals that are , or may be, taken against them by I 
enti ty or other officers of the entity . 
27 Criminal C ode . s~cti on 7 (Principal offenders ) 
Crim inal Code , section 8 (Offences co mmitted in prosecu tio n of comr 
purpose) 
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Appeal against action affected by reprisal 
45.(1) This section applies to a public officer who, under an Act, may 
appeal against, or apply for a review of, any of the following actions-
(a) disciplinary action taken against the officer; 
(b) the appointment or transfer of the officer or another public officer 
to a position as a public officer; 
(c) unfair treaonent of the officer. 
(2) Whether or not the Act specifies grounds for the appeal or 
application, the officer may also appeal or apply to have the action set aside 
because it was the taking of a reprisal against the officer. 
(3) Subsection (2) applies even if the decision on the hearing of the 
appeal or application is in the form of a recommendation. 
Reloca_!ion of public sector employee 
46.(1) This section-
(a) must be read with the Public Sector Management Commission 
Act 1990; and 
(b) gives a right to appeal for the relocation of an officer of the public 
service or employee of a department (the "employee"). 
(2) The appeal may be made on the ground that-
(a) it is likely a reprisal will be taken against the employee if the 
employee continues in the employee's existing work location; and 
(b) the only practical way to remove or substantially remove the 
danger is to relocate the employee. 
(3) The appeal may be made to the Commissioner for Public Sector 
Equizy by the employee or for the employee by the chief executive of the 
employee's department. 
( 4) If the Commissioner considers the ground is proved, the 
Commissioner may recommend to the Governor in Council that the 
employee and, if the employee is an officer of the public service, the 
employee's position be relocated-
(a) if the employee is an officer of the Senior Executive 
s 47 29 
s 47 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 
Service-within the public sector; or 
(b) if the employee is not an officer of the Senior Executive 
Service-within the employee 's department or another 
department. 
(5) The Commissioner cannot recommend the relocation without the 
consent of-
(a) the employee: and 
(b) if the relocation is to another unit of the public sector-the other 
unit ' s chief executive officer. 
(6) The Governor in Council may relocate the employee and, if the 
employee is an officer of the public service, the employee's position-
(a) if the employee is an officer of the Senior Executi ve 
Service-within the public sector; or 
(b) if the employee is not an officer of the Senior Executive 
Service-within the employee's department or anothe1 
department. 
(7) For subsection (6), the Governor in Council has power to do, 01 
authorise the doing of, anything necessary or convenient to relocate th( 
employee, including-
(a) abolishing an office in the public service held by the employe1 
and creating another to be held by the employee; or 
(b) ending the employee's appointment to an office and appointin 
the employee to another for which the maximum salary is no les 
than the previous office's . 
Division 7-lnjunctions about reprisal 
Right to apply for Industrial Commission injunction 
47.(1) An application for an injunction about a reprisal may be made t 
the Industrial Commission if the reprisal-
(a) has caused or may cause detriment to an employee within u 
meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1990; and 
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(b) involves or may involve a breach of the Industrial Relations Act 
I 990, or an award, industrial agreement, certified agreement or 
enterprise flexibility agreement under that Act. 
(2) The application may be made by-
(a) the employee; or 
(b) an industrial organisation-
(i) whose rules entitle it to represent the industrial interests of 
the employee; and 
(ii) acting in the -employee's interests with the employee's 
consent; or 
(c) the Criminal Justice Commission acting in the employee's 
interests with the employee's consent if-
(i) the employee is a public officer; and 
(ii ) the reprisal involves or may involve an act or omission that 
the Criminal Justice Commission may investigate. 
(3) The Industrial Relations Act 1990, section 4228 applies to the 
application, but this Division prevails if it is inconsistent with that section. 
(4) If the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to grant an injunction 
on an application under subsection (1), the jurisdiction is exclusive of the 
jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal other than the Industrial Court. 
(5) Without limiting this section, the application is an industrial cause 
within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1990. 
Right to apply for Supreme Court injunction 
48.(1) This section applies only to a person who cannot apply to the 
Industrial Commission for an injunction about a reprisal under section 4 7. 
(2) An application for an injunction about a reprisal may be made to the 
Supreme Court by-
(a) a person claiming that the person is suffering or may suffer 
detriment from a reprisal; or 
2! Jr.ausrria/ RdariottJ Act 1990, section 42 (Power lo grant injunctions) 
' 
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(b) the Criminal Justice Commission acting in the person's interest 
with the person's consent if-
(i) the employee is a public officer; and 
(ii) the reprisal involves or' may involve an act or omissio n tha 
the Criminal Justice Commission may investigate . 
Grounds for injunction 
49. The Industrial Commission or Supreme Court may grant a1 
injunction, in terms it considers appropriate, if it is satisfied that a perso 
has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage, in conduct ( th 
"reprisal conduct") amounting to--
(a) the taking of a reprisal; or 
(b) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a person to take 
reprisal; or 
(c ) inducing or anempting to induce, whether by threats, promises c 
otherwise, a person to take a reprisal; or 
(d) being in any way, directly or indirectly , knowingly concerned i1 
or party to, the taking of a reprisal. 
Order may require specified action 
SO. If the Industrial Commission or Supreme Court is satisfied that 
person has engaged or is engaging in reprisal conduct, it may grant , 
inj unct io n requiring the person to take specified action to rem edy an 
detriment caused by the conduct. 
Evidence 
51.(1) The Industrial Commission or Supreme Court may grant a 
injunction restraining a person from engaging in reprisal conduct-
(a) whether or not it considers that the person intends to enga1 
again, or to continue to engage, in the conduct; or 
(b) whether or not the person has previousl y engaged in rne condu( 
or 
s 52 
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(c) whether or not there is an imminent danger of substantial damage 
to anyone if the person engages in the conduct. 
(2) The Industrial Commission or Supreme Court may grant an 
injunction requiring a person to do something-
(a) whether or not it considers that the person intends to fail again, or 
to continue to fail, to do the thing; or 
(b) whether or not the person has previously failed to do the thing; or 
(c) whether or not there is an imminent danger of substantial damage 
to anybody if the person fails to do the thing. 
Interim injunction 
52. An interim injunction may be granted pending the final decision on 
the application. 
Confidentiality of applications 
53.( 1) For an application before it, the Industrial Commission or 
Supreme Court may direct that-
(a) a report of the whole or part of the proceeding for the application 
must not be published; or 
(b) evidence given, or anything filed, tendered or exhibited in the 
application must be withheld from release or search, or released 
or searched only on a specified condition. 
(2) The direction may be given if the lndustrial Commission or Supreme 
Court considers that-
(a) disclosure of the report, evidence or thing would not be in the 
public interest; or 
(b) persons other than p<!,rties to the application do not have a 
sufficient legitimate interest in being informed of the report, 
evidence or thing. 
(3) An application for an injunctlon may be heard in chambers. 
(.4) An application for an injunction may be heard ex parte if the 
lncl.ustrial Commission or Supreme Court considers an ex parte hearing is 
s 54 
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necessary in the circumstances . 
(5) Th.is section does not limit the power of the Industrial Commission 
or Supreme Court. 
Undertakings as to damages and costs 
54. If the Criminal Justice Commission appl ies for an injunction. no 
undertaklng about damages or costs is to be required . 
PART 6-GENERAL 
Preservation of confidentiality 
55.(1) 1f a person gains confidential information because of the person' s 
involvement as a public officer in this Act's administration, the person must 
not make a record of the information, or intentionally or recklessly disclose 
the information to anyone, other than under subsection (3) . 
Max.imum penalty-84 penalty units. 
(2) A public officer gains information through involvement in the 
administration of this Act if the officer gains the information because o· 
being involved, or an opportunity given by being involved, in th1 
administration. 
EUJmpl,-
lf a public officer gains information because the public officer receives a publi 
interesl disclosure fqr an appropriate entity, the public officer gains the infonna tio 
through involvemcnl in the administration of this Act. 
(3) A person may make a record of confidential information, or disclos 
it to someone else-
(a) for this Act; or 
(b) to discharge a function under another Act including, for exampl 
to investigate something disclosed by a public interest disclosw 
or 
(c) for a proceeding in a court or tribunal; or 
s 56 34 s 56 
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(d) if authorised under a regulation or another Act. 
(4) This section does not affect an obligation a person may have under 
the law about natural justice to disclose information to a person whose 
rights would otherwise be detrimentally affected. 
(5) Subsection (4) applies to information disclosing, or likely to disclose, 
the identity of a person who makes a public interest disclosure only if it is-
(a) essential to do so under the law about natural justice; and 
(b) unlikely a reprisal will be taken against the person because of the 
disclosure. 
(6) To remove doubt, if there is an inconsistency between this section 
and section 6, this section prevails. 
(7) In this section-
"confidentlal information" includes-
(aY information about the identity, occupation, residential or work 
address or whereabouts of a person-
(i) who makes a public interest disclosure; or 
(ii) against whom a public interest disclosure has been made; 
and 
(b) information disclosed by a public interest disclosure; and 
(c) information about an individual's personal affairs; and 
(d) information that, if disclosed, may cause detriment to a person; 
but does not include information publicly disclosed in a public interest 
disclosure made to a court, tribunal or other entity that may receive 
evidence under oath, unless further disclosure of the information is 
prohibited by law. 
"law" for a public interest disclosure made to a committee of the 
Legislative Assembly, includes a standing rule, order or motion of the 
Legislative Assembly. 
False or misleading information 
56.(1) A person commits an offence if the person-
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(a) makes a statement to an appropriate entity intending that it be 
acted on as a public interest disclosure; and 
(b) in the statement, or in the course of inquiries into the statement, 
intentionally gives information that is false or misleading in a 
material particular. 
Maximum penalty-! 67 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment. 
(2) The offence is an indictable offence. 
Misconduct by breach of Act 
57.(1) A public officer is guilty of misconduct under an Act under which 
the officer may be dismissed from office or disciplined for misconduct. if 
the officer contravenes the following-
section 42 (Reprisal is an indictable offence) 
section 55 (Preservation of confidentiality) 
section 56 (False or misleading information). 
(2) To remove doubt, it is declared that under the Criminal Justice Act 
1989, section 29(3)(d),29 the Criminal Justice Commission may investigate 
the contravention, or the alleged or suspected contravention, if-
(a) the public officer is a member of the Police Service; or 
(b) the contravention is official misconduct by a person holding an 
appointment in a unit of public administration within the meaning 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1989. 
Proceedings for offences generally 
58. An offence against this Act other than an offence declared to be ar. 
indictable offence is a summary offence. 
Proceedings for indictable offences 
59.(1) A proceeding on a charge for an indictable offence under this Ac 
29 Criminal Justia Act 1989, section 29 (Role and functions) 
36 s 61 
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ay be taken, at the election of the prosecution-
(a) by summary proceeding under the Justices Act 1886; or 
(b) on indictment. 
(2) A Magistrates Court must not hear the charge summarily if-
(a) the defendant asks the court at the start of the hearing to treat the 
proceeding as a committal proceeding; or 
(b) the court considers that the charge should be prosecuted on 
indictment. 
Magistrates Court may start to hear and decide the charge 
1mmarily even if more than 1 year has passed since the offence was 
1mmitted. 
hange to a committal proceedlng during summary proceeding 
60.(1) This~section applies if, during a proceeding before a Magistrates 
)urt to hear and decide a charge for an indictable offence summarily, the 
,urt decides the charge is not one that should be decided summarily. 
(2) The court must stop treating the proceeding as a proceeding to hear 
1d decide the charge summarily and start treating it as a committal 
oceeding. 
(3) The defendant's plea at the start of the hearing must be disregarded. 
(4) The evidence already heard by the court must be taken to be evidence 
the committal proceeding. 
(5) To remove doubt, it is declared that the Justices Act 1886, 
:ction 10430 must be complied with for the committal proceeding. 
61.(1) The Governor in Council may tnake regulations under this Act. 
(2) A regulation may provide that, for all or particular public interest 
sclosures-
1 Ji,sric~s Act 1886, section 104 (?roceedlngs on an e:,.amination of witnesses in 
relation to an indictable offence) 
s 61 37 
s 61 
'#histleblowers Protection Act 1994 
(a) a public sector entity is to be treated as a part of another public 
sector entity; or 
(b) a part of a public sector entity is to be treated as part of another 
public sector entity or a separate public sector entity; or 
(c) public sector entities or parts of public sector entities are to be 
treated as a single public sector entity. 
(3) A regulation under subsection (2) may not-
(a) apply to a public sector entity specified in Schedule 5, 
section 2(l)(a), (b) or (g);31 or 
(b) provide for a court or tribunal to be treated as .part of a pu~lic 
sector entity not consisting of courts or tribunals of like 
jurisdiction or their administrative offices; or 
(c) be inconsistent with a requirement under an Act that a public 
sector entity act independently. 
31 Schedule 5, section 2 (Meaning of "public sector entity") 
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SCHEDULE 1 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
Public sector entities 
Legislative Assembly committee 
Parliamentary Service Commission 
and Parliamentary Service 
court or tribunal presided over by 
Supreme Court Judge 
court or tribunal presided over by a 
District Court Judge 
court or tribunal presided over by a 
magistrate or justice of the peace 
administrative office of a court or 
tribunal 
Executive Council 
department 
local government 
Regional Health Authority 
statutory GOC 
office of the Parliamentary 
Schedule 5, section 1 of the Act 
Chief executive officers 
Speaker or chairperson 
Speaker or Clerk of the 
Parliament 
Chief Justice 
Chief Judge of District Courts 
Chief Stipendiary Magistrate 
proper officer of the court or 
tribunal or chief executive of the 
relevant department 
senior officer appointed as clerk 
of Executive Council 
department's chief executive or 
Minister 
mayor or chief executive officer, 
including, for Brisbane City 
Council, the town clerk 
chairperson, regional director or 
chief executive of the relevant 
department 
director or chief executive officer 
Parliamentary Commissioner for 
------------·· . - - ' .. 
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SCHEDULE 1 (continued) 
Commissioner for Administrative 
Investigations 
Administrative Investigations 
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SCHEDULE 2 
OFFENCES ENDANGERING THE ENVIRONMENT 
section 19( I )(b) and (c) of the Act 
Clean Air Act 1963 
Section 46(3A) (Special penalties in certain cases) 
Clean Waters Act 1971 
Section 48 (Special penalties in certain cases) 
Contafhiilated Land Act 1991 
Section 13 (Prohibition of land contamination) 
Section 14(2), (3) or (4) (Sites for disposal of hazardous 
substances) 
Section I 7(1), (2), (3) or (4) (Notification of contamination) 
Section 20(4) (Notice to remecliate contaminated land) 
Cultural Record (Landscapes Queensland and Queensland Estate) 
Act 1987 
Section 56(1) or (2) (Offences concerning Queensland Estate) 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 , 
• All provisions for whlcn a contravention is an offence 
Flsheries Ad 1994 
Section 89 (Noxious fisheries resources not to be possessed, 
released etc.) 
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SCHEDULE 2 (continued) 
Section 90 (Nonindigenous fisheries resources not to b 
possessed, released etc.) 
Section 91 (Aquaculture fisheries resources not to be released) 
Section 92 (Duty of person who takes or possesses noxious c 
nonindigenous fisheries resources) 
Section 123 (Protection of marine plants) 
Forestry Act 1959 
Section 53(l)(b) (Interference with forest products on Crov. 
holclings and mining leases) 
Section 54 (1nterfering with forest products on Crown lands etc . 
Land Act 1962 
Section 250(1) (Tree clearing permit) 
Section 372(1) (Trespass to Crown land etc. and removal 
trespassers) 
Mineral Resources Act 1989 
Section 6.15 (Conclitions of mineral development licence) 
Section 6.27 (Contravention by holder of mineral developmc 
licence) 
Section 7 .33 (Conditions of mining lease) 
Nature Conservation Act 1992 
Section 88(1) (Restriction on taking etc. protected animals) 
Section 89(1) (Resuiction on taking etc. protected plants) 
Section 91 (Prohibition on release etc. of international 
prohibited wildlife) 
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SCHEDULE 2 (continued) 
Section 92 (Prohibition on breeding etc. hybrids of protected 
animals) 
Section 93 (Aborigines' and Torres Strait Islanders' rights to take 
etc. protected wildlife) 
Section 94 (Conservation officers prohibited in dealing with 
protected wildlife) 
Section 97(2) (Restriction on taking etc. of native wildlife in areas 
of major interest and critical habitats) 
Section 109 (Compliance with order) 
Petroleum Act 1923 
Section 63A (Penalties) 
Petroleum Regulation 1966 
Section 243 (Penalties) 
Queensland Heritage Act 1992 
Section 33(1) (Development not to be carried out without 
Council's approval) 
Section 47 (Offences) 
Section 51 (Offence to destroy protected area etc .) 
Section 59 (Contravention of stop order) 
Section 65(2) (Restoration orders) 
Transport Operations (Marine Pollution) Act 1995 
All provisions for which a contravention is an offence 
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SCHEDULE 2 (continued) 
Water Resources Act 1989 
' • Section 4.44 (Destruction of vegetation, excavation or placing o. 
fill) 
Section 4.48(3) (Suspension of permit in exceptional 
circumstances) 
• Section 4.50(2) (Notice to stop activities) 
Section 4.51 (2) (Notice to remove vegetation etc.) 
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SCHEDULE 3 
EXAMPLES OF APPROPRIATE ENTITIES IN 
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES 
section 26 of the Act 
Examples, under section 26( 1 )( a) of the Act, of public interest disclosures 
made to appropriate entities because the disclosure is about the conduct of 
the entities or of their officers-
I. W, an employee of a department, has information that officers of a 
disability service run by the department have been committing serious 
abu~es against clients. The conduct is of a type mentioned in 
section 19( 1 )(a) of the Act. 32 W discloses the conduct to the department. 
The department is an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure because it is 
about the conduct of its staff. 
2. W, an employee of a local government, has information about the 
local government's conduct in using negligent management practices 
resul~ng i~ subs~antial loss of public funds. The conduct is of a type 
mentioned m section 17 of the Act.33 W discloses the conduct to the local 
government. The local government is an appropriate entity to receive the 
disclosure because it is about its own conduct. 
3. W, a prison officer employed by the Corrective Services Commission, 
has information that another prison officer has committed a criminal assault 
on a prisoner. The conduct is of a type mentioned in section 18( I) of the 
Act34 W discloses the conduct to the Corrective Services Commission. 
The Corrective Services Commission is an appropriate entity to receive the 
disclosure because it is about the conduct of its staff. 
Section 19 (Anybody may disclose danger to person with disability or to 
environment from panicular contraventions) 
Section 17 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper management 
affecting public funds) 
Section 18 (Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safety or 
environment) 
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4. W , a police officer, has information that certain other police officers 
are not investigating certain offences in return for corrupt payments . The 
conduct is official misconduct mentioned in section 15 of the Act.35 W 
discloses the conduct to the Queensland Police Service. The Queensland 
Police Service is an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure because it is 
about the conduct of one of its officers . 
5. W, an employee of a State instrumentality, has information that a 
senior officer of the instrumentality has misappropriated funds from the 
instrumentality. The conduct is official misconduct mentioned in section 15 
of the Act. W discloses the conduct to the instrumentality. The 
instrumentality is an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure because it is 
about the conduct of one of its officers. 
Examples, under section 26( 1 )(b) of the Act, of disclosures made to 
appropriate entities because the disclosures are about something the 
entities have a power to investigate or remedy-
1. W, an employee of a department, has information that officers of a 
· disability service run by the department have been committing serious 
abuses against clients. The conduct is official misconduct mentioned in 
'. section 15 of the Act. W discloses the conduct to the Criminal Justice 
·';: .; Commission. The Criminal Justice Commission is an appropriate entity to 
·: ··receive the disclosure because it involves conduct it may investigate. 
""-
i 2. W, an employee of a department, has information about the 
·1:;  department's conduct in using negligent accounting practices resulting ir 
r~ , substantial loss of' public funds. The conduct is of a type mentioned ir 
';- J section I 7( 1) of the Act.36 W discloses the conduct to the Queenslanc 
1 Audit Office . The Queensland Audit Office is an appropriate entity tc 
receive the disclosure because it involves conduct it may investigate. 
3. W, an employee of a department, gives evidence at a hearing of the 
35 Section 15 (Public officer may disclose official mlsconduct) 
36 Section 17 (Public officer may disclose negligent or improper managemen 
affecting publ ic funds ) 
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SCHEDULE 3 (continued) 
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee inquiring into the department's 
management practices. At the hearing W discloses information about the 
department's conduct in using negligent management practices resulting in 
substantial Joss of public funds. The conduct is of a type mentioned in 
·section 17(1) of the Act. The Committee is an appropriate entity to receive 
the disclosure as it involves conduct it may investigate. 
4. W, a prison officer employed by the Corrective Services Commission, 
has information that another prison officer has committed a criminal assault 
on a prisoner. The conduct is of a type mentioned in section 18(1) of the 
Act.37 W discloses the conduct to the Queensland Police Service. The 
Queensland Police Service is an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure 
because it involves conduct it may investigate. 
5. W, an employee of a private sector company, has information that the 
comp;giy_ has committed an offence against the Environmental Protection 
Act 1994 that is a substantial and specific danger to the environment. The 
conduct is of a type mentioned in section 19(l)(b) of the Act.38 W 
discloses the conduct to the department in which the Environmental 
Protection Act I 994 is administered. The department is an appropriate 
entity to receive the disclosure because it involves conduct it may 
investigate. 
6. W, an employee of a shipping company, has information that a ship 
owned by the company has discharged oil into coastal waters of 
Queensland. The conduct is an offence under the Transport Operations 
( Marine Pollution) Act I 995 and is a substantial and specific danger to the 
environment. The conduct is of a type mentioned in section 19( 1 )(b) of the 
Act. W discloses the conduct to the department in which the Transport 
Operations ( Marine Pollution) Act I 995 is administered. The depa..-unent 
is ,an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure because it is about conduct 
it may investigate. 
37 Section I 8 (Public officer may disclose danger to public health or safety or 
environment) 
38 Section I 9 (Anybody may disclose danger to person with disability or to 
environment from particular contraventions) 
-------- ---- - - -·- w-- - - -
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7. W, an employee of a State instrumentality, has information that 
senior officer of the instrumentality has misappropriated funds of tl 
instrumentality. The conduct is official misconduct mentioned in section 
of the Act, involving the commission of an offence. W discloses tJ 
conduct to the Queensland Police Service. The Queensland Police Servi 
is an appropriate entity to receive the disclosure because it is about cond~ 
it may investigate. 
8. W. a police officer, has information that certain other police office 
are not investigating certain offences in return for corrupt payments. T 
conduct is official misconduct mentioned in section 15 of the Act, involvi 
official misconduct within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 191 
The Criminal Justice Commission is an appropriate entity to receive t 
disclosure because it is about conduct it may investigate. 
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SCHEDULE 5 
SECTIONAL DEFINITIONS 
section 4(2) of the Act 
Meaning of "chief executive officer" 
1.(1) The "chief executive officer'' of an appropriate entity includes, if 
the entity is listed in Schedule 1 of the Act, a person specified in the 
Schedule as chief executive officer of the entity. 
(2) A regulation may specify a person who is to be treated as a chief 
executive officer of a particular public sector entity for all or particular 
public interest disclosures. 
(3) The object of a specification under Schedule I of the Act or a 
regu1atlon is-
(a) to make it easier to identify who is to be treated as the chief 
executive officer, particularly of entities for which this might 
otherwise be difficult to decide; or 
(b) to provide for a person other than a chief executive officer to be 
also treated as a chief executive officer because the function given 
to chief executive officers under this Act may also be 
appropriately given to the person. 
(4) A regulation under subsection (2) may not specify a chief executive 
officer for a public sector entity specified in the Schedule 1 of the Act, other 
than a part of a department. 
Meaning of "public sector en~ty" 
2.(1) A ''public sector entity" is any of the following-
(a) a committee of the Legislative Assembly; 
('b) the Parliamentary Service Comrn.ission and the Parliamentary 
Service; 
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(c) a court or tribunal; 
(d) the administrative office of a court or tribunal; 
(e) the Executive Council; 
(f) a department; 
(g) a local government; 
(h) a university, university college, State college or agricu 
college; 
(i) a commission, authority, office, corporation or instrumen 
established under an Act or under State or local govern 
authorisation for a public, State or local government purpose 
U) a GOC, but only to the extent indicated under Part 4, Di vii 
of the Act; 
(k) an entity, prescribed by regulation, that is assisted by r 
funds. 
(2) However, the following are not public sector entities-
(a) a GOC, other than to the extent indicated under Part 4, Divi 
of the Act; 
(b) the following entities, under or within the meaning c 
Education (General Provisions) Act 1989-
(i) a parents and citizens association; 
(ii) a school that is not a State school; 
(iii) an advisory committee;39 
(iv) an international educational institution;40 
(c) an entity prescribed by regulation. 
(3) For the purpose of this Act, a State educational institution is r 
39 See Education (G~nual Provisions) Act 1989, section 9. 
40 See Education (C~nuat Provisions) Act 1989, section 75. 
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the ~epartment in which the Education (General Provisions) Act 1989 is 
adrrurustered. 
... -·--·-----·---=----- -
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SCHEDULE 6 
DICTIONARY 
section 4( 1) of th , 
"administrative action" is an act or omission of an administr. 
character done or made by, in or for a public sector entity, 
includes, for example-
(a) a decision or failure to decide; and 
(b) a formulation of a proposal or intention. 
"agricultural college" means an agricultural college under the Agricul 
Colleges Act 1994. 
"annual report" of a department means the annual report ol 
department required to be prepared and tabled in the Legisl. 
Assembly under the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977 
"appropriate entity" is a public sector entity to which a public int 
disclosure may be made or referred under-
(a) section 26 of the Act (Every public sector entity is an appror 
entity for certain things); or 
(b) section 28 of the Act (Disclosure may be referred t, 
appropriate entity). 
"duef executive omcer" see Schedule 5, section I of the Act. 
"chief judicial omcer" means a judicial officer who is treated unde 
Act as a chief executive officer of a court or tribunal. 
"commission of inquiry" means a commission of inquiry unde 
Commissions of inquiry Act 1950 and includes an inquiry un 
commission mentioned in section 4(2) of that Act. 
"detriment" includes-
(a) personal injury or prejudice to safety; and 
(b) property damage or loss; and 
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(c) intimidation or harassment; and 
(d) adverse discrimination, disadvantage or adverse treatment about 
career, profession, employment, trade or business; and 
(e) threats of detriment; and 
(f) financial loss from detriment. 
"di bi!' " f sa 1ty o a person has the same meaning as in the Disability Services 
Act 1992. 
"environment" has the same meaning as in the Environmental Protection 
Act 1994. 
''investigate" includes take evidence. 
"judidal officer" includes a registrar or deputy registrar of a court or 
tnbunal performing delegated judicial tasks. 
''mala~mlnistratlo_n" i_s administra~ve_ action that is unlawful, arbitrary, 
un1ust, oppressive, unproperly discnminatory or taken for an improper 
purpose. 
"officer'' of a public sector entity includes-
(a) a constituent member of the public sector entity, whether holding 
office by election or selection; and 
(b) an employee of the public sector entity, whether employed on a 
permanent or temporary basis; and 
(c) if the public sector entity is a department-the Minister 
responsible for its administration. 
"official misconduct" has the same meaning as in the Criminal Justice Act 
1989. 
"proP:r officer'' of a court or tribunal means-
(a) for the Supreme Court, J District Court or the Childrens Court 
constituted by a Judge-the registrar of the court; or 
(b) for a Magistrates Court or the Childrens Court constituted other 
than by a Judge-the clerk of the court; or 
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(c) for another court or tribunal-the administrative officer in d 
of the administrative office attached to the court or tribunal. 
"public funds" are funds available to, or under the control of. a p1 
sector entity and includes, for example, public moneys withir 
meaning of the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977. 
''public health or safety" includes the health or safety of persons-
(a) under lawful care or control; or 
(b) using community facilities or services provided by the publ 
private sector; or 
(c) in employment workplaces. 
Examplts of paragraph (a)--
I . S1uden1 under the care or control of a teacher . 
2. Patient under the care or control of a doctor, nu~e or other health professic 
3. Prisoner under the care and control of a prison officer . 
''public interest disclosure" means a disclosure of information spec 
in sections 15 to 20 of the Act made to an appropriate entity 
includes all information and help given by the discloser t 
appropriate entity . 
''public officer" is a person who is an officer of a public sector entiry 
includes-
(a) a public sector entiry that is a corporation; and 
(b) only to allow a member of the Legislative Assembly tom; 
public interest disclosure-a member of the Legisl 
Assembly. 
''public sector contractor'' is a person who contracts with a public s 
entity to supply goods to the entity or services to the entity other 
as an employee. 
''public sector entity" see Schedule 5, section 2 of the Act. 
"Regional Health Authority" means a Regional Health Auth 
established under the Health Services Act 1991 . 
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''relevant court or tribunal" of a juilicial officer is the court or tribunal of 
which the judicial officer is a member or is attached . 
''relevant department" means-
(a) for a Regional Health Authority-the chief executive of the 
department in which the Health Services Act 1991 is 
administered; or 
(b) for an administrative office attached to a court or tribunal-the 
department in -which is administered the Act under which the 
court or tribunal is established. 
''reprisal" see section 41 of the Act. 
"State college" has the same meaning as in the Vocational Education, 
Training and Employment Act 1991. 
"State educational Institution" has the same meaning as in the Education 
- · (General Provisions) Act 1989. 
''tribunal" means-
(a) a tribunal constituted by a person acting judicially; or 
(b) a body or person performing a function under an Act to hear 
appeals by employees about dismissal from employment , 
ilisciplinary action or other unfair treatment; or 
(c ) a commission of inquiry; or 
(d) a Misconduct Tribunal within the meaning of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1989. 
-------------------· -·- -
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AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 
No. 108 of 1994 
An Act to encourage the disclosure of conduct 
adverse to the public interest in the public sector, and 
for related purposes 
[Notified in ACT Gazerre S289: 22 December 1994} 
The Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory enacts as 
follows: 
PART I-PRELIMINARY 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Public !nteresc Disclosure Ace 1994. 
Commencement 
2. (1) Section 1 and this section commence on the day on which this 
Act is notified in the Gazette. 
(2) The remaining provisions commence on a day, or respective days, 
fixed by the Minister by notice in the Gazelle. 
(3) If a provision referred to in subsection (2) has not commenced 
before the end of the period of 6 months commencing on the day on which 
2 P ublic In terest Disclosure No . 108. 1994 
this Act is notified in the Gazeue, that provision, by force of thi s subsecti on, 
commences on the first day after the end of that period. 
Interpretation 
3. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears-
"act" includes investigate; 
"conduct" includes act or omission; 
"disclosable conduct" means conduct which, by virtue of subsection 4 
( 1 ). is to be taken to be disc losable; 
"detriment" means--
(a) injury, damage or loss; 
(b) intimidation or harassment; or 
(c) discrimination, disadvantage or adverse treatment in 
relation to career, profession, employment, trade or 
business; 
"government agency" has the same meaning as in the Public Sector 
Management Act 1994; 
"offence" means an offence under an Act; 
"officer" has the same meaning as in the Public Sector Management Act 
1994; 
"proper authority" means a person or body authorised to receive a 
public interest disclosure under this Act and includes, in relation to 
such a person or body-
(a) its Chief Executive Officer, or 
(b) its governing body; 
"public interest disclosure" means a disclosure of information that the 
person making the disclosure believes on reasonable grounds 
tends to show-
(a) that another person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes 
to engage, in disclosable conduct; 
(b) public wastage; 
(c) that a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to 
engage, in an unlawful reprisal; or 
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(d) that a public official has engaged, is engaging, or proposes 
to engage, in conduct that amounts to a substantial and 
specific danger to the health or safety of the public; 
"public official" means--
(a) an officer of a government agency; 
(b) a person employed, by or on behalf of the Territory or in 
the service of a Territory authority or Territory 
instrumentality, whether under a contract of service or a 
conrract for services, including a person who has ceased to 
perform those services; or 
(c) a person otherwise authorised to perform functions on 
behalf of the Territory, a Territory authority or Territory 
instrumentality; 
"public wastage" means conduct by a public official that amounts to 
negligent, incompetent or inefficient management within, or of, a 
government agency resulting, or likely to result, directly or 
indirectly, in a substantial waste of public funds, other than 
conduct necessary to give effect to a law of the Territory; 
"Territory instrumentality" has the same meaning as in the Public Sector 
Management Act 1994; 
"unlawful reprisal" means conduct that cau ses, or threatens to cause, 
detriment-
(a) to a person in the belief that any person has made. or may 
make a public interest disclosure; or 
(b) to a public official because he or she has resisted attempts 
by another public official 10 involve him or her in the 
commission of an offence. 
Disclosable conduct 
4. (1) For the purposes of thi s Act, conduct is to be taken to be 
disclosable if-
(a) it is of a type referred to in subsection (2); and 
(b) it could constitute-
(i) a criminal offence; 
(ii) a disciplinary offence; or 
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(iii) reasonable grounds for dismissing or dispensing with, or 
otherwise terminating, the services of a public official 
who is engaged in it. 
(2) Paragraph ( 1) (a) applies in relation to the following types of 
conduct: 
(a) conduct of a person (whether or not a public official) that 
adversely affects, or could adversely affect, either directly or 
indirectly, the honest or impartial performance of official functions 
by a public official or government agency; 
(b) conduct of a public official which amounts to the performance of 
any of his or her official functions dishonestly or with partiality; 
(c) conduct of a public official, a former public official or a 
government agency that amounts to a breach of public trust; 
(d) conduct of a public official, a former public official or a 
government agency that amounts to the misuse of information or 
material acquired in the course of the performance of official 
functions (whether for the benefit of that person or agency or 
otherwise); 
(e) a conspiracy or attempt to engage in conduct referred to in 
paragraphs (a) to (d) (inclusive). 
(3) In this section-
"criminal offence" means an offence against a law in force in the 
Tenitory; 
"disciplinary offence" means conduct that constitutes grounds for 
disciplinary action under a law in force in the Tenitory. 
Disclosures during proceedings 
5. If information that could amount to a public interest disclosure is 
disclosed in the course of the proceedings of a court or tribunal, the court or 
tribunal may refer the information to a proper authority. 
Other protection P:eserved 
6. This Act does not limit the protection given by any other Act or law 
to a person who makes a public interest disclosure or prejudice any other 
remedy available to the person. 
Liability of agent of the Crown 
7. An agent of the Territory who commits an offence against this Act 
is liable for a penalty for the offence. 
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Legal professional privilege 
8. Nothing in this Act shall be taken to entitle a person to disclose 
information which would otherwise be the subject of legal professional 
privilege. 
PART II-PROPER AUTHORITIES 
Division I-Government agency 
Proper authorities 
9. Each government agency is a proper authority to receive-
(a) a public interest disclosure-
(i) concerning the agency's conduct or the conduct of an 
officer of the agency; 
(ii) concerning a matter, or the conduct of a person, that the 
agency has a function or power to investigate; 
(iii) referred to it by another government agency; or 
(iv) if the person making the disclosure believes that the 
agency is a proper authority to receive the disclosure; or 
(b) a public interest disclosure that a person has engaged, is engaging, 
or proposes to engage, in an unlawful reprisal where-
(i) in the case of an unlawful reprisal that relates to a 
previous public interest disclosure-the previous public 
interest disclosure was made to the government agency; 
or 
(ii) in the case of an unlawful reprisal that relates to an 
attempt by a public official to involve another person in 
the commission of an offence-the public official is an 
officer of the government agency. 
Procedures 
10. (1) A government agency shall establish procedures-
(a) to facilitate the making of public interest disclosures: and 
(b) to deal with public interest disclosures that it is the proper authority 
to receive; 
as soon as practicable, and in any event, within 12 months after-
(c) the commencement of this section; or 
(d) the government agency comes inco exiscence; 
-----------------~--------------------- --------.. -, - · C, 
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whichever is larer. 
(2) A government agency shall ensure rhar procedures established 
under subsection (I) are maintained. 
(3) The procedures robe established under subsection (I) shall include 
procedures dealing with the following: 
(a) making public interest disclosures; 
(b) assisting and providing information to a person who makes a 
public inreresr disclosure; 
(c) protecting a person who makes a public interest disclosure from 
unlawful reprisals, including unlawful reprisals taken by officers 
of the government agency; 
(d) acting on public interest disclosures. 
(4) The government agency shall, in respect of a document setting out 
the procedures established and maintained in accordance with this section-
(a) make a copy of the document available to its officers; 
(b) make a copy of the document available to the public for inspecrion 
at all reasonable times; and 
(c) supply to a person a copy of the document on payment of an 
amounr directed by the governmenr agency to be paid in relation to 
supply of such a copy (being an amount that the government 
agency has determined, on reasonable grounds, to be equal to the 
costs that will be incurred by the government agency in providing 
such a copy). 
Report on disclosures 
11. (1) A government agency that is required by an Act to prepare an 
annual repon of its activities during a year for tabling before the Legislative 
Assembly shall include in the repon-
(a) a description of the procedures maintained by it under section I 0 
during the year, 
(b) statistics relating to the year in accordance with subsection (2); and 
(c) particulars relaring ro the year in accordance with subsection (3). 
(2) The statistics robe included in the annual repon are-
(a) the number of public interest disclosures received by the 
government agency; 
(b) the number of each type of public interesr disclosure received by 
the government agency; 
e 
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(c) the number of public interest disclosures received by the 
government agency that were referred to it by other government 
agencies; 
(d) the number of public interest disclosures investigated by the 
government agency; 
(e) where the government agency has referred public interest 
disclosures to other government agencies for investigation-
(i) the total number of disclosures referred; 
(ii) the identity of each other agency to which a disclosure 
was referred; 
(iii) the number of disclosures referred to each other agency; 
and 
(iv) the number of each type of public interest disclosure 
referred ro each other governmenr agency; 
(f) the number of public interest disclosures on which the government 
agency declined to act under section 17; and 
(g) the number of public interest disclosures that were substantiated by 
the government agency's investigation of the disclosure . 
(3) The annual repon shall include particulars of remedial acrion taken 
by the government agency in relation to--
(a) each public interesr disclosure that was subsranriared on 
investigation by the government agency; and 
(b) any recommendations of the Ombudsman rhat relate to the 
government agency. 
Division 2-The Ombudsman 
Application of Ombudsman Act 1989 
12. For the purposes of rhis Act, the Ombudsman may exercise any of 
the powers referred to in the Ombudsman Act 1989 as 1f a reference to an 
investigation under the Ombudsman Act 1989 were a reference to an 
investigation under this Ac1. 
Ombudsman a proper authority 
13. The Ombudsman is a proper authoriry to receive a public interest 
disclosure from any person. 
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Intervention by Ombudsman 
14. If, in relation to a public interest disclosure that he or she has 
received, the Ombudsman considers-
(a) that there is no other proper authority that can adequately or 
properly act on the cJjsclosure; or 
(b) that any proper authority that should have acted on the disclosure 
has failed, or been unable for any reason, to adequately act on the 
disclosure; 
the Ombudsman may exercise his or her powers to act on the cJjsclosure. 
PART III-PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURES 
Making a public interest disclosure 
15. (1) Any person may make a public interest disclosure to a proper 
authority. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) a person may 
make a public interest disclosure-
(a) about conduct in which a person engaged, or about matters 
arising, before the commencement of this Act; and 
(b) whether or not the person is able to identify any person that the 
information disclosed concerns. 
Anonymous disclosures 
16. Nothing in this Act requires a proper authority to investigate a 
public interest disclosure if the person making the disclosure does not 
identify himself or herself. 
Frivolous etc. disclosures 
17. (1) A proper authority may decline to act on a public interest 
cJjsclosure received by it if it considers that the disclosure--
(a) is frivolous or vexatious; 
(b) is misconceived or lacking in substance; 
(c) is rrivial; or 
(d) has been adequately dealt with by itself or another proper 
authority. 
(2) If an issue raised in a public interest disclosure has been 
determined by a court or tribunal authorised to determine the issue at law 
after consideration of the matters raised by the disclosure, the proper 
e 
e 
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authority shall decline to act on the disclosure to the extent that the 
illsclosure attempts to reopen the is sue . 
(3) If a public interest disclosure was referred to the proper authorit y 
by the Ombudsman, the proper authority shall not decl ine to act on the 
disclosure under this section unless the Ombudsman is satisfied that the 
proper authority has adequate grounds under this section to make that 
decision. 
Referral without investigation 
18. Subject to section 21, if a public interest di sclosure received by a 
proper authority is not related to-
(a) the conduct of the authority or of an officer of the authonty; or 
(b) a matter, or the conduct of any person, th at it has a functi on or 
power to investigate; 
the proper authority shall refer the disclosure to a government agency that , 
because it has a function or power to deal with the conduct or matter the 
illsclosure concerns, is a proper authority to receive the cJjsclosure. 
Investigation by proper authority 
19. A proper authority shall investigate a public interest disclosure 
received by it if the disclosure relates to-
(a) its own conduct or conduct of an officer of the authority, 
(b) a ma'tter, or the conduct of any person, that the authority has a 
function or power to investigate; or 
(c) the conduct of a person, other than an officer, perform ing services 
for or on behalf of the authority. 
Referra I with investigation 
20. (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a public interest disclosure being 
investigated by a proper authority relates to-
(a) the conduct of another government agency or the conduct of an 
officer of another government agency; or 
(b) a matter, or the conduct of any person, that another government 
agency has a function or power to investigate; 
the proper authority may refer the public interest disclosure to the other 
government agency. 
(2) Nothing in this section affects the duty of a proper authority to act 
under section 19. 
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No referral 
21. (1) A proper authority shall not refer a public interest disclosure 
to another government agency, other than the Ombudsman, under section 18 
or subsection 20 (I) if, in the authority's opinion-
(a) there is a serious risk that a person would engage in an unlawful 
reprisal; or 
(b) the proper investigation of the disclosure would be prejudiced; 
as a result of the reference to the other government agency. 
(2) Where, but for subsection (1), a proper authority would have 
referred a public interest disclosure to another public authority under section 
18, the proper authority shall refer the disclosure to the Ombudsman. 
Action by proper authority 
22. (1) Subject to subsection (2), if, after investigation, a proper 
authority is of the opinion that a public interest disclosure has revealed-
(a) that a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in 
disclosable conduct; 
(b) public wastage; 
(c) that a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in 
an unlawful reprisal; or 
(d) that a public official has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to 
engage, in conduct that amounts to a substantial and specific 
danger to the health or safety of the public; 
the authority shall take such action as is necessary and reasonable-
(e) to prevent the conduct or reprisal continuing or occurring in future ; 
and 
(f) to discipline any person responsible for the conduct or reprisal. 
(2) Where the Ombudsman repons that a public interest disclosure has 
revealed--
(a) that a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, in 
disclosable conduct; 
(b) public wastage; 
(c) that a person has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to engage, 1n 
an unlawful reprisal; or 
e 
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(d) that a public official has engaged, is engaging, or proposes to 
engage, in conduct that amounts to a substantial and specific 
danger to the health or safety of the public; 
a proper authority to which the disclosure relates shall, having regard to any 
recommendations of the Ombudsman, take such action as is necessary and 
reasonable-
(e) to prevent the conduct or reprisal continuing or occurring in future; 
and 
(f) to discipline any person responsible for the conduct or reprisal. 
(3) Subsections (I) and (2) do not apply if-
(a) an investigation, or a report by the Ombudsman, reveals conduct 
referred to in paragraphs ( 1) (d) or (2) (d); and 
(b) the conduct is necessary to give effect to a law of the Territory. 
Progress re port 
23. (1) A person who makes a public interest disclosure, or a proper 
authority which refers a disclosure to another proper authority, may request 
the proper authority to which the disclosure was made or referred to provide 
a progress repon . 
(2) Where a request is made under subsection (I), the proper authority 
to which it is made shall provide a progress repon to the person or authority 
who requested it-
(a) as soon as practicable after receipt of the request; and 
(b) if the proper authority takes funher action with respect to the 
disclosure after providing a progress repon under paragraph (a)-
(i) while the authority is taking action-at least once in every 
90 day period commencing on the date of provision of the 
repon under paragraph (a); and 
(ii) on completion of the action. 
(3) A progress repon provided under subsection (2) shall contain the 
following paniculars with respect to the proper authority that provides the 
report: 
(a) where the authority has declined to act on the public interest 
disclosure under section 17-that it has declined to act and the 
ground on which it so declined; 
(b) where the authority has referred the public interest disclosure to 
another proper authority-that it has referred the disclosure to 
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another authority and the name of the authority to which the 
disclosure has been referred; 
(c) where the authority has accepted the public interest disclosure for 
invesrigarion-the current status of the investigarion; 
(d) where the authority has accepted the public interest disclosure for 
investigation and the investigation is complete-its findings and 
any action it has taken or proposes to take as a result of it s 
findings. 
(4) Nothing in this section prevents_ the proper authority from 
providing a progress repon in accordance w1th subsernon (3) to a person 
who may make a request under subsection (1). 
Joint action 
24. lf more than l proper authonty 1s required by this Act to act on a 
public interest disclosure, the proper authorities may enter into such 
arrangements with each other as are necessary and reasonable-
(a) to avoid duplication of action; 
(b) to allow the resources of the authorities to be efficiently and 
economically used to take action; and 
(c) to achieve the most effective result. 
PART IY-UNLA WFUL REPRISALS 
Division I-Unlawful reprisals-genera/ 
Offence 
25. (1) A person shall not engage, or attempt or conspire to engage, 
in an unlawful reprisal. 
Penalty: $10,000 or imprisonment for I year, or both. 
(2) It is a defence to a prosecution under subsection ( l) if it is 
established that the accused person-
(a) had just and reasonable grounds for engaging in the conduct, or 
attempting or conspiring to engage in the conduct, that would, 
except for this subsection, amount to an unlawful reprisal; and 
(b) was engaging, or had engaged, in the conduct, or had conspired or 
attempted to engage in the conduct, before forming the belief that a 
person had made or may make a public interest disclosure. 
e 
Pub/r e /nreresr D,sclos ure No . 108, 1994 13 
Function to assist complainant 
26. Where a proper authority receives a public interest disclosure that 
relates to an unlawful reprisal it shall provide the person who made the 
public interest disclosure with information about the protecrion and remedies 
available under this Act in relation to an unlawful reprisal. 
Relocati·on powers 
27. Wher~ an officer of a government agency applies in writing to the 
government agency for relocation and the government agency considers-
(a) that there is a danger that a person will engage in an unlawful 
reprisal in relation to the officer if the officer continues to hold hi s 
or her current position; and 
(b) that the only practical means of removing or substantially 
removing the danger is relocation of the officer to another posirion 
in a government agency; 
the government agency shall, as far as practicable, make arrangements for 
relocation of the officer to another posirion in a government agency. 
Consent to relocation 
28. Section 27 does not authorise the relocation of an officer to another 
position in a government agency without the consent of the officer. 
Division 2-Civil claims 
Liability in damages 
29. (1) A person who engages in an unlawful reprisal is liable in 
damages to any person who suffers detriment as a result. 
(2) The damages may be recovered in an action as for a tort in any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
(3) Any remedy that may be granted by a court with respect to a tort, 
including exemplary damages, may be granted by a coun in proceedings 
under this section. 
Application for injunction or order 
30, An application to a court of competent jurisdiction for an injunction 
or order under section 31 may be made-
(a) by a person claiming that he or she is suffering or may suffer 
deoiment from an unlawful reprisal; or 
(b) by the Ombudsman on behalf of a person referred to in paragraph 
(a). 
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Injunction or order to take action 
31. (1) If, on receipt of an application under section 30, a coun is 
satisfied that a person has engaged or is proposing to engage, in-
(a) an unlawful reprisal; or 
(b) conduct that amounts to or would amount to-
(i) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a person to 
engage in an unlawful reprisal; 
(ii) inducing or attempting to induce, whether by threats, 
promises or otherwise, a person to engage in an unlawful 
reprisal; or 
(iii) being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly 
concerned in, or party to, an unlawful reprisal; 
the coun may-
(c) order the person to take specified action to remedy any detriment 
caused by the unlawful reprisal; or 
(d) grant an injunction in tenns the court considers appropriate. 
(2) The court may, pending the final detennination of an application 
under section 30, make an interim order in the tenns referred to in paragraph 
(1) (c) or grant an interim injunction. 
(3) The court may grant an injunction or an interim injunction under 
this section whether or not the person has previously engaged in conduct of 
that kind. 
(4) The court may make an order or an interim order under this section 
requiring a person to take specified action, whether or not the person has 
previously refused or failed to take that action. 
Undertakings as to damages and costs 
32. (1) If the Ombudsman applies under section 30 for an injunction 
or order, no undertaking as to damages or costs shall be required. 
(2) The Ombudsman may give an undenaking as to damages or costs 
on behalf of a person applying under section 30 and, in that event, no 
further undertaking shall be required. 
-
e 
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PART V-MISCELLANEOUS 
Confidentiality 
1 5 
33. (1) A public official shall not, without reasonable excuse, make 
a record of, or wilfully disclose to another person, confidential infonnation 
gained through the public official's involvement in the administration of this 
Act. 
Penalty: $5,000. 
(2) Subsection (!) does not apply to a public official who makes a 
record of, or discloses, confidential information-
(a) to another person for the purposes of this Act or the regulations; 
(b) to another person, if expressly authorised under another law of the 
Territory; or 
(c) for the purposes of a proceeding in a court or tribunal. 
(3) In this section-
"confidential infonnation" means-
(a) infonnation about the identity, occupation or whereabouts 
of a person who has made a public interest disclosure or 
against whom a public interest disclosure has been made; 
(b) infonnation contained in a public interest disclosure ; 
(c) infonnation concerning an individual's personal affairs; or 
(d) information that , if disclosed. may cause demment to a 
person . 
False or misleading information 
34. A person shall not knowingly or recklessly make a false or 
misleading statement, orally or in writing, to a proper authority with the 
intention that it be acted on as a public interest disclosure. 
Penalty: $10,000 or imprisonment for I year, or both . 
Limitation of liability 
35. (1) A person is not subject to an y l1abil1t y for making a public 
interest disclosure or providing any further 1nfonnat1on 1n relation to the 
disclosure to a proper authority investigating it, and no action, claim or 
demand may be taken or made of or against the person for ma.king the 
disclosure or providing the further information. 
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(2) Without limiting subsection (I), a person-
(a) does not commit an offence under a provision of an Act which 
imposes a duty to maintain confidentiality with respect to a matter; 
and 
(b) does not breach an obligation by way of oath or rule of law or 
practice requiring him or her to maintain confidentiality with 
respect to a matter; 
by reason only that the person has made a public interest disclosure with 
respect to that matter to a proper authority. 
(3) Without limiting subsection (!), in proceedings for defamation 
there is a defence of qualified privilege in respect of the making of a public 
interest disclosure, or the provision of further information in relation to a 
public interest disclosure, to a proper authority. 
Liability of person disclosing 
36. A person's liability for his or her own conduct is not affected by 
the person's disclosure of that conduct in a public interest disclosure. 
Corporations-pen a I ties 
37. Where a body corporate is convicted of an offence under this Act, 
the penalty that the court may impose is a fine not exceeding 5 times the 
maximum amount that, but for this section, the court could impose as a 
pecuniary penalty for the offence. 
Regulations 
38. The Executive may make regulations, not inconsistent with this 
Act, prescribing matters-
(a) required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed; or 
(b) necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving 
effect to this Act. 
Amendment of Ombudsman Act 1989 
39. Section 4 of the Ombudsman Acr 1989 is amended-
(8) by omitting from subsection (I) "For the purposes of this Act, 
there shall be an" and substituting "There shall be established the 
office of the' '; and 
(b) by adding at the end of subsection (2) "or the Public !n1eres1 
Disclosure Acr /994" . 
1:t·f. 
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Amendment of Public Sector Management Act 1994 
40. Part XII of the Public Secror Management Act 1994 is repealed . 
[Presentation speech made in Assembly on 23 February 1994 J 
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